


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West Europe Report

No. 1020



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24 September 1980

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1628

CONTENTS

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

| | |
|--|----|
| Armenian Terrorist Leader Hagopian Interviewed (Hagop Hagopian Interview; PANORAMA, 1 Sep 80)..... | 1 |
| Role of Christian Democrats in European Political Scheme Discussed (Serge de Warneaggar; LE SOIR, 3 Sep 80)..... | 7 |
| Brussels City Administration Applies for Swiss Loans (Lucien Nicaise; LE SOIR, 17-18 Aug 80)..... | 10 |

BELGIUM

| | |
|--|----|
| PVV's de Clercq Criticizes Parties for Role in Crisis (Willy de Clercq; LE SOIR, 3 Sep 80)..... | 12 |
| Martens' Policies Opposed by Unions, SP (LE SOIR, 3, 4 Sep 80)..... | 16 |
| Labor Unions To Strike Martens Intensifies Discussions Positions Radicalized | |
| Martens Faces SP, CVP Opposition (LE SOIR, 2 Sep 80)..... | 23 |
| Military Experts Sent to Zaire (LE SOIR, 2 Sep 80)..... | 26 |
| Comines Community Refuses Flemish School (LE SOIR, 15-16 Aug 80)..... | 28 |
| Major General Tytgat Interviewed on National Defense Problem (Tytgat Interview; VOX, 14 Aug 80)..... | 31 |
| Admiral Schlim Promoted to Naval Chief (LE SOIR, 7 Aug 80)..... | 35 |

| | |
|--|----------------|
| Belgian Military Weapons Exports Detailed (Jean Pourbaix; POURQUOI PAS?, 7 Aug 80)..... | 37 |
| CYPRUS | |
| Search for Peace in Cyprus Extolled (Editorial, Resad Kazim; HALKIN SESI, 9 Sep 80)..... | 42 |
| Increase in Available Aircraft Seats Planned (CYPRUS MAIL, 3 Sep 80)..... | 44 |
| Briefs Support for USSR | 46 |
| DENMARK | |
| Chances for Bourgeois Government Coming To Power Aired (Victor Andersen; BERLINGSKE AFTEN, 22 Aug 80)..... | 47 |
| Radical Liberals Introduce New Defense Plan Alternative (Rolf Bagger; BERLINGSKE AFTEN, 22 Aug 80)..... | 61 |
| Poll Shows Decline in Support for Economic Democracy (Ager Schultz; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 24 Aug 80)..... | 65 |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY | |
| Developments in Aerospace Industry Surveyed (WEHRTECHNIK, May 80)..... | 67 |
| FINLAND | |
| Pekka Vennamo Attempts Moderate Image at Rural Party Meet (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 3 Aug 80)..... | 77 |
| Briefs Hawk Countervailing Sales Defense Committee to Lapland Law Treaty With USSR | 79 79 80 |
| FRANCE | |
| Chirac, Gaullist Factor in 1981 Presidential Elections (LE MONDE, 23 Jul 80)..... | 81 |
| Chirac Weighs Possible Candidacy, by Andre Passeron Chirac Statement on Candidacy | |
| Ideological Precepts on Dissident Communist, Socialist Factions (Hugues Portelli; PROJET, Jul-Aug 80)..... | 87 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Military Civil Air Operations at Tours Airport Described (Philippe Souffrac, AIR ACTUALITES, May 80)..... | 94 |
| ITALY | |
| Policy Outlines for Mezzogiorno, Sicilian Development (Michelangelo Russo; GIORNALE DI SICILIA, 18 Jul 80)..... | 101 |
| NETHERLANDS | |
| Police Adopt New Policy To Deal With Squatters (Coen van Harten, Jan Heinemann; ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE, 23 Aug 80)..... | 106 |
| Dutch Willing To Accept Lower Incomes (F. A. Hoogendijk; ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE, 23 Aug 80)..... | 111 |
| NORWAY | |
| Benkow Wants Parties To Build Bourgeois Election Front (Egil Sundar; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 Aug 80)..... | 115 |
| Benkow's Initiative for Bourgeois Coalition Praised (Editorial; AFTENPOSTEN, 1 Sep 80)..... | 118 |
| Knut Axel Sverre, Foreign Ministry Human Rights Adviser, Interviewed (Knut Axel Sverre Interview; NORGES SJOPART-OG HANDELSSTIENING, 30 May 80)..... | 120 |
| Nysing-Dahl Urges Speed in Prestockage Approval (AFTENPOSTEN, 28 Aug 80)..... | 127 |
| SPAIN | |
| ERRATUM: Constitution of the Spanish State, 1978..... | 129 |
| SWEDEN | |
| Liberal Party at Congress Seeks 'Own Profile' (Various sources, 18, 23 Aug 80)..... | 130 |
| Congress During VAT Fight, by Axel Waldenarson | |
| Leadership Must Define Role, Editorial, by Svante Nycander | |
| Congress Speakers Voice Discontent, by Ake Ekdahl | |

ARMENIAN TERRORIST LEADER HAGOPIAN INTERVIEWED

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 1 Sep 80 pp 62-65

[Interview with Hagop Hagopian, spokesman, Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia, by Rita Forena: "Zeroing in on the Pope"]

[Text] For the first time, a leader of the Armenian terrorists organizations, responsible for anti-Turkish homicides and attacks in Italy, speaks out--and threatens reprisals against the Vatican and the Pope. PANORAMA was successful in getting an interview with one of the leaders, perhaps the chief, of the most mysterious and best-organized armed formation operating in the Middle East and Europe: the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. At least 130 attacks were claimed over the past 5 years by that organization which has the mission of fighting for the creation of a "fatherland" for the 5.5 million Armenians who have been living scattered throughout the world for more than half a century, following the massacre carried out by the Turks (1.5 million victims) during and after World War I. Many of the attacks by the Armenians took place in Italy, particularly and recently in Rome (two dead and 12 injured, on 17 April, while an attempt was made to assassinate the Turkish ambassador on 10 March); but the guerrilla fighters of these formations have also struck in other European capitals: Paris (25 October 1975, killing the Turkish Ambassador), Madrid (2 June 1978, murder of wife, son, and driver of Ankara representative), Vienna (22 October, killing a Turkish diplomat). In Turkey, finally, several hundred political murders have been credited to the Armenians. The individuals behind these operations have never been identified nor have they been captured. Nobody knows where the organization has its base, nor how it is organized, from whom it gets money and weapons, and how it organizes political assassination attempts and murders. It is however certain that the secret Armenian organizations are finding their greatest support and consensus in

the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, where the Armenians have a certain following, often as a left-wing alternative to the parties of the Lebanese Maronite right-wing parties. PANORAMA met Hagop Hagopian, spokesman and "brain" of the ELA [Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia], in Beirut. This is the first time that an organization official has agreed to answer questions from a journalist. So far, the ELA, in the course of two secret meetings with representatives of the press, had only presented its programs and had claimed credit for operations carried out. During this exclusive interview, Hagopian for the first time reveals the organization's background and programs--programs which once again touch Italy directly.

Question: It has been said that you are the chief of the ELA, not just its spokesman. Is that true?

Answer: No. The ELA has a collegial leadership of which I am a member; tasks are divided up and decisions are made collectively.

Question: And what is your job in the organization?

Answer: My assignments are also decided upon from time to time within the directorate.

Question: Where is your headquarters?

Answer: We have clandestine headquarters in various countries which we use for very short periods of time. The place where we are talking right now will be abandoned today.

Question: Where do you draw the boundaries of the Armenia which you say you want to liberate?

Answer: For us, there is only one Armenia: we above all want to liberate our land which has been occupied by the Turkish fascist regime and then we are going to have the reunification of Soviet Armenia into a socialist and democratic state.

Question: Does the USSR agree with your program?

Answer: Unfortunately, no. To fight Turkey, which is a part of the Western bloc, we need the support of the socialist countries but the Soviets consider efforts to liberate Armenia from the Turks as being directed against them and last year, to give you an example, they hanged three Soviet Armenian patriots.

Question: How are you planning to liberate Armenia? Through attacks only?

Answer: The armed struggle is only one aspect of our revolutionary strategy: in 5 years we managed to win for ourselves the support of the Armenian masses and the democratic and revolutionary forces throughout the world. Today the Armenian people is accusing the policy of silence and compromise by the traditional Armenian parties and considers the ELA a force which, in a few years, has forced the world to remember that there is still an Armenian problem. I am not just mentioning slogans to you: proof of what I am telling you is to be found in the fact that the Tashnag Party (one of the Armenian parties--the editor) is trying to imitate us in order to regain lost ground. The 18 April attack in Rome against the Turkish Ambassador to the Holy See as a matter of fact was organized by Tashnag which used the name of a revolutionary group, "Commando of the Avengers of Armenian Genocide." I would like to tell you something else: some of the leaders of Tashnag and Henshang (another Armenian party) have secretly joined ELA.

Question: Let us recapitulate. How many armed Armenian organizations are there?

Answer: There is only one organization: ELA. But we have three groups: the Organization for the Liberation of Armenia, the New Armenian Resistance and the Commando of the Avengers of Armenian Genocide.

Question: What are the relations between ELA and these three groups?

Answer: We have no operational relations but we support their activities. As for the rest, it is evident that they moved along a trail already blazed by us.

Question: How do you explain Armenian violence 60 years after the Turkish massacre?

Answer: There are substantially two factors to be taken into consideration: the general discovery as to the failure of the policy of the traditional Armenian parties--which was bound to lead to a change in the fight for the reconquest of our rights--and the fact that many Armenians since 1966 participated in the Palestinian Arab struggle from which they learned many things.

Question: Do you have any relations with the Palestinian Resistance?

Answer: We have relations with all revolutionary organizations all over the world.

Question: Why has the major portion of your operations been directed against Western countries, particularly Italy?

Answer: That is not correct: we struck above all at Turkish targets and in Turkey itself. Even so, nobody has claimed credit for many operations. Naturally, we consider to be our enemies also those countries which aid Turkey militarily and economically.

Question: Italy certainly does not head the list of countries helping Turkey and yet about 40 of your attacks have been made in Italy, some of them intentionally against Italians.

Question: Italy right now plays a first-ranking role in the plot to liquidate the Armenian question. There are at least 16 centers which, under the cover of humanitarian aid, in reality are organizing Armenian emigration to the United States.

Question: By whom are those centers organized?

Answer: By Ansha, which is a part of the World Council of Churches and which in Italy operates under the protection of the Vatican, in collaboration with the Armenian Church and with the Tashnag Party to which are connected two first-ranking personalities of that organization: William Saroyan (a man with the same name as the writer) and George Mardighian, who died recently.

Question: Why is ELA against Armenian emigration?

Answer: the emigrants with whom Ansha is concerned are only those who come from the Middle East or from the socialist countries. The purpose of this operation is obvious: removing the Armenians from countries close to historical Armenia in order to scatter them and assimilate them a little bit everywhere throughout the world. This is a policy which the Western countries have been pursuing since the time of the massacre to eliminate the question in Turkey. All of the Western countries are ready to receive the Armenian emigrants and to give them priority. Behind that plot we find the United States, its Western allies, Zionism, and Turkish fascism, as well as the Armenian Church and the Tashnag Party. For the Armenian reactionary parties, massive emigration from the Middle East also serves to check the social tensions within the poor classes of the diaspora which in Lebanon, for example, consists of about 250,000 persons.

Question: Does Ansha operate only in Italy?

Answer: No, its most important bases are in Beirut, Rome, and Athens but there are also centers in Milan, Brussels, and Switzerland. Within a few weeks, about 120 Armenian families will leave Lebanon, heading for the United States and making a stopover in Rome. We are determined to stop this traffic. On 23 December of last year, we exploded a bomb against an Ansha center in Rome, the Dina Boarding House, and in a leaflet, left on the spot, we warned the Italian authorities that we would continue to strike ever harder so long as these centers are not closed down. But both the attack and the message were kept secret. Your press did not mention this but in New York, for example, THE ARMENIAN REPORTER published a long account of the attack. Your country has been warned: those who in Italy want to cover the activities of Ansha with silence are the ones who are really responsible for the victims.

Question: According to you, is the presence of Ansha centered in Italy sufficient justification for the bombs in Republic Square at rush hour time?

Answer: Italy has been warned. We said many times that we will strike at the Turks also outside Turkey. It is up to the countries who act as hosts to Turkish institutions to take precautions. Why did nobody think of closing down the cafe adjacent to the office of the Turkish Airlines on Republic Square? Although we were not responsible for the death of the two Italians, we did send condolences to the families. We realize that it is difficult for public opinion to understand our reasons because the Armenian problem has been forgotten for the past 65 years; but the West must start to think about its guilt which extends from complicity in genocide all the way to the aid being given to Turkey today. We are determined to stop the activities of Ansha in every possible way. In Italy, Ansha is protected by the Vatican and the Italian authorities therefore are not directly responsible but somebody must intervene to stop the traffic of Armenian emigrants. Otherwise, the institutions and officials involved in the activities of the centers will be hit. That includes the Vatican. And that in turn includes the Pope.

Question: If the centers were to be closed down, would your operations stop?

Answer: We are ready to collaborate with those who show that they understand our reasons.

Question: Does that mean that you would refrain from carrying out any further anti-Turkish attacks in Italy?

Answer: Let us rather say that we would change our methods: instead of exploding bombs at 1800, we would explode them at midnight.

Question: Could it be that you are zeroing in on Italy also because it is an "easy" country--if for no other reason than because of the black market in arms?

Answer: All countries are easy for anybody who really wants to take action. However, ELA does not procure its weapons on the black market; that would be the most dangerous way to do it in terms of maintaining the secrecy and security of our operations. You must remember that none of the individuals carrying out our attacks have so far been arrested or identified.

Question: Does that mean that it is easy to get weapons into Italy?

Answer: We have had arms caches in many countries for quite some time.

Question: Do you have any relations with the Red Brigades or with other Italian terrorist groups?

Answer: No, we do not have any relations. But that does not mean that we do not approve their revolutionary actions.

Question: Are there any Italians who are collaborating with you?

Answer: We have revolutionaries in all countries, in Italy, in France, in Switzerland; we would therefore not be surprised if we had local support.

Question: Who finances you?

Answer: Our strength is the Armenian people; that is where we get our support from. And from robberies.

5058

C50: 3104

ROLE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCHEME DISCUSSED

Brussels LE SOIR in French 3 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by Serge de Waerssegger: "The Place of the Christian Democrats in Europe"]

[Text] The lights have gone out in Cologne. The Christian-Democrats of the European People's Party have returned home, after their third congress. With the exception of their European members of parliament and some "nationals," who, under the Sicilian sun, will study the strategy to be pursued in the Strasbourg Parliament, particularly regarding the matter of energy and regional policies. What will remain of the motions and the speeches delivered at the beginning of the week along the banks of the Rhine after the filing-away of proposals intended for the big brothers in the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] and the CSU [Christian Social Union] who are in the midst of the German election campaign? And, beyond that, where do we place the Christian-Democrats on the European political chessboard?

In Europe, as in Belgium, the big political families dominate, that is, the socialists, the Christian, and the liberal families. In Europe--just like the PSC [Social Christian Party] and the CVP [Social Christian Party] in Belgium--the European People's Party intends to assume a centrist role between the socialists, by virtue of their concept of solidarity and not of class struggle, and the liberals, by virtue of the Christian personalism which counterbalances the sometimes exacerbated individualism of that ideology. In theory, therefore, open on its left by virtue of a populist and strong doctrine, open on its right by virtue of its sensitivity regarding the personal development of the individual and its vocation to do things, this party could play the role of an arbiter between progressivism and conservatism in the European Parliament.

If indeed the weight of that party were decisive in the numerous debates of last year, the switch from this theoretical vision to reality appeared quite complex. First of all because the European Parliament, in addition to the liberals who are called "right-wing" and the socialists and communists, who are placed on the left, contains two huge formations which are situated "elsewhere"--that is, the conservatives, essentially British,

some of whose attitudes, by way of contrast, provide a progressive tone which is lacking in certain liberal positions; the Gaullists, the passionate defenders of national sovereignty but who, on the ideological chessboard, can bend their position to one side or the other, depending upon the issue up for examination. Besides, the communist representation, essentially limited to France and Italy, is often divided by the differing strategic views of the national parties.

Next, the makeup of the PPE (European People's Party) causes the party to incline toward the right. The European Union of Christian-Democratic workers--which in particular since 1978 has been trying to organize a left wing within that party--believes that only 18 out of the 107 PPE members of parliament could be won over to their tendency.

This would explain why the party turned out to be definitely more dynamic on institutional, energy, and economic topics rather than on social issues. This latter aspect however is not missing in the worries of the PPE but it is above all made up of the overall aspect of support for European regional policy which is aimed at reducing the inequalities between the regions of the EEC or the fight against hunger in the world. On the other hand, when it comes to relationships within the world of labor--such as, for example, information and participation in the enterprise--the area of agreement breaks up, except for some pieces of writing which are neither fish nor fowl. The watchword of liberty, which the PPE claims as its own, is aimed more at the individual behavior of the citizen than at democracy in the social-economic context.

We get a comparable reaction when we take up the topic of the rights of man: violations of individual rights or the rights of peoples, in the East, are vigorously condemned. The PPE proposes Atlantism but on a footing of equality with Washington. On the other hand, when these violations are committed by a right-wing regime, these reactions appear definitely more moderate and are often tied in with the attacks suffered in those countries by the Christian-democratic elements. This timidity appears motivated especially by the fear of playing into the hands of Marxist resistance organizations through the adoption of an excessively sharp position.

On the other hand, there are two topics which trigger the party's undeniable dynamism. The defense of the family, the preservation of youth and demography, on the one hand, and European unification, on the other hand. The first series of topics naturally springs from the Christian personalist tradition, such as it was recalled on Tuesday by Mr Jean Lecanuet.

The second is a part of the line pursued by a man such as Schuman, de Gasperi, or Adenauer. It is based on the concept that the values of development of the human individual and his or her sense of liberty and of responsibility, defended by the Western European countries, cannot be effectively carried on in the future except through the rally of these countries within a coherent and vigorous entity. It is significant that, among all of the European political formations, the formation of the

Christian-democrats is the only one that organized itself in the form of a structured party aimed at a European federalism. For this cause, the PPE has the advantage of having few (in France) or no (in Great Britain or Denmark) representatives of those countries where the fear of attacking national sovereignty through European unification is particularly strong.

5058

CBO: 3100

BRUSSELS CITY ADMINISTRATION APPLIED FOR SWISS LOANS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 17-18 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by Lucien Nicaise]

[Text] The Brussels communes, which have been in financial straits for years, and several provincial towns such as Namur and Verviers, are trying all possible ways to get around the stumbling blocks which the central state puts in the way to hinder their normal management. And to escape the monthly horrors of payments due, their representatives are beside themselves trying to worm through the smallest opening that leads toward rescue.

Some have found this opening by taking the plane for Geneva and negotiating treasury loans in Switzerland, at especially low [interest] rates, and often in affiliates of...Belgian banks. It is even said that the money "hidden away" by our compatriots to escape the tax-man could well be returning thus as a life-buoy for some municipalities...

The problems plaguing Brussels are not new. Accumulated deficits total some 6 billion [Belgian] francs and the decrease in Brussels' share of the communal fund is the main reason for it. There is also the fact--and the Brussels executive [authority] has decided to correct these inequalities--that the budget of some Brussels communes is encumbered by a [high] density of under-paid workers, and that others support numerous public buildings for which there is no tax compensation to reimburse the communal treasury.

In the course of recent years, when the communes had exhausted their credit lines with the communal loan society, they turned to private organizations... In fact, the communal loan society has never agreed to provide treasury loans. So the communes submitted to the often very high rates [of interest] demanded by the private banks.

This year the private banks quit supporting the Brussels communes--but had they not been advised to demand repayment guarantors that were difficult to accept? Moreover, the interest rates reached as high as 15 percent! It was at this point that the first Brussels commune found a rich vein. A research

bureau furnished it 200 million at 11 percent. This was already an improvement, but this research bureau had obtained the money much cheaper still abroad... We are speaking of the Saint-Gilles commune. It was then that the idea of Switzerland hit. An idea which moreover was promoted by several intermediaries and by the representatives of foreign banks in Belgium. In addition to which, at the present time, offers of capital are pouring in both on the bureau of the regional minister and on the burgo-masters' bureaux...

Incelles was the first commune to get around 700 million of fresh money at 6.25 percent. It came from the Geneva subsidiary of a Belgian bank. Forest followed closely and its municipal magistrate for finance came back with 432 million obtained at 6.125 percent in a Zurich bank. The burgo-master of Schaerbeek also made the pilgrimage to Switzerland and negotiations are in progress for some 700 million Belgian francs. As for the Saint-Josse, its communal council took the decision to borrow 40 million Swiss francs, but the authorities are hesitating to finalize the deal while the "big" regional loan is pending.

All these communal negotiations are in complete accordance with the law. The municipalities made their decisions, and the regional authorities, deeming it "morally" impossible to deprive the communes of this life-buoy, do not take issue with the decisions made... They are thus quite simply approved through expiration of the 40-day waiting period.

All this is done, of course, while awaiting this much-heralded regional loan which should expunge the deficits and permit the communes to start afresh, with however several severe restrictive measures, for it seems impossible that the two other regions of the country should some day agree to meet the portion coming to Brussels...

This regional loan is presently on a path, it can be fairly said, that is strewn with snarls. Every time it is on the point of being subscribed, new legal objections are born. We know that the government has decided that the Brussels region will benefit, starting in 1980, from a supplementary allotment of 700 million. It is this sum which should be charged against the loan that should be between 5 and 6 billion.

But the communal loan society and some technical experts have taken the position that it would require a law passed through the two chambers for there to be a guarantee that this allotment would be annual. The regional executive has therefore drawn up this bill. The council of ministers has referred it "sine die" while at the same time entreating the minister of finances to guarantee the regional loan.

For some official organizations this would not be sufficient. But, with this guarantee from the minister of finance, the regional minister could well take up his malette (translation unknown) and the Geneva plane and get results as good as a simple communal magistrate of finance could obtain...

The billions would be obtained quickly, and the Brussels communes, which still labor under high interest rates, both with the communal loan society and elsewhere, would see their burden of debt service diminished accordingly. It is believed that every day that passes costs the Brussels communes a total of 1 million francs in unnecessary costs....

PVV'S DE CLERCQ CRITICIZES PARTIES FOR ROLE IN CRISIS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 3 Sep 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by Willy de Clercq, deputy, Party of Liberty and Progress chairman: "Challenges To Be Responded To"]

[Text] The truce was of short duration. Barely put to rest around 15 August, politics again fully burst upon the scene early in September. The political situation is rarely analyzed with optimism so long as the international and world crisis continues to sprout further ramifications and consequently contributes to increasing reasons for worry among the most lucid individuals.

In Belgium, we have had an increase in various kinds of statements. There are those, for instance, made by the chairman of a party whose ministers, in the administration, not only accepted but often proposed measures which he criticizes today.

Then there are those by organizations accustomed, by virtue of their essence and their vocation, to promising their members advantages which the crisis unfortunately renders impossible to attain. I would like to observe that, on this occasion, they are providing further illustration of their political concepts and the confusion of authority resulting from that: "It will be difficult for them," they announced, "to go along with the coordination effort proposed by the administration--which by the way they have been calling for loudly--if certain measures are not withdrawn" because there certainly cannot be any doubt in the minds of some people that the administration could act with the determination that public opinion expects of it so long as its projects and objectives have not received their backing and their agreement.

There are also declarations by a former minister, a vice chairman of the socialist federation, who again expresses his desire of seeing the PS [Socialist Party] leading the administration and who thus only adds to the kind of confusion that keeps everybody worried.

It is thus evident that some people are sharpening their weapons for the return from vacations. Sometimes they threaten or condemn; sometimes

they distort; but always they calculate or jockey for position. Unless of course, unprepared, little inclined, or unable to assume the heavy burden of responsibility within this crisis, they prefer to rush in headlong forward flight, leaving the country awash in difficulties and saddling others with the difficult job of reviving the economy, restoring public finances, controlling unemployment, and reorganizing the government.

For us liberals, Belgium has three challenges to face.

Create and Organize New Belgium

The first of these two tasks has already been partly accomplished. Under any other circumstances, such a reform, expected for so many years and finally instituted, would have been hailed as it should since it is the solution to problems that had dangerously poisoned our daily life. Is it the intensity of the other crisis, the economic crisis, which has pushed the importance of the institutional reform into the background? Or did the so frequently postponed hope for this solution in the end tire a public opinion which only later on will realize the broad range of results obtained?

These are hefty questions. The communities are organized and officially grant everyone the right to a serene difference of culture and behavior. The regions have been created and, under their impetus, better suited politicians can better come to grips with the specific economic or social difficulties. The Belgian state is kept together and combines the positive aspects of our common life.

But much remains to be done to modernize a state whose very survival springs from better community or regional adaptation. That will be the task of the administration for the next several months, with the twin objective of making the new structures more effective and making sure that the institutions, amid confidence regained, will play the economic, social, and institutional role which falls to them.

Facing the Situation Together

A country cannot emerge from a crisis if it scatters its efforts in social struggles. The absence of consensus of an overall determination is an obstacle to the solution of a crisis which requires each and everyone to apply himself and which calls for the collaboration of all. The administration must play its role and parliament must play its role. Public opinion must know how to distinguish between its long-term interest in this ambiguous and sometimes perpetuated confusion and mess, on the one hand, and specific short-term, immediate demands which are suggested or proposed to it.

Too often, passions are today focused upon short-term objectives which cannot be fitted into the undertaking of general rescue and salvage which

should permit our kind of society to survive. Knowing how to live with the crisis unfortunately is a necessity for the next several years. This concept rules out any egotism. It presupposes a general solidarity and a priority for realism and for the lessons learned from experience. It would be regrettable if the crisis were used to serve as a pretext for the establishment of a type of society which has failed everywhere and which sooner or later--as recent experience has just shown once again--winds up leading to ripping liberalization even in the countries of the East.

Clear-sightedness and good common sense--regardless of the importance of the crisis--must preserve us from dramatic experiences which unfortunately took place elsewhere, in situations where the individual can unfold only through dangerous attempts at escaping from a state which controls everything, which is the master of everything, which dominates everything. The principal and fundamental stakes in the crisis and in the solutions which we will find for it are represented by the need for preserving the existence of a regime where, on the strength of common vigilance, liberties have destroyed servitude the hideous remnants of a time which nobody wants to relieve and the characteristically debasing restraints of political systems each of which is fundamentally hostile.

The state today is ever-present. It distributes advantages, jobs, regardless of whether they are productive or not, leisure, regardless of whether it is necessary or not, and compensations. In the end, some day it will relieve us of the need for displaying any initiative and intelligence. It will relieve us of the need for existing by ourselves, of being. Everybody complains of the way things are. Everybody finds the situation heavy, paralyzing, sclerosing. But at the same time everybody in quite a few circumstances is persuaded to turn toward this nourishing father. Recourse to the state is no longer the exception in our days. It is an almost normal reflex on the part of a group which expects efforts from the state which it can barely accomplish without being diverted from its mission and that mission is not to replace itself but rather to "regulate" amid justice and equity.

If we want a less dominating state, we must stop constantly asking it for something because the government system is sustained by the requests that are addressed to it in order progressively to extend the tentacles of its dominant and unsuited power.

The liberals say nothing else when they demand that free enterprise be relieved of its shackles, that government finance be restored in order to give free enterprise the means of action which justify and motivate its existence, that individuals be relieved of the burden of excessively heavy taxation in order to give them more autonomy and to multiply their possibilities of choice.

Earlier in these columns I explained the reasons for the presence of the liberals in the government. I will now mention some new ones: the liberals want to help clarify the political choices. Does it really make sense to

propose a policy which, in one and the same party, combines the progressive excesses of one group and the conservative bottlenecks of the other group, the most hard-line collectivist visions and the most reasonable social-democratic objectives? It is it reasonable to expect the mixture of opposites to produce an appropriate remedy for the disease? On the contrary, it makes the disease only worse by delaying the real therapy.

Either the defenders of socialization clearly indicate to the country the choices which they propose, point out the results obtained elsewhere on the basis of remedies which they propose here, show the kind of future they are preparing for and stop to hide it behind slogans, dreams, or artificially maintained hopes. Or all of the collaboration groups should rally around the undertaking of liberty, moderation, and responsibility which built our old prosperity and which will assure our future, if we are capable of coming up with some adjustments, corrections, and reforms demanding modulations and changes in our economic and social situations.

That is where the real choices are. On them depends the type of society which we want for tomorrow.

5058
CSO:3100

MARTENS' POLICIES OPPOSED BY UNIONS, SP

Labor Unions To Strike

Brussels LE BOIR in French 3 Sep 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by J.v.S.: "Two Percent—Mr Martens Squeezed between Strike Threats, Budget Gap, and Socialist Party Anger"]

[Text] The future became even darker for Mr Martens and his administration. The labor union organizations have climbed another rung in the escalation against certain aspects of the minister's policy. All things being equal, civil service employees will go on strike on Friday, 19 September, and the national officers of the interoccupational organizations will stand aloof from the resumption of social policy coordination which is scheduled for Wednesday, 10 September.

So, the 2-percent war seem difficult to avoid. For budget reasons, the administration does not seem to be able to go back on its decision to take a 2-percent annual contribution out of civil service pay in order to put that money into the retirement funds. It does not intend to drop the 6 billions which this challenged measure was supposed to earmarked for the treasury. The labor unions in turn think that one should orient oneself toward other financing sources.

The vise thus seems to be tightening around the premier. The latter will have to call on all of his talents as a tactician and conciliator in order to defuse the bombs which threaten the very existence of his team. On the political front, as a matter of fact, the risks of a confrontation remain very great within the majority.

There are two meetings which ought to supply new elements for Mr Martens' situation estimate: the PRL [Party of Liberty and Walloon Reforms] executive board has been summoned for this Tuesday morning, while the PS [Socialist Party] moved the resumption of work of its office up to Wednesday.

If the French-speaking socialists shed their reservations and adopt positions which are more or less close to those advocated by Mr Van Miert and if the liberals persist in their determination not to amend the decisions

decreed on the government level last 9 August, then the entire majority is in danger of blowing up. The last resort will then consist of the talks which Mr Martens is to hold this week with the leaders of the parties constituting his majority. As we reported in our earlier editions, this is increasingly becoming a question of convening a ministerial committee on general policy for the end of this week.

Early Monday afternoon, a very relaxed Karel Van Miert announced that the SP office had unanimously accepted his situation analysis; and the leader of the Flemish socialists once again spelled out his viewpoint:

"We never had the intention of shirking our responsibilities or failing to be loyal to a coalition of which we are members. For the past 3 years we have amply demonstrated that we are among the most loyal partners in government. Contrary to others, we never tried to bring an administration down. But we demand the same kind of loyalty from the others."

Mr Van Miert then returned to his line of argument. Those famous 2-percent are in contradiction to the government agreement which explicitly calls for the maintenance of linkage between salaries and the index. The measure envisaged is all the more unacceptable since small and medium incomes are already heavily burdened by the increase in indirect taxes. On the other hand, we had to fight 3 years in order to secure the implementation of the ceiling on "fat" pensions. Besides, a decision as important as the one regarding the 2 percent should have been preceded by real coordination. In any case, there can be no question of "squeezing the little lemons to the very last drop, for the benefit of the big ones, as some people are trying to do."

Mr Van Miert thinks that he can detect other shortcomings in the government declaration. He thus reproaches liberal National Defense Minister Charles Poewick of wanting to take the place of the minister of foreign affairs by promising--without any reference to his colleagues in the administration--an increase in military aid to Zaire.

Likewise, it is unacceptable that the liberal wing of the majority should propose to extend military service by 2 months, contrary to the terms of the government agreement. (Mr Van Miert is making a reference here to the suggestion brought up among the entourage of Mr Poewick, aimed at extending the duration of military service by one month in 1981 and a second supplementary month in 1982.)

Finally, there can be no question of forcing a decision regarding the deployment, in Belgium, of 48 cruise missiles before the end of the year, by which time the results of the German and American elections and the results of the Madrid conference on cooperation and security in Europe will be known.

Mr Martens Issues Appeal for Calm

Questioned by our fellow newsmen from RTBF [Belgian Radio-Television], Premier Wilfried Martens issued an appeal for calm, courage, and lucidity on the part of Belgian politicians,

He declared that he had written to civil service union officials in order to explain the significance of the 2 percent to them. According to him, the criticisms expressed against the budget contradict each other and that clearly illustrates the difficulties which the country is experiencing. The starting positions of each side are far apart and it is extremely difficult to find a good solution. Mr Martens once again repeated that the budget objectives must be attained.

In answer to a question dealing with the Flemish of Comines [Mining Company], the premier responded that it was too early to make any statements. The law as a matter of fact provides that the students may register throughout the entire month of September. "The government made the only possible decision," he added, "because the political establishment had to prove its desire to implement the law in both directions, on both sides of the language border."

In the area of the Community, again, Mr Martens recalled that negotiations on the Brussels case should start in October. And all parties must be invited to participate in this dialogue.

The premier is thus in good spirits since he is not hesitating to prepare projects for the months to come.

Martens Intensifies Discussions

Brussels LE SOIR in French 4 Sep 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by C.-L. B.: "Two Percent--Martens Increases Conferences and Awaits Socialist Party Opinion"]

[Text] One should at this time and for the next couple of days to come very carefully watch the moves made by Premier Martens who wants to keep up the dialogue with the labor unions in spite of the refusal of the latter to participate in the resumption of social policy negotiations. We know as a matter of fact that the principal labor union organizations do not intend to take part in these negotiations without the prior cancellation, by the government, of its decision to reduce civil service pay by 2 percent, a cancellation which was by the way also demanded by Mr Van Miert, chairman of the SP, one of the majority parties.

One of the intentions which one can validly credit the premier with, in the light of the conversations he is conducting, would be to put the following into the same discussion "basket": the restoration of the social security system (a matter in which the private sector, both employees and

employers, will be called upon to do most of the work) and the principle of the 2 percent withholding (this contribution for budget recovery which has been demanded of the government sector as a sign of "solidarity").

On the other hand, on the political level, there is the "Van Miert case." At the PS office meeting, which began at 1430 on Wednesday, Mr Andre Cools, the French-speaking socialist chairman, was unable to report anything on that situation.

In this connection it seems that the majority is trying to break up the problems posed by the leader of the Flemish socialists. On the one hand, his attitude on the social policy situation and above all on the 2 percent --a position which is quite understandable for a party chairman even though it may be rather belated or opportunist. On the other hand, there is something which some people, headed by the liberals, consider the "caprices and wild imagination of Mr Van Miert in the field of international policy"--such as the military budget, cooperation with Zaire, and missiles.

Mr Martens thus received Mr Jean Gol, PLR chairman, Tuesday evening in order to discuss these different aspects of the political situation.

On Wednesday, he was to meet with Mr Vanden Boeynants, PSC [Social Christian Party] chairman; Mr Tindemans, CVP [Social Christian Party] chairman and Mr Andre Cools, provided the work of the office of the French-speaking socialists would give the latter enough time.

Mr Gol went to the office of the premier, several hours before his departure for Berlin, accompanied by Mr Hatry, where they are to attend the meeting of the Liberal International. The PLR chairman is to return on Friday in order to participate in a new round of meetings with the chairmen of his majority which Mr Martens is planning to hold this week before convening a general policy committee on Saturday.

Mr. Gol, who was accompanied on his way to 16 rue de la Loi by National Defense Minister Charles Poewick, according to the echoes we have been able to pick up, explained to his conversation partner that a prime minister could not possibly contemplate renouncing the first important measure (the 2 percent) of his recovery program, even though there may be a heavy storm of protest--because otherwise he would run the risk of losing his credibility. Both agreed on underscoring the policy correction upheld by Mr Cools within the coalition.

Thus, those people who saw Mr Martens upon his return from West Germany --where the military problem took on a new dimensions for him, as indicated elsewhere by our special correspondents--think that the head of government, in his own view, still had some cards to play in the delicate game with the labor unions.

Positions Radicalized

Brussels LE SOIR in French 4 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by J. V. S.: "Positions Radicalized While Waiting for Socialist Party"]

[Text] For majority circles, Tuesday only brought confirmation. This means that the leeway held by Wilfried Martens and his administration is narrower than ever before.

Indeed, as we can read below, the major interoccupational labor union organizations gave their unconditional support to the civil service unions. As expected, they decided not to participate in the resumption of social policy coordination talks so long as the administration has not dropped its intention to skim a "pension contribution" off the salary of all civil servants.

Under these conditions, the resolute support given on Tuesday by the PRL for the decisions made early in August by the administration in the matter of the budget does not necessarily facilitate the task of Premier Wilfried Martens.

On that subject we will also read below the statements given us by Chairman Jean Gol. We know that, as far as the leader of the French-speaking liberals is concerned, the administration cannot be a "weathervane." Decisions were made with the agreement of the ministers representing each of the six parties in the coalition. There can therefore be no question of going back on them because otherwise the administration's credibility would be shaken.

Finance Minister Paul Hatry talked along similar lines in his government communication which was broadcast on radio and which was also televised on Tuesday evening. "The government," he declared, "asks everyone to make an effort to participate in the common undertaking of restoring our economy and saving the country. This is not partisan politics, this is not a policy of provocation or attack against acquired rights, as some people pictured it. The administration was unanimous in making its decisions; all ministers assumed their responsibilities above all with a concern for the interests of everyone and the entire country."

Let us add to this brief review the fact that Chairman Leo Tindemans, in the name of the CVP, emphasized the big sacrifices which everyone will have to accept. As for Paul Vanden Boeynants, the other Social-Christian chairman, he confided to our newspaper the other day that the government could not very well go back on its decisions, no matter how worthy of criticism they might be.

There is one unknown however which still exists. And it is a big one. Everybody has been able to observe the silence maintained so far among PS

leadership circles. Of course, there were the two free statements by Mr Glinne in JOURNAL ET INDEPENDANCE but--for the moment at least--Ernest, the rebel, is a spokesman of only a minority within the SP. As for chairman Andre Coels, he is currently maneuvering with the caution worthy of a Sioux Indian. In spite of the attacks to which he has been subjected from labor union officials, he is waiting for the opinions from the members of his office before plunging into the fray. That is something that will materialize Wednesday afternoon. The French-speaking socialists are facing a big dilemma: isolate their Flemish comrade within the majority or isolate themselves within the entire socialist movement.

If no alternate proposals are submitted to Mr Martens, these suggestions should overcome the rather stiff resistance of the liberal positions,

Walloon Rally and Comines--Not Sharing the Same Views

The parliamentary delegation of the Walloon Rally met Tuesday and took up the issue of the Flemish school at Comines. "We do not want to adopt a position which might look shabby," party chairman Henry Mordant stated in this connection. "The problem is not whether this school exists or does not exist. People forget that scores of thousands of French-speaking individuals, held hostage to the north of the language boundary, have no facilities in the communities where they nevertheless do constitute a very large proportion, sometimes even a majority of the inhabitants. Those people over there are deprived of the right to open a French school. This is a flagrant injustice which confirms how equal and reciprocal criteria are no longer implemented on either side."

The RW [Walloon Rally] considers this measure another illustration of the aggressiveness of the official mentality of a Belgium which has become irreversibly Flemish. "As for the decision itself, the RW in particular underscores the fact that ministers had to meet in a disaster situation in order to satisfy the pro-Flemish demands upon Comines. And that happened 2 weeks after a government reform had been voted upon and passed under ridiculous conditions, a reform which confirms the hegemony of Flanders and its views which overwhelm Brussels, while giving Wallonia only a sham autonomy."

The RW furthermore castigated the administration's decision to take 2 percent off civil service salaries. In this respect it supports the labor unions. "The fact that certain parties or the administration itself are trying to make an about-face," it added, "is only one more demonstration of the improvisation and mess among those who preside over the destinies of a country that has become ungovernable."

PRL--Carry the Decisions Out

Both during his press conference at the end of his party's executive committee meeting and during the interview he gave LE SOIR, Mr Col maintained the firm tone of his earlier statements.

Regarding those famous 2 percent, things would have been simpler if the administration had clearly announced what it was after by presenting this disputed measure as a solidarity contribution made by those who benefit from stable employment at a moment when a large portion of the budget deficit is due to rising unemployment.

Responding to criticisms voiced by his colleague Van Miert regarding expenditures approved for military purposes, Chairman Jean Gol retorted: "It is disquieting to note the bitter opposition of the Flemish socialists against our defense and security expenditures. This obsession is becoming downright suspect. Everything is happening as if the SP's sole purpose is to reduce to naught all of our efforts to defend our domestic and foreign security."

Concerning our military cooperation with Zaire, Mr Gol thinks that it is "shabby" to "make a big thing" about the assignment of an additional five military personnel. "The European countries must do everything to prevent some day being replaced by the Soviet Union or by East Germany."

Communist Party Resumes Offensive

For its meeting after the return from summer vacations, the Communist Party's Political Bureau published an aggressive communique concerning the budget measures decreed by the administration early in August. It condemned the "concerted attacks by big business and government against jobs, the living standard, and social gains."

According to the PC [Communist Party], the policy of the Martens III cabinet is only designed to permit financing--in spite of the crisis--"of a new increase in tax relief and public assistance granted, without counterpart, to big business, excessive investments, in other words, which are as costly and as challengeable as those of Zeebrugge, as well as a further increase in military spending."

Finally, the communists called for the withdrawal of the "regressive arbitrary options," such as the 2 percent on civil service pay, the new taxes on natural gas and heavy heating oil, and the additional taxes imposed upon retirees and sick people.

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CSO: 3100

MARTENS PACES SP, CVP OPPOSITION

Brussels LE 8018 in French 2 Sep 80 pp 1, 2

(Article: "Politicians 'Return From Vacations Noisier Than Kids'")

[Text] Hundreds of thousands of children today return to their schools and that is something that never goes unnoticed. But politicians, make at least as much noise through their shattering statements.

Mr Karel Van Miert, chairman of the Flemish socialists, took the lead: starting on Friday, he affirmed his opposition to the 2-percent withholding from civil service pay; he demanded a ceiling on the national defense budget, the review of all decisions on missiles, and thought that the trip of the liberal ministers to Zaïre was a rather doubtful thing.

Over the weekend, these statements gave rise to a meeting devoted to explanations between the premier and the leaders of the Flemish socialists. We will undoubtedly get an echo of what was said on that occasion at the end of the meeting of the SP [Socialist Party] office which is to be held this Monday.

But the CVP [Social Christian Party] also sounded off. Barely returned from his vacation and several hours before leaving for Germany, where he will attend the Congress of the European People's Party, its chairman, Mr Leo Tindemans, made some statements to our fellow newsmen from DE STANDAARD which will also make a little bit of noise.

The CVP chairman is particularly pessimistic regarding the economic and budget situation. "Times are literally charged with anxiety," he said. He recalled the large size of the current expenditure deficit which comes to at least 100 billions, as well as the deficit in the country's balance of payments (200 billions).

Emphasizing that we are experiencing export difficulties in our conventional sectors, in spite of the support we are getting from some of our traditional industries and noting that the domestic money market is no longer enough to meet our financial needs, Mr Tindemans came out with the

following formula: "The moment of truth is not far away for Belgium. "But," he said, "the CVP will undoubtedly come out with a new 'master plan' before the end of year in which it will propose some ideas to fight the crisis."

Envisaging a Lowering of the Living Standard

These proposals by Mr Tindemans immediately produced an echo from Mr Marc Eyskens, cooperation development minister, but also an economics professor at KUL (Louvain Catholic University). Mr Eyskens spoke out quite bluntly and the opening of the Louvain fair:

"Belgians must get ready for a lower living standard during the years to come." The CVP minister admitted that Belgium so far had resisted the crisis "at least at first sight."

"As a matter of fact," he said, "we have arrived at a point where we are compensating for the process of impoverishment and where we camouflage it. But social security and households are heavily in debt; the disquieting budget and balance of payments deficits are the most striking and the most dramatic proof of this."

"A decline in the living standard also appears inevitable in Sweden, Denmark, and Holland although in those countries they are at least talking about it openly," he added. Mr Eyskens recommended that this decline be handled in a controlled fashion so as to make allowances for social and redistributive justice. "We must," he said, "benefit from the decline in consumer demand in order to promote investments for industrial renewal and the improvement of our export capacities because industrial conversion--on which our future prosperity depends--is entirely too slow." (We would like to refer our readers at this point to the thoughts expressed under our column entitled "Facts and Rumors," on the second page [of the original].)

What about Brussels? What about Camines?

The country's economic difficulties, serious though they may be, are always paralleled by its language problems.

In this connection we might also emphasize among the statements made by Mr Tindemans to STANDAARD those concerning the problems of Brussels and Camines [Mining Company].

Concerning future negotiations on the status of the metropolitan area, the former prime minister asserted that "one can visualize various formulas for launching a serious dialogue on Brussels. But the worst of them would be the formula of the 'stealthy arrangement'."

In a first phase, Mr Tindemans would like a formula such as the one of the group of twenty-eight. "If this is not possible," he says, "the dialogue should then be continued among the majority parties."

Concerning the Comines affair, the CVP chairman feels that the decision that was made does not "a dangerous precedent." Mr Tindemans as a matter of fact noted that language legislation is sufficiently clear so that one need not inopportunately intervene in the School Agreement, in his opinion. "According to language legislation, the community is obligated to create a school provided a sufficient number of signatures was collected," the CVP chairman said.

The controversy on Comines entails the risk of going beyond the fact that, as of now, only a few Flemish children--six, it was said on Monday morning--turned up at the new section of the public secondary school.

Mr Martens--Means to Attain Objective Can Be Discussed

Questioned by RTBF (Belgian Radio-Television), Premier Wilfried Martens responded with as much good will as caution to all of the questions dealing with current politics.

After having stressed that he "considers social policy coordination as necessary, especially during a period of crisis," Mr Martens spelled out the manner in which he visualized this coordination. In view of the situation, he said in substance, the administration has set itself a budget objective. This financial objective cannot be up for discussion although the methods can be discussed by which the objective can be obtained. "We are not proposing a take-it-or-leave-it formula."

The public service employee union leaders met at the very moment when Mr Martens was making this statement on radio. They had already basically decided on a general 24-hour strike in the public services for Saturday, 19 September.

It is obvious that the choice of a Saturday is designed considerably to increase the number of participating strikers.

Concerning the positions adopted recently by Mr Van Miert, the premier simply declared that he would now hold talks with the chairmen of the other parties in the coalition--after having listened to the SP leaders.

The premier also expressed his desire to settle the problems of the status of Brussels before the 1982 Community elections. He feels that all parties should be invited to resume the dialogue which should be launched starting early in October. The procedure should be subjected to a coordinated effort, Mr Martens noted.

5058

CSO: 3100

MILITARY EXPERTS SENT TO ZAIRE

Brussels LE SOIR in French 2 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by G.-L. B.: "Only Five More Belgian Military Experts Going to Zaire"]

[Text] Five more Belgian military advisors are to go to Zaire, in addition to the about 100 who are already there throughout this vast territory; this is what was to result from a trip which Belgian National Defense Minister Charles Poswick has just made to the country of General Mobutu.

This information was supplied to us by the minister's aides; on Saturday, the socialist daily DE MORGEN had attacked the minister. He was accused of having stepped up aid to the Zairian Army. The argument was based on a report by a local sheet regarding addresses exchanged among Belgian and Zairian personalities at Lubumbashi. Statements were also obtained from Mr Herman Decroo, another liberal minister visiting Kinshasa, affirming the strong sympathy on both sides in tackling the problems of that African nation.

Let us now look at the explanations we got.

Promise by Mr Simonet

Mr Poswick spent last weekend at home with his family, in the Belgian section of Limbourg, after which he moved to the Dutch section of Limbourg, planning afterward to go to Great Britain to attend the M-borough air show, which he was to inspect throughout Monday. This information came to us from an intermediary.

He had gone to Zaire accompanied by three of his aides, including General Lefebvre, office chief, and Georges Manigart, deputy office chief. They accompanied their minister during each of his trips. He had been invited by his counterpart, the defense minister of Zaire. He inspected the units which Belgium committed itself to train and advise after the Shaba crisis, in other words (since the French are training paratroopers at Kinshasa):

the 21st Brigade of the Kamanyola Division, at Kolwezi, and the commandos at Kotakali.

Sources at the National Defense Ministry emphasized the fact that Minister Poswick only confirmed to the government of General Mobutu a commitment undertaken officially by Belgium at the time Mr Simonet was minister of foreign affairs. This somehow, it was said, is only an "administrative confirmation."

From 100 to 115

One must however look upon this information in the light of a talk which took place in Kinshasa between Minister Poswick, as well as his aides, on the one hand, and representatives of military cooperation personnel, on the other hand. The latter reviewed the situation, described their role, expressed their desires, and then submitted their recommendations. Those include the following: a unit may have been put back in order (and officers and NCOs may have been properly instructed and trained) but that does not mean that one can now leave it to itself right away. That means that the Belgian experts are against forcing them to abandon the Zairian military personnel to whom they had devoted so much care. It also means that, in this context, an additional five advisors might very soon be assigned to Zaire. That would increase the number of personnel on the spot from 110 to 115. "For simple technical reasons."

Mr Poswick--we were finally told--said nothing more than that during an exchange of toasts in the course of a dinner at Lumumbashi. He was even briefer during a dinner given in his honor at Kinshasa by Belgian Ambassador Jean-Paul Van Bellinghen. It is Mr Decroo who was the most loquacious during this impromptu trip.

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C80:3100

COMINES COMMUNITY REFUSES FLEMISH SCHOOL

Brussels LE SOIR in French 13-16 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by G. Dt.]

[Text] The Comines communal council finally met Wednesday evening to pronounce on the possible creation of a Flemish school in Comines. As was to be expected, the communal council rejected this request unanimously. According to the council, the legal conditions had not been met. Troubles ahead for the government.

Comines, a small strip of land detached from eastern Flanders in 1963 to become a part of Wallonia. A French-speaking territory from the beginning, even if many of its inhabitants are bilingual. They know the "West-Flemish" patois and French.

Comines, a French-speaking oasis separated from Wallonia and sunk in Flanders. It's enough to consult a map to realize that to reach it one must pass either through Flanders or France.

Comines is also a commune with facilities for the Flemish. The latter, for the first time in 17 years, have asked for the use of these facilities and the creation of a Flemish school.

Wednesday evening the commune was to render its verdict. At 2000, the council hall was packed with people: French-speaking Comines residents and many members of the Dutch-speaking press. A very large security force had been provided. According to DE STANDAARD it kept out Flemish Comines residents from the council hall.

Twenty-one of 25 councillors were present, several of them had even returned from the south of France especially to participate in the vote. The session will last only 25 minutes and the conclusion is not a surprise: The council rejected the demand for creation of an infant school and a primary school, unanimously. Applause and shouts of "Comines is French-speaking!" greeted the decision. At the exit children sported calicots [translation unknown] [saying]: "No Flemish school."

In order to understand the decision of the communal councillors one must agree to enter into the Byzantine intricacies of the Comines school affair. According to the council, some of the requests of Flemish parents were not legal [or legally valid]. One recalls that 16 requests fulfilling very precisely established legal conditions are necessary, by the royal decree of 20 November 1979, in order to create an infant or primary school.

On 1 December 1979, the last date for returning application forms, there were 19 requests for the creation of a primary school and 16 requests for the infant school. But certain irregularities were allegedly committed: One of the signatories apparently had subsequently moved to Roulers, another signed for the children of his mistress, four forms were scratched out at the place where parents had to promise to send their children to the school.

On the other hand, there have been withdrawals since then. "When the parents realized that this new school would only be a very small school with only one professor for the six classes," they say in the commune. "Because of pressure from the burgo-master," is the answer on the Flemish side.

Thus only twelve requests for primary school would be certified. All the requests for creation of an infant school were rejected, for they were supposedly made on forms different from those established by the royal decree.

At the conclusion of the council (meeting), the burgo-master, Mr Piters, said that the commune had strictly followed the law and that, in his opinion, the decision of the council was final. "It is evident, however," he added, "that anything can happen and that our unanimous refusal of this request could be ridiculed by the people in high places who govern us. It is obvious that this situation would be intolerable for us, and that it would entail serious consequences. Let it be made clear," he concluded, "that the communal councillors will never let themselves be ruled by extremists."

However, in accordance with the procedure established on 30 July between Mr Mathot, the communal councillors, and the representatives of the Flemish quarters of Comines, the files will be turned over to the governor of Hainaut, then to Mr Mathot. The latter will present to the Council of State the cases of parents who had filled out the enrollment forms correctly and who had sent them before the deadline, but who since then went back on their decision. Are their requests still valid? A special jury, which will probably be composed of functionaries and magistrates known for their moderation, will examine the disputed requests.

The procedure could be long, but Minister Mathot has promised that a decision (yes or no) would be taken before 1 September.

Risk of Escalation

But tension threatens to mount in the weeks to come. The "Taal Aktie Komitee" (TAK) and the "hard core of the Pourons" have posted signs in several

parts of Flanders and all along the linguistic border demanding Flemish schools for Flemish children. And new moves are announced by these organizations in the following days, both in Brussels and on the linguistic border. Further, the Flemish press, which has for several weeks been pursuing an intense publicity campaign supporting the Comines school, will continue its "forcing" in the days to come, relied in turn by the Flemish politicians. The final decision, whatever it may be, will set teeth on edge and shake the government.

The problem of Comines, like many of our community problems, is so charged with emotion that it is very hard to get at the truth. It is obvious, however, that for many of the French-speakers of Comines, it is a "Flemish plot." For years they have had to endure the weekly parades of TAK. A year ago, they saw a whole wave of Flemish extremist movements "breaking" on their town. There was even fighting in the streets of Comines on that occasion.

The Flemish quarters of Comines circulate a quite *boite* [translation unknown] newspaper, and they have even bought a small chateau to transform it into a cultural center, with the help of gifts from a *gantoise* [translation unknown] insurance company, "De Noordstar en Boerhaave," headed by Mr Raes Roeland, a man closely linked to extreme right groups. He is a member of "Ware Di, Voorpost" of the "Staf Declercq Committee" and of many other extremist organizations.

But things are undoubtedly not so simple; The Flemish political parties and press organs with one voice, from the left to the right, have supported the Flemish demands. For them, it is a "test case." For the first time the Flemish are asking for facilities and they are being turned down, whereas the French-speakers have obtained them many times. From there to seeing a backlash of Flemish unity against "Francophone arrogance", and cherishing the old grievance of being picked on, it is only a short step, one quickly taken by certain circles.

The problem of Comines is most clearly being exploited by politicians of every stripe who have an interest in seeing the problem "boil over" to get useful publicity.

A prickly problem, in fact a real porcupine, for the government.

9516

CSO: 3100

MAJOR GENERAL TYTGAT INTERVIEWED ON NATIONAL DEFENSE PROBLEMS

Brussels VOX in French 14 Aug 80 pp 6-7

[Interview with Major General Tytgat, chairman of the Commission for National Defense Problems (CPND) conducted by J. Fr. M.]

[Text] On 3 August 1980 the Commission for National Defense Problems (CPND) celebrated its 30th birthday. On that occasion it seemed worthwhile to acquaint you somewhat better with this commission. Therefore, we met with its chairman, Major General Tytgat, who was kind enough to answer our questions.

[Question] General, could you describe to us briefly what the CPND is and explain somewhat its mission?

[Answer] You should know, first of all, that the CPND is an inter-ministerial agency under the jurisdiction of the prime minister, consisting of officials from different ministries and officers. The ministries of foreign affairs, national defense, interior, economic affairs, justice, and communications are each represented by an official with the rank of director or councillor. The executive personnel is supplied by the minister of national defense.

It has a variety of missions, as follows:

First of all, on the level of the prime minister and the Ministerial Defense Committee, it is a question of an administrative and technical secretariat.

On the level of the ministries, the CPND activities are more direct, for the commission is in charge of developments in civil defense:

- It coordinates defense plans involving the activities of a number of ministerial departments;

- Without hindering initiatives or the exercise of responsibilities, it supervises progress made in current matters.

On the level of the mixed committees (committees of civilians and military for the study of some specific problems), for example, COMIXTER consists of representatives of national defense, communications, the SNCB [Belgian National Railroads], public works, economic affairs, interior, and employment and labor. It plays the role of a coordinator. In particular, the chairman of the CPND may summon interdepartmental meetings.

On the international level, the commission takes part in the formulation of plans of civil or civil and military interest within international organizations established with a view to insuring common defense.

In a period of crisis CNI (National Information Center for the Government) joins with the CPND. In order to make the center operational it will consist of both civilians and military (active service and reserve officers).

[Question] We emphasize an important problem: civil defense. Could you enlighten us somewhat on this subject? What is the status of Belgian civil defense?

[Answer] Civil defense covers all nonmilitary aspects of defense.

The notion of civil defense could not be limited to "civilian protection" or to "maintaining order."

These two very important areas of "civil defense" are no more than partial aspects. Therefore, it is a question of all the measures adopted to insure at all times the survival of the population and, under all circumstances, support for the armed forces.

Obviously, such civil defense must be prepared and organized in peacetime.

Unfortunately, at present Belgium has very limited possibilities for offering its population a safe civil defense. Should a crisis break out the government would have neither a fallback position nor secure telecommunications. Yet, these are essential features in the preservation of governmental activities. We must admit that our country is far less well prepared than most of our neighbors and NATO allies.

[Question] A great deal is being said, indeed, of the Belgian lag in defense matters, in legislative matters in particular. Unquestionably, you would be in the best position to discuss with us this famous draft law on which so much ink has already been used?

[Answer] I assume that you would like to discuss the draft law known by the public as the "Gramme-Close" draft bill. Actually, this plan has been under study for the past 5 years. In order to properly understand the extent of this plan a short explanation would be necessary of the current state of our legislation. For the time being, we recognize only two exceptional conditions:

- Wartime, which becomes effective on the day set by royal decree for the mobilization of the armed forces. Its main purpose is to make possible the concentration of police powers in the hands of the central government which, subsequently, could delegate such powers in their entirety or in part.

The civilian authorities retain the power. At that point civilian requisitions may be enacted;

- The stage of siege which constitutes wartime reinforcement. Instituted by agreement of the Council of Ministers, a royal decree would allow the minister of national defense, in cases of absolute necessity, to exercise or delegate police powers. The royal decree, therefore, grants the military authorities the possibility to exercise specifically stipulated powers justified by critical situations related to the military defense of the territory.

Furthermore, Article 7 of the Law of 12 May 1927 stipulates the existence of a period comparable to that of wartime, which also allows military and civilian requisitions within the civil protection framework.

Let us note, therefore, that in order to have civilian requisitions and enable the king to exercise some special powers, a wartime status must be proclaimed and, consequently, the army must be mobilized at a time when this may not as yet be necessary. This is a rigid and inefficient system which should be replaced by a more flexible one which would enable the king to take the extraordinary measures necessary to insure the security of the country and enable Belgium to fulfill its international obligations.

[Question] Would it not be possible to use this legal stipulation for purposes other than military?

[Answer] I believe this to be out of the question.

In a draft currently submitted for the approval of the pertinent ministers it is clearly specified that the law would apply exclusively in the following cases:

- External danger;
- With a view to meeting our obligations to NATO;
- The adopted measures may not be such as to infringe on the rights guaranteed by the constitution.

Furthermore, the royal decrees must be motivated. They must be discussed by the Council of Ministers and immediately submitted to the chambers.

I believe that, with these four limitations, we have adequate guarantees to prevent the law from being used inappropriately.

[Question] Therefore, to go back to the beginning of our talk, the problems considered by the CPND would affect several ministerial departments.

What is the reaction of these departments in terms of defense problems?

[Answer] Let us note, first of all, that each department has its BPCD (Civil Defense Plans Office). Basically, these offices are interested in all defense problems. Frequently, however, their personnel is too small to be truly effective (or else some officials combine their work in a BPCD with other functions within the department, or delegate their functions in the BPCD to officials unqualified for the job).

Therefore, it frequently happens that such personnel are not very well informed of the problems concerning us.

Another worrisome problem is that in order to act properly the BPCD should have a mobilization officer in charge of drawing up a list of officials indispensable to the functioning of the department.

Without this precaution no mobilization deferment would be possible and all officials who would qualify would be mobilized without distinction.

Not all departments have properly grasped the nature of this problem.

[Question] What does the man on the street think of all these problems?

[Answer] Today everyone is speaking about defense and shelter problems. However, we must realize that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to catch up with the lagging which has developed over the years in comparison with a number of European countries. Initially, we shall have to limit our requirements because of the lack of financial means. Should we submit a number of proposals the government would not follow suit. Yet, it is the political powers that allocate budget appropriations. This is a major responsibility they must assume.

[Question] General, could I ask you what your conclusion is regarding civil defense problems?

[Answer] It is certain that no immediate solution to our civil and military defense problems could be found. First of all, as I have already said, certain budgetary disparities prevent us from implementing some essential aspects of our program. However, we must not forget that some decisions (such as, for example, the vote on the draft laws) are only political and do not involve the state budget in the least. These are decisions which I fervently wish would be made by our leaders. This would enable Belgium at least to meet its international obligations and to avoid, should a crisis break out, finding itself facing an even more catastrophic situation than the one we faced 40 years ago.

5157

CSO: 3100

ADMIRAL SCHLIM PROMOTED TO NAVAL CHIEF

Brussels LE SOIR in French 7 Aug 80 p 2

[Article: "Admiral Andre Schlim at the Head of the Naval Force"]

[Text] Admiral Andre Schlim has been promoted to the functions of Chief of Staff of the Naval Force, thus succeeding next 1 October to Vice-Admiral J. Van Dijck who will retire.

Thus we have a nomination which had been retarded quite a bit because of political reasons. It is an amply deserved nomination according to the opinion of knowledgeable military sources, due to the service and the years spent as a career officer by the said admiral. Nonetheless, people had tried to throw into the game a Social-Christian candidate who had active support in some circles and at the highest level of government. But Minister Poewick had held a firm hand on the helm.

Admiral Schlim was born in Bonnet (Luxemburg province) in 1926. In December 1941 he slipped out of Belgium and went to England where he enlisted as volunteer in the Royal Navy. He then participated in escorting convoys in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. He also participated in the landing of allied troops in Salerno.

Back in England at the end of 1943, he was assigned to the British Naval Air Force. After training in Canada he served successively as fighter pilot in the 892nd squadron (Hellcats) and in the 827th (Seafires).

When the ports of Belgium had been liberated, Ensign Schlim rejoined the Belgian navy and took part in the mine sweeping operations in the coastal waters. His services had brought him the war cross of 1940 with palm-leaf and bronze lion.

Thereafter he was given charge of several commands on the sea, especially of the school vessel "Kamina."

At the Naval Force staff he was made successively director of the "operations, plans and programs sections," deputy to the chief of staff for

logistics, and commander of the "operations groupment" in Odetende.

In October 1978 he was deputy chief of staff of the Naval Force. Since 1 January 1979 he fulfilled the functions of second assistant chief of the joint general staff.

1751

CH01 3100

BELGIAN MILITARY WEAPONS EXPORTS DETAILED

Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 7 Aug 80 pp 17-19

(Article by Jean Pourbaix)

[Excerpts] There seems to be no end to the speculations about the mystery or puzzle of the war weapons trade between Belgium and foreign countries.

As we have already had occasion to say (POURQUOI PAS? of 26 June 1980), one heading, or rather a "Section XIX" of our foreign trade listings -- containing a single "Chapter 93" -- is entitled "Weapons and Ammunition."

If this heading were to be believed, our foreign sales of "Weapons and Ammunition" would have been steadily decreasing, amounting to only 1178 million F in 1975, 1068 million in 1976, 806 million in 1977, 739 million in 1978, and 738.6 million in 1979. It is true that some recovery seems to be taking place in 1980. During the first quarter of this year, these sales grew by 50.6 percent compared to the same period in 1979; they amounted to 207.5 million against 137.8 million.

The Uruguay Precedent

Under Section XII of the list (chapter 99: "Art Objects, Collectors' Items, and Antiques"), we find among Belgium's shipments to Uruguay, 27,200 kilograms of these art goods (including "antiques over 100 years old") valued at 3,447,000 francs. These shipments were lumped under 99.96, that is as "confidential shipments" or "vertrouwelijk trafiek."

Let's not insist on finding deceit everywhere. It is not impossible that these confidential cargoes were weighted down with a large quantity of stone cannon balls, such as can be found near the Musée de la Porte de Hal in Brussels, and around some historic mortars.

That was in 1978. Statistics for 1979 have been released since, and we did not fail to scan them for the corresponding items in our trade with dear old Uruguay.

It is immediately apparent that our sales to Uruguay grew from 240.8 million francs to 439.2 million. This time there is no mention of "confidential" sales of art objects, collectibles, and antiques. Meaning that Section XXI has disappeared from the statistical data. But the "confidential shipments," traditionally classified under 99.96, are still there (except that they have moved to Section XXII) with a volume of 95,100 kilograms, valued at 64,458,000 francs.

It is truly most confusing, and enough to discourage anybody.

However there is one intriguing fact for the inquisitive mind. It is the existence of an "Air Navigation" sub-subheading (88.02) identified as "Aerodynes, Rotochutes" in Section XXI of the statistical nomenclature entitled "Transportation Equipment."

Being vastly ignorant of aviation matters, we cannot define "aerodynes" and "rotochutes." It is enough to know that in 1979 we exported 70 tons of them to Uruguay, for a value of about 179 million francs -- or nearly 41 percent of our total exports -- while this heading did not even account for one cent of our 1978 sales.

It is peculiar to say the least, and also rather suspicious.

Military Supply Contracts With Bolivia

From Uruguay, let us lightly skip over to Bolivia, a country which is presently under the thumb of a hateful system of oppression.

The Belgian press commented fairly extensively on a certain contract signed over two years ago by FN to sell weapons to Bolivia. According to our colleagues at L'ECHO DE LA BOURSE/AGEFI, it is being said in Liege that the ban issued by Mr Nothomb, our minister of foreign affairs, against any further sales of war equipment to Bolivia, will have only "minor repercussions at FN, which is believed to have already delivered the bulk of the contract."

Last July, Mr Simonet, who was then minister of Foreign Affairs, confirmed, in answer to a written question from Mr Glinne, that Ducroire had guaranteed 85 percent of the total exports, whose value was estimated at 900 million francs. In support of his approval of the export license requested by the minister of Economic Affairs, Mr Simonet argued that the military regime in power in La Paz at the time, was seeking to restore democracy, and he furthermore cited the fact that FN was in need of orders.

A little later, in September 1979, again in answer to a question from Mr Glinne, Mr Simonet pointed out that partial delivery had been made by FN for an amount of 110 million. According to the Flemish newspaper DE MORGEN, this was supposed to involve 4000 light weapons consisting of FAL rifles and MAG machine guns.

In addition, FN is believed to be negotiating for another "small" contract -- but still amounting to 150 million francs -- for delivery of rifles. However, it seems that the deal will not be concluded without difficulties if the decision of Minister Nothomb is enforced.

On the same topic, it is interesting to note the grievances of Andre Dubuisson, president of FN, during the shareholders' meeting of 5 June 1980.

"Specifically with respect to orders, the growth recorded in the first months of the budget year, fulfills our projections. The attitude in some circles in our country, about military exports, causes us serious concern. As you know, these exports are subject to export licensing granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The difficulties which we encounter with increasing frequency in this area, notably in obtaining guarantees from Dueroire for military exports, could eventually have a significant impact on the company's future. I only ask one question: Who would benefit from the disappearance of this sector of industry? Certainly not our workers, nor the Liege economy."

Total Export Growth of 1122 Percent

Given the relative importance of the Bolivian military market, our curiosity naturally led us to ask to what extent, by what means, and possibly under what disguise our weapons shipments to Bolivia were declared and classified in Belgium's export statistics.

The first salient point is the sharp increase in our total sales to the country which owes its name to Simon Bolivar.

In 1976, our exports to Bolivia were still limited to 89.2 million francs. During the three years that followed, they developed as follows:

147 million in 1977; 338.9 million in 1978; and 1177.3 million in 1979.

This is a growth of 1225.5 percent in three years!

This being the case, the trick is to track down, or try to track down, the sections, chapters, and sub-chapters of the nomenclature behind which lurk our weapons shipments to Bolivia.

The easiest -- but not the least complicated -- approach is to examine the official records for the distribution of the 5850 tons of Belgian goods exported to Bolivia in 1979, for the total figure of 1177 million francs mentioned above.

Let us proceed in ascending order.

1. 394,000 F in textiles and textile goods;
2. 1,204,000 F in plants and plant products;
3. 1,438,000 F in materials used for paper manufacturing, and so on;
4. 4,759,000 F in transportation equipment;
5. 4,783,000 F in food industry products, beverages, spirits, tobacco;
6. 5,221,000 F in plastics, artificial materials, ethers, and so on;
7. 13,140,000 F in livestock and animal products;
8. 21,016,000 F in optical instruments and devices;
9. 25,390,000 F in stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, and glass products;
10. 26,146,000 F in conventional metals and their products;
11. 43,077,000 F in products of the chemical and related industries;
12. 145,680,000 F in machinery, equipment, and electrical equipment, of which nearly 135 million in boilers, machines, instruments, and mechanical devices.

This gives us a total inventory of 292,248,000 francs out of a total export figure of 1,177,000 francs. We therefore find, in the breakdown of our 1979 sales to Bolivia, a shortage or a gap of about 885 million, corresponding to more than 75 percent of our shipments to that country.

Under Cover of "Confidential Shipments"

Naturally, the falsifiers of our official trade statistics had to find a means to plug up this hole of nearly 885 million francs.

It was obviously not possible to tuck away this 885 million in some corner of Section XIX (chapter 93) reserved for "Weapons and Ammunition," since the latter is supposed to apply solely to hunting weapons (manhunting excepted).

What then?

It's very simple, even simpler than falling off a log.

This 885 million, a manifest cause of shame, was modestly concealed from view under cover of the notorious "confidential shipments" which we have already denounced in connection with Uruguay (pending further investigation).

That is how, in the new Section XXII which did not exist in 1978, the 885 million (more precisely 884,795,000 francs for a volume of 641.2 tons) are entered in the above-mentioned confidential, in other words unmentionable, shipments.

The funniest part of the story -- so to speak -- is that the 885 million surreptitiously exported to Bolivia appear under chapter 99.96, which in reality does fall under the "confidential shipments" denomination of Section XXI (chapter 99), entitled "Art Objects, Collectors' Items, and Antiques," to which we referred in connection with Uruguay. It's so complicated that you wouldn't know your own mother.

But to conclude.

To begin with, you don't have to be Sherlock Holmes to sense that the \$85 million secreted in the inventory of our sales to Bolivia, have a fishy smell about them.

Secondly, whatever the facts may be, it is unacceptable and even scandalous on the part of the official agencies involved to resort to such tricks to deceive public opinion, if the goal is to encourage the industry of violent death, as everything seems to indicate.

Now that a scheme of this type has been uncovered, the least that we are entitled to expect from the minister responsible for the truth and candor of our foreign trade statistics, is that he will have the basic honesty of putting an end to the dishonorable practices which we are condemning here.

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CSO: 3100

SEARCH FOR PEACE ON CYPRUS EXTOLLED

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 9 Sep 80 p 3

[Editorial by Resad Kazim: "True Peace"]

[Text] We, the Turkish people, want genuine, pure, unadulterated peace. We are not slogan peacemakers. We are more the peacemaker than those who write the slogan "Forward For Peace" on walls here and there because for years we have lived in an atmosphere of disorder, confrontation, and war; we have suffered every kind of misery.

Therefore, we want real peace; both people in their own homeland, at ease, free. One will not impose its hegemony over the other in any way. The product of a noble agreement that will not return us to a pre-1974 situation or force us to be servants, slaves, and second-class citizens in our own homeland....

We understand this to be true peace. We mean applicable measures that are practical and viable whereby we will never again be subject to Greek-Cypriot and Greek oppression.

How can this be achieved? As we have emphasized many times before, it is done by implementing the principle of equality in all spheres, by binding the security of the Turkish people to sound, enduring, unbreakable, and immutable legal and practical principles.

This does not mean the reinforcement or codification of the present "de facto" situation, as the Greek Cypriots charge.

There is no argument whatsoever for this.

For example, if the Greek-Cypriot leaders say that they no longer recognize the agreement reached between Denktas and Kleridis at Vienna in 1975--which is actively being implemented--envisioning an exchange of populations between north and south Cyprus and if they try to renege using pre-1974 tricks and stratagems, it is then impossible to reconcile with true peace a position that will present a dreadful threat to our security.

Past bitter experiences have shown that Greece and the Greek-Cypriot Church deem permissible any method of eliminating the Turkish people, whom they see as obstacles to Enosis. And they have implemented these methods mercilessly.

So when we say "true peace" we mean an atmosphere where such events will not be repeated on Cypriot soil and where two-third of the Turkish people will not suffer the plight of refugees for the fourth or fifth time. We will not agree to any formula that falls short of this.

True peace is actually beneficial and necessary for the Greek-Cypriot people's own internal situation, peace of mind, and future. Only in this way can the Greek-Cypriot people achieve true stability, peace, tranquility and security.

Look, we Turks, because we are not selfish, sincerely desire not only our own peace and security but that of our neighbors, for we believe that a fire that erupts in a neighbor's house will effect us one way or another.

If the Greek-Cypriot leaders attain this high level of humanity and civilization or if they can show this maturity, an atmosphere of true peace can be established and nurtured on Cyprus. Otherwise all the work will have gone for naught.

CSO: 4907

INCREASE IN AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT SEATS PLANNED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 3 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Cyprus Airways, in conjunction with British Airways, will make available 60,000 aircraft seats for tourists from the United Kingdom next summer. This is some 25 per cent more than this year.

This was announced in a television interview last night by Cyprus Airways General Manager Mr E. Savva who also announced that as from April next Cyprus Airways is introducing a new service to Birmingham.

This will be in addition to its flights to London and Manchester.

Mr Savva also had good news for the U. K. Cypriots when he said that for certain seasons they will be offered a special excursion fare to their native land of £139 sterling (return fare) and £79 (sterling) for children.

The normal excursion fare now is £182 sterling for low season and £198 for high season and for children £116 and £125 respectively.

Mr Savva did not think that Cyprus required chartered flights for its U. K. traffic since Cyprus Airways and British Airways were able to provide the number of seats required and at more convenient terms for tour operators.

"The terms are better and the operator pays for the seats utilised, not the seats booked", Mr Savva explained, pointing out that there were instances of chartered flights cancelled when the seats were not sold.

Favourable

He said it was wrong to make comparisons with stand-by rates offered by Laker and others or the APEX fares for fixed dates at a penalty for cancellations, all of which are used only by a limited number of persons.

Compared with normal rates the Cyprus Airways fares per passenger mile were very favourable, he said, and pointed out that whereas costs have gone up by some 40 per cent the fare increases represented only 28 per cent.

Mr Savva said Cyprus Airways would offer reduced fares for the winter season to help the span of the season.

The Cyprus Airways chief appeared in the Cyprus TV programme "We and Our Country" together with the Cyprus Tourism Organisation Director General Mr A. Andronicou who said that tourist arrivals in the island for the period up to end August (the first eight months) reached 239,000 which compared with the 200,000 of the same period last year, an increase of 18 per cent.

Even if the increase drops to 15 per cent average by the end of the year the total number of arrivals shall be 330,000 and will mean a touristic income of £70 million, Mr Andronicou said.

He noted that this shall mean that Cyprus has reached by the end of the current year the target it had set for 1981, that is one year ahead of schedule, and with less number of hotel beds then planned.

Mr Andronicou said that hotel occupancy during the year has been estimated at 67 per cent.

Far from any fall in the number of tourists, Mr Andronicou said, the visitors showed considerable increase from Scandinavia, West Germany, Austria and Switzerland.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

SUPPORT FOR CSSR--Czechoslovakia has assured Cyprus that it will do all it can for a fair political solution to the Cyprus problem. The assurance was given by the Chairman of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, Mr A. Indra, during a dinner in Prague for the Cyprus parliamentary delegation currently visiting Czechoslovakia. The dinner was attended by the Vice Chairman of the Federal Assembly, the Foreign Minister, Minister of Trade and other officials. Mr Indra referred to the relations of his country with Cyprus and said Czechoslovakia will always stand firmly by the side of the Cypriot people in their struggle for independence and freedom. "We advocate a just political solution to the Cyprus problem securing the full independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Cyprus Republic", Mr Indra said. "You may rest assured, dear Cypriots, that the Czechoslovak Republic will do all it can for the finding of such a solution", he said. House President Mr Alecos Michaelides who heads the five-member Cyprus delegation echoed Mr Indra's words about relations between the two countries and underlined support for detente. "But", Mr Michaelides said, "real detente is possible only if there is respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states". [Excerpt] [Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 3 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 4920

CHANCES FOR BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENT COMING TO POWER AIRED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 22 Aug 80 pp 13, 14

[Article by Victor Andersen]

[Text] The big question around Christiansborg this summer is whether the bourgeois parties of Denmark have any chance of seizing power from the Social Democrats in connection with the next election. One of our respected contemporary historians told this columnist that "it is the height of idiocy" that the bourgeois parties have so far been unable to get the balance of power on their side of the field.

The last time it looked as if there might be a bourgeois government was in February 1975. There is good reason to dwell a little on the circumstances at that time since it is by no means unlikely that they will be repeated next time the bourgeois parties knock on the queen's door to ask for ruling power.

The situation was that the narrow Liberal government of 1973-75 was overturned with a vote of no confidence that just got the votes needed due to Hans Jorgen Lambourn, who abstained. Thus he assisted passively in killing off a bourgeois government. Poul Hartling tried instead to set himself up at the head of a four-party government consisting of the Liberals, the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center-Democrats. With the support of the Progressive votes it would have a bare majority. Progressive statements were encouraging and Poul Hartling set to work. Ministerial posts were distributed. For instance Poul Schluter was to be foreign and market affairs minister. Jens Moller environmental affairs minister, Christian Christensen church affairs minister and Erhard Jacobsen internal affairs minister. Erik Ninn-Hansen was to be minister of trade and an association in Odense was looking forward to having the new minister of trade, industrial affairs and shipping as its guest speaker at a meeting held the evening of 11 February. He just had to go by Amalienborg earlier that day to receive his ministerial appointment. A press conference had been scheduled at Christiansborg that February morning in one of

the elegant gilded rooms. Blocks of paper had been laid out, pencils had been sharpened and a duplicating machine in the prime minister's office was turning out sheets of paper giving the names of the new ministers.

But then the whole thing folded. Hartling called off the four-party government at the time when he was to have announced its formation. His hands were shaking, it was said, and the same things are being said today.

It was Glistrup who provided the difficulties. After having stated his support of the four-party coalition on 9 February by having "indicated Hartling to the queen"--as they say in the special phraseology of government formation--Glistrup went on to make more cryptic statements to the media--such as that unless a political control organ was formed from the parties on which the government was basing its mandate it was unlikely to survive through Lent or past Glistrup's wife's upcoming birthday.

This supposedly made Hartling so nervous that for that reason alone he hastily questioned the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals whether they would back his coalition politically. When they declined Hartling called off his project and instead Anker Jorgensen, to his own surprise, came to power again.

The fact that Hartling fumbled the chance for a bourgeois government is still being criticized by the Conservatives. As late as this summer they were making evaluations like this: "Hartling should have put it to the test. We really wonder if the Progressive Party would have dared overturn a bourgeois government if things had gone that far. But Hartling lost his nerve. Next time there is a chance for a bourgeois government there should be no shaking hands."

In the interest of historical truth this column can say that things were not quite like that. The tough leader was not as scared as the Conservatives think.

But those at Amalienborg also knew about Glistrup's new remarks even though they were not made to the queen.

However the royal court is up-to-date, they listen to the radio and so forth. Private secretary Mogens Wahi made a telephone call to Poul Hartling after which he immediately dropped his plans for a four-party coalition.

The episode--referred to in inner political circles as the "phone call from the queen"--tells us several things. In the first place in an era of modern communications it is obvious that the queen is not

guided solely by what parties tell her directly. In the second place in forming a future bourgeois government it will not be enough for the participants to inspire each other with courage, so that no one's hands shake in evaluating such things as what to expect from the Progressive Party. Courage is not needed. If it is this means there is lack of clarity with regard to the parliamentary basis for the government being named by the queen. To insure the completely neutral position of the crown there must be absolute clarity concerning what the parties intend in advance so that it is not left up to the queen to decide whether she risks becoming part of the political game. It also means that if there are hardliners and softliners in a party they must reach some kind of internal agreement as to what kind of government they would recommend before they pass the royal guards on their way into Amalienborg.

Since the queen always follows the advice of the ruling or functioning prime minister--and when this phone call was made Hartling was the functioning prime minister--one might say that the secretary was a little officious in making the call. On the other hand, from the secure position of hindsight it can be said that he served the neutral status of the crown better than if he had on the basis of full knowledge of Glistrup's hardline terms allowed the queen to tacitly approve the formation of a government which with Glistrup's often pigheaded consistency might have fallen at the end of the masquerade ball on Shrove Monday. It also seems that Hartling saw the parliamentary peril in maintaining the four-party coalition the minute he got the royal telephone call. But one can't accuse him of being afraid personally.

Anker Jorgensen might ask to have the motto, "The division of the opposition is my strength," embroidered in cross stitch for a Christmas present. At any rate that is the simple truth concerning his situation. The talk one hears about Denmark needing a strong man is ridiculous. We have a strong man, namely Anker Jorgensen who doesn't really deserve this description because his policies are strong but because his opponents on both sides are so weak. And they are weak because they are divided and because they have the historic reputation of only being able to work together for short periods of time before stabbing each other in the back once again.

But the bourgeois party leaders and more or less self-appointed spokesmen have been unable to ignore the mounting pressure from bourgeois voters. They feel, just like considerate political scientists, that it is "the height of idiocy" that the bourgeois parties are unable to cooperate.

Therefore we have seen a series of efforts this summer to bring movement into the power picture so at best the bourgeois parties will be

able to assume ruling power from the Social Democrats or at least be seated at the same table with them.

Three such attempts will be mentioned here.

Most untraditional was an idea advanced by Conservative Erik Ninn-Hansen that Anker Jorgensen should announce a new election as soon as possible with the idea of forming a government consisting of the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Radical Liberals. That would not remove Anker Jorgensen from the throne, it would just supply him with some bourgeois grand viziers or bodyguards--and it would blacken Anker Jorgensen's name in Danish history since it would be a clear catastrophe situation produced by his inability to lead a straight Social Democratic government.

Of course Anker Jorgensen would not go along with this kind of humiliation. Therefore the proposal was doomed to failure in advance. But it did gain a lot of coverage in the summer press and confused a lot of voters.

At the same time it gave the professional spokesmen something to meet their summer obligations with. Social Democratic group chairman Knud Heinesen opposed it with his usual academic irony. Conservative anchorman Palle Simonsen--highly regarded in the party--called Ninn-Hansen's SKVR [Social Democratic, Liberal, Conservative, Radical Liberal] construction "an unrealistic idea" in the columns of *BERLINGORS TIDENDE*. And the authoritative Social Democrat writing under the pseudonym of Altmann also turned thumbs down promptly.

Glistrup Not Part of Government

A second big contribution to the summer debate on the bourgeois chances to assume power was former Conservative finance minister and current EC parliamentarian Poul Moller's doing. In an article in *JYLLANDS-POSTEN* early in the season he proposed a very close cooperation among the Conservatives, Liberals and Progressives. This remarkable proposal was given extra gloss and significance in the minds of the reading public because of the personal tragedy suffered by Poul Moller as a Folketing politician, especially because of the chicanery of the Progressive Party. Now he repaid evil with good. He wrote:

"As most people are aware the Progressive Party is no favorite of mine, and that is especially true of party leader Hagens Glistrup. It is always unpleasant to bite into a sour apple. But in my view the best chance for a change in government lies in an understanding among the Liberals, the Conservatives and the Progressives. If this possibility is written off ruling power will remain in the hands of the Social Democrats, probably for the rest of this century."

Even though Poul Moller did not describe precisely how he thought this understanding with the Progressive Party would operate in practice it was clear that it would go further than "including the votes of the Progressive Party" when the Liberals and Conservatives form a government.

But this hinted at something that shifted the entire scene for Liberal and Conservative delegates around the nation, as this paper's reporters discovered this summer.

And such a close three-party combination has been expressly rejected by Liberal and Conservative leaders, as it was in the double interview with Poul Schluter and Henning Christophersen that was published in the July issue of the Liberal monthly LIBERAL. The interview was amazingly long, 39 pages, and has been famous more for its length than for its content, which is unjust. At least it must have been useful for many who greatly admire Poul Moller as a writer to see this clear statement from Poul Moller's party comrade, Poul Schluter:

"For once I don't mind talking about personalities. Hogens Glistrup is still the dominant personality in his party and I do not think there is a possibility of a Conservative, Liberal and Progressive government coalition as long as Glistrup leads the party."

One can't get closer in political Christiansborg Danish to a resounding no than that.

Political Namecalling

Glistrup has also clearly rejected this. It is true that he spoke favorably of a Liberal, Conservative and Progressive coalition, the only condition being that three men from each party be sent to a deserted beach hotel for 14 days to hammer out a government program. But to this he has added a torrent of personal invective concerning his hypothetical government colleagues, Poul Schluter and Henning Christophersen. He called them--by name--"flabby political promise-makers" and "always obscene in office and in the media."

As a rule politicians can take more strain than that. This was shown by the dramatic government formation in 1957. A short time before Social Democrat H. C. Hansen had called Single-Tax Party man Viggo Sternke a "tiresome fellow" and Radical Liberal Bertel Dahlgaard had told journalists in Amalienburg Castle Square as late as the point when consultations were underway with the king that he "would rather die a natural death than sit in a government that included the Single-Tax Party." All this had to be swallowed hastily when the votes fell in such a way that a three-party coalition with the Social Democrats, Radical Liberals and the Single-Tax Party was the only alternative.

But it seems likely that the voting strength would have to be unusually strong this time before Poul Schluter and Henning Christoffersen could bring themselves to invite Glistrup into a government with them and their obscenity.

For the same reason Anker Jorgensen totally missed the point when, referring to the fact that the Liberals, Conservatives and Progressives united in the spring to reject the urban renewal bill, he called them the "united obstruction parties." There is no indication that the three parties are united in any way. On the contrary, the strongest three-party coalition supporter in the Progressive Party, Jorgen Junior, felt so isolated in his parliamentary group that he has now left it.

The third big possibility in the summer debate--and probably extending beyond that--is the express Liberal and Conservative decision to join forces in seizing ruling power from the Social Democrats, preferably as soon as the next election has been held.

Voter Landslide Needed

That seems to be the possibility we should concern ourselves with. Unfortunately for bourgeois enthusiasts this can best be done initially with the help of Pihl's little math book for the middle grades. With the present vote distribution the Liberals and Conservatives together have only 45 seats compared with the 68 held by the Social Democrats. Thus it would take a voter landslide approximating the 1973 election (called the "day of wrath" by Tage Kaarsted) to enable the Liberals and Conservatives to dethrone the Social Democrats without help.

Liberal editor Erling Brondum of HORSSENS FOLKEBLAD is one of those who openly remind the voters of this fact. He himself clearly supports a Liberal-Conservative government alternative, but says:

"It does no good to promise voters that as long as they vote for Liberal and Conservative candidates the nation will get a Liberal-Conservative government and liberal bourgeois policies. Dozens of seats must change hands before that can happen."

He goes on to say: "It does help to promise voters that if they make these two parties so strong that Anker Jorgensen cannot reach a compromise that excludes these parties there will finally be a chance to force the Social Democrats to go along with the necessary economic legislation or else relinquish ruling power."

Liberal and Conservative leaders are realistic in their evaluations. In the LIBERAL interview Poul Schluter admitted that even though he

was acting the part of the woman who counted her chickens before they were hatched he didn't dare hope for more than a bourgeois minority government after the next election.

Even if we take our previous calculation and add the Progressive Party, the three parties together have only 63 seats at present, in other words less for the three parties combined than the Social Democrats hold alone. And at this time it is very unclear how the Progressive seats might function after the next election in the government formation situation that will then exist.

Pitch on Our Hands

As we mentioned a Liberal, Conservative, Progressive coalition is out of the question even though Bertel Haarder said earlier that the Liberal Party would have to find a majority wherever it could and not take as long to discover the Progressive Party as the Radical Liberals were with respect to the Conservatives, namely 63 years. He also said, "We have pitch on our hands, after all."

The Liberal-Conservative opportunity to make use of Progressive support lies on a lower and less involved level--the one called "counting in their votes." As Poul Schluter said in the LIBERAL interview: "Of course the Progressive seats count. They also counted when they prevented the formation of the four-party government. They were decisive on that occasion. In a future situation it is possible that the Progressives will use their votes differently and it may be that after the next election the Progressive votes will be decisive in the sense that they decide whether the nation will have a Social Democratic or a liberal bourgeois leadership."

This statement by Poul Schluter seems to be the most important one in the entire interview. It shows that the Liberals and Conservatives--in spite of the rough treatment Glistrup gave them in 1973--are ready to give Glistrup another chance after the next election to indicate a bourgeois government. But this time without also making conditions that make it difficult--as was the case in 1973--for the monarch, her private secretary and the acting prime minister to follow his lead.

Naturally Poul Schluter and Henning Christophersen would prefer voters in the next election to vote directly for Conservatives or Liberals, making it a "day of rejoicing" for them in reparation for the "day of wrath" they experienced in 1973. They will be working very hard on this from now on until the election with their new aggressive power takeover line as a sales pitch. At the same time it is obvious from the LIBERAL interview that they are afraid they won't get enough votes to really be able to assume power.

The communication problems of the two top bourgeois politicians with regard to the voting public just now appear to be that on the one hand they would like to create great expectations among voters in their joint cooperation so that they can shovel in votes that way but at the same time they are afraid of making hopes so high that they are doomed to disappointment if the two parties are unable to affect the balance of power to any great extent after the election. And that is the bitter reality for bourgeois Denmark--that it is unable with its own votes alone to chase Anker Jorgensen out of office by the time of the next election.

In this review of the Liberal-Conservative combination we have assumed that their harmonious power takeover depended solely on luck in gaining seats in parliament. We have taken for granted that all the old grievances between the Liberals and the Conservatives have been forgotten, that in all political situations the two parties will have identical views, that the two parties in fellowship have come up with creative new ideas that will attract voters by the drove, that the two people now heading the two parties will be able to work well together and finally that in the event that the joint drive to gain power succeeds there is no bloody conflict over who gets top spot, the position of prime minister.

But it is not possible to say in advance that these problems can be discounted. As the head of the Seamen's Union might have said, we need a little bread along with the meat. We will now take up these items one by one.

Are there old grievances between the Liberals and Conservatives?

Inevitably there are. Those who know their party history remember how Christmas Moller overturned the Madsen-Mygdal government on the defense issue in 1920. One could also mention how the two bourgeois parties fought throughout the entire Stauning epoch to the satisfaction of only one person--Stauning himself. While we are on the subject of mutual betrayal the Conservatives for their part remember how the Liberals went behind the Conservatives' backs on 31 January 1933 and entered into the Kanslergade compromise with the Social Democrats and Radical Liberals (devaluation, social reform, wage agreements). In the summer of 1965 with his Svanninge speech Poul Hartling also surprisingly drew the Liberals along with him against the Radical Liberals.

There was also plenty of deceitfulness when in 1973 the Liberals suddenly took off in a solo sprint, leaving the Conservatives behind, and formed their own government (which Hartling, the tough guy, managed to pull off). And it wasn't exactly nice in 1978 when the Liberals' new tough guy, Henning Christophersen, led the party along new paths once again, a Social Democratic-Liberal coalition. His claim

that he would have liked to have the Conservatives along with him on this political jaunt was quickly shown to be an empty gesture by ensuing events.

On the other hand there was trusting cooperation in the Liberal-Conservative government of 1950-53. In addition the Conservatives' special friend in the Liberal camp, Erik Eriksen, rejected Radical Liberal offers in 1951 and 1957 of help in forming a straight Liberal government, in both cases citing solidarity with the Conservatives. As Erik Eriksen said in 1957:

"Should I betray the cooperation with the Conservatives to which I have devoted the best years of my life in order to become a hostage to the Radical Liberals?"

And there didn't seem to be any real break between the two parties in the Liberal-Conservative-Radical Liberal government of 1966-71, except that Nathalie Lind seems to have had a great talent for getting funds out of Finance Minister Poul Moller, which probably helped the three-party coalition set a record in the area of tax increases.

Cooperation chances between the two parties are also greatly affected by remarks made by leading people in the parties. When Poul Hartling was thinking of forming his own government without the Conservatives in 1973 and the Conservatives cautiously inquired what was going on, Hartling replied according to the unanimous testimony of Ib Stetter, Hilmar Baunegaard and Erik Ninn-Hansen: "The Conservatives are not in a position to make demands."

Even though the 1973 election had been especially brutal for the Conservatives they were annoyed by his choice of words. "They left in great irritation," Tage Kærsted said. Or as Ninn-Hansen said: "For 20 years I have lived with Liberal-Conservative cooperation as a reality and now we are regarded as intruders."

This recalls other periods when the Liberals--in the words of Poul Sørensen--used the Conservatives "like a mat to wipe their feet on." On the other hand Liberals over a certain age could remember back to the 1930's when the ultraconservative NATIONALTIDENDE (later DAGENS NYHETER) said that "a farmer's party like the Liberal Party will never make it in the city." And it must have left a lasting impression when Poul Moller said as late as 22 October 1975 in a speech that "the smell of the cow stall still lingers around the Liberals." As Poul Sørensen had said previously about Poul Moller: "I'm always nervous when I open up my morning paper that I will read something he has said somewhere or another."

At the same time it is more or less certain that examples of old grievances and unfortunate remarks, no matter how numerous, will vanish like the dew in the morning sunlight the minute the Liberals and Conservatives have a real chance of assuming power once more.

One Dividing Issue

Do the Liberals and Conservatives have identical views on all vital political issues?

Poul Schluter and Henning Christophersen have taken pains this summer to depict how harmoniously they have acted with respect to the latest crisis legislation--they have written reports together, made inquiries together, etc. The fact that they disagreed on education for 16-19-year-olds is mentioned as an exception that confirms the rest of the close cooperation.

Under the shiny surface of cooperation, however, there is at least one issue on which they do not agree. Liberals become cold as steel when one mentions the words "frozen cost-of-living increments."

This is the background: In the fall of 1976 a compromise was reached on future placement of the 10 billion kroner the state-paid cost-of-living increments would eventually amount to while they were frozen in ATP [Workers Supplemental Pension Fund]. The Liberals foresaw that the money could play into LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] hands as starting capital for OD [Economic Democracy] or other forms of influence over business life and are now seeing the confirmation of their fears since with its very first loan the "Thomas Nielsen fund" as it is called--its formal name is the "Wage-earners Cost-of-Living Fund"--aided cooperation. The Liberals accuse the Conservatives of complicity in what happened. In the view of the Liberals the Conservatives have helped start a trend toward the dictatorship of funds and the unions. The Conservatives maintain that their part in this was small and that anyway they were misled by the Social Democrats.

The issue is not easier to live with now that the fund has started to operate and the first loan touched off a protest from the Industrial Council in line with the worst suspicions of the Liberals. It is still being said in Liberal circles: "We were very very angry with the Conservatives on account of this issue. And it is not forgotten yet."

In addition to this issue which directly divides them it has hitherto been characteristic of the two parties that they have had a hard time finding issues on which they could be equally enthusiastic. As spokesmen for the two parties who are less keen on cooperation say: "In

reality bourgeois Denmark can only agree on two things--retaining the apprenticeship system and keeping OD with central funds out."

But it is unlikely that disputes over old legislation or former program plank differences will jeopardize the possibilities for a Liberal-Conservative coalition.

Friendship at the Summit of Power

Do the two parties have exciting new ideas they can present to the voters?

We should probably not get our hopes up too high at this point. At present we can note the surprising development that the two parties have retreated from the very uncompromising income policy that formed the basis for their economic policies. As a step in this retreat the labor market factions will be allowed to determine wages on their own next spring. Thus the Liberals and Conservatives are abandoning a policy that definitely lacked public appeal. By freeing the labor market the two parties also have a better chance of curing themselves, as well as their voters, of the obsessive idea that labor market issues can best be resolved under a Social Democratic regime.

Can the current heads of the two parties get along together?

The question arises because in past government coalitions it has turned out to be vital that the leading politicians get along well on a personal level. Thus Radical Liberal Jorgen Jorgensen's good relations with Social Democratic politicians are legendary. And when the Liberals and Conservatives worked well together in 1950-53 it had a lot to do with the fact that Erik Eriksen said soon after meeting Conservative Poul Sorensen: "That is a man I can work with politically." As Ninn-Hansen described it: "They were quite close, more so than any other party leaders at Christiansborg."

However Poul Hartling would hardly have been able to behave that way toward a Conservative leader. It is said that "at home with his father, school inspector Hartling, where prominent Liberals came and went he was reared on jealousy of the Conservative Party." (Poul Moller)

The vital and relevant question of how Poul Schluter and Henning Christophersen get along is answered by eyewitnesses who see them daily with reassurances that "they get along fine." They have the same form of bittersweet humor. "They can laugh together at the same things." They do not get together in private life. But that may be too much to ask at the present stage of the new brotherhood.

There are also good relations among several others in the party groups. Bertel Haarder and Palle Simonsen really mean it when they clap each other on the back.

There could be problems a little farther down the power ladder. The deputies and editors of the two parties around the country have been used to fighting it out in hand-to-hand combat for decades. It is not certain it will be that easy for them to "laugh together" immediately on receipt of a command from above. The Liberals in particular may find this tough going. But cooperation is necessary in this case and that is what there will be.

Although as we noted the two party leaders get along well together, there are some friendly remarks Poul Schluter and Henning Christophersen are unable to say to each other.

After the election last October, for example, it would have been quite natural for Poul Schluter to indicate Henning Christophersen to the queen or vice versa. But neither man said a word. That would have been the same thing as indicating the leader of the opposition. They preferred to bite their tongues and say nothing. For holding the position of prime minister in a coalition government always gets extra votes in the next election.

That was the case when the Liberals and Conservatives were in the government together in 1950-53 with Erik Eriksen as prime minister. And that was the case in the Liberal-Conservative-Radical Liberal government of 1968-71 with Hilmar Baunsgaard as chief of state. That was a government without success but in the next election the Radical Liberals kept the same number of seats while the others lost seats.

This brings us to the last question. Can the two parties agree on who would be prime minister in a future coalition government? Both parties have told this paper that personalities have not been discussed at all. No, for experience shows that this kind of problem solves itself when the votes have been counted. The voting wheel of fortune determines the outcome. It is unlikely that things would turn out the same in the next election as they did last time--with both parties having exactly the same number of seats, 22--since the Faeroe Islands unification man, Pauli Ellefsen, will add his vote to the 22 held by the Liberals.

Thus the Liberals and the Conservatives are in the unusually fortunate position with their equal share of seats of being on an equal footing so they can negotiate their mutual power takeover in a relaxed atmosphere while the painful question of who will eventually have more power than the others will be left up to the voters to decide.

Is Anker Jorgensen Tired?

As indicated earlier, this article series cannot end by saying that the prospects for an imminent bourgeois power takeover are the brightest. Even if the Progressive Party votes could be relied on as a parliamentary base for a Liberal-Conservative coalition government after the next election the broader perspective shows that an improbable voter landslide would be needed as well. Much too little is known today about the so-called cutoff limit parties on the bourgeois wing. It is a big question whether they will all still be there after the next election. But we do know that when the Social Democrats form a government they can count on all the left-wing votes.

Thus it appears that a condition necessary for an imminent bourgeois power takeover would be that the Social Democrats become tired out by insoluble economic problems (which wouldn't make the job much fun for bourgeois power holders either) and decide to take time out on the reserve bench. When Hans Hedtoft was worn out by political life in 1950 and by his wife's ill health (she had broken down at the Rebild ceremonies that year) and he was confronted with a tricky resolution in Folketing he greeted it almost as a liberation. The Liberals and Conservatives then came to power where they remained for 3 years, not because of their own strength but because of the temporary weariness of the Social Democrats.

But there is nothing to suggest that Anker Jorgensen is getting tired. Despite gloomy predictions for last year's election the Social Democrats gained three seats. Anker Jorgensen regards that as his own personal victory. It is said at Christiansborg that he is close to believing that he can walk on the water (although an attempt at the dedication of the Koge Bugt Seaside Park early this summer did not succeed).

Of course the economic problems may get so bad that it would be more convenient for the Social Democrats to act as onlookers for a while. Both Henry Grunbaum and Henning Christophersen have said fairly directly that Anker Jorgensen does not have much understanding of these problems. But that might also be a strong point for him. Many details are involved in determining the opportunities of bourgeois Denmark.

Dark Horse

But let us conclude by asking contemporary historian Tage Kærsted to join us and present his general assessment. He said:

"In my view a bourgeois cooperation that depended on parliamentary support from the Progressive Party would be such a risky venture that

a bourgeois government would hardly dare count on it. Therefore--if I may speculate freely on the subject in the summertime--I don't think a bourgeois government around the Liberals and the Conservatives is possible unless we have the same conditions that prevailed in 1930-33 when the Social Democrats actually wanted to sit things out for a while and gather their forces."

Who might head a future bourgeois government?

"That depends on the political situation in existence when the opportunity to form a government occurs. It might be Poul Schluter, it might be Henning Christophersen or it could be that the choice would be someone entirely different. And I can give historical reasons for this somewhat ambiguous reply. Not many people realized in advance that the leader of the bourgeois cooperation in 1968 would be Hilmar Baunsgaard. The Conservatives and the Radical Liberals had long detested each other and a short time before that Poul Sorensen had expressed a pious hope for the rapid demise of the Radicals. Therefore one has to keep in mind at all times that the parliamentary situation--expressed in the cold figures of seats held--is what decides which chief gets the biggest feather in his cap."

This leads us to enter the name of a candidate called "Dark Horse" in the race for top spot if bourgeois Denmark gets its chance to take over ruling power from the Social Democrats.

6578

C80: 3106

RADICAL LIBERALS INTRODUCE NEW DEFENSE PLAN ALTERNATIVE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 22 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Rolf Bagger]

[Excerpts] The debate on the new defense act is changing its character. From a debate solely concerned with the size of defense expenditures it has become in the last few weeks a debate on possible reinforcements to Denmark from outside in a crisis situation and the possibility of storing the heavy equipment of such reinforcements in this country during peacetime. But this week the Radical Liberals showed their true colors in the debate by saying that in the long run the party wants the Danish armed forces to be the defender of our sovereignty, something that can be used as an instrument to handle a crisis in the period before a war might break out.

The debate on a future Danish defense act took a new turn this week. This happened when the Radical Liberals' parliamentary group during a meeting at the home of the party's defense policy spokesman, Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen, defined the party's stand on the future Danish defense role and defense tasks in the years ahead.

"We can't do everything," Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen told this paper during the meeting. "But we can issue warnings and we can have a defense that can be used to maintain our sovereignty and that is what we want. We would like to see Danish defense become more usable as a tool in a crisis situation rather than being regarded as something that can be used during an actual war. The armed forces should be used in the crisis stage. In the gray zone, if you will."

At the same time the party also defined its stand on the issue of allied reinforcements to Danish territory in a crisis situation and possible storage of the heavy equipment for these reinforcements in depots in this country during peacetime.

Bilgrav-Nielsen told this paper:

"After it came out that certain talks are being held and that a partially new Danish policy with regard to reinforcements is involved and that this means storage depots we feel that this lack of clarity should be corrected by including in the new defense act or at least in the deliberations crystal clear guidelines on what Danish policy is on this issue and our lack of desire for a change in the present Danish policy on reinforcements and storage depots. We do not want to place more reliance on storage depots -- maintaining the military equipment of foreign countries. That would make Danish territory even more interesting and vulnerable and we feel this would help make preserving Danish self-determination an illusion at an even earlier date."

With these demands and reservations the Radical Liberals have definitely taken a different stand prior to the talks on the new defense act which will be resumed in September than the Social Democrats who want to restructure the armed forces within an unaltered budget framework or the Liberals and Conservatives who want an increase in defense spending of at least 3 percent annually figured in fixed prices. The Social Democrats as well as the Liberals and Conservatives base their wishes and demands for future Danish defense on the assumption that allied reinforcements could reach Denmark in a crisis prior to the outbreak of an impending war.

United in One Debate

This combines the debate on a new defense act and the debate on reinforcements and storage depots for these reinforcements in one and the same debate. A week ago the chief of the defense staff, Lieutenant General G. K. Kristensen, said that if a new defense act is passed on the basis of unchanged spending, which under any circumstances would mean a sharp reduction of Danish defense forces, this would increase the need for reinforcements on the order of up to 40-50,000 men and more storage areas for their heavy equipment.

Planning

Plans have also been made on this basis in Denmark. Before long, probably within the next month, they will start filling a number of storage depots at Karup Airport with equipment (ammunition, fuel, lubricants, etc.) for a number of American planes. Office manager Wahl in the Defense Ministry told us that the ultimate goal is enough depots to supply 100 American combat planes but that at the moment they were using only space already available for this purpose and that would not hold enough material for 100 planes.

In the long run--using an appropriation from NATO's so-called infrastructure program (joint investments)--depots will be expanded and

so will airports, harbors and warning systems in Denmark at a cost of 700 million kroner. This will be done in the period up to 1985. This depot construction will create room for supplies for the remaining combat planes. But it may take as long as a whole year before NATO appropriates the money according to office manager Wahl.

With regard to reinforcement of army units, Wahl said it is unlikely that the complete reinforcement plan will be prepared by NATO before the beginning of 1985. The first condition for building depots to store equipment in Denmark is that certain units be picked out for possible assignment to Denmark. As they say in the military, they must first be "earmarked." But a political decision is also needed for this and so far it hasn't been made either.

Denmark has long been working in practice on the problems of receiving reinforcements, but not specific units designated in advance with heavy equipment already stored in Denmark. Both the so-called NATO "fire brigade," ACE Mobile Force, and the special British "fire brigade," UK Mobile Force, have been on maneuvers in this country as have American marine units. In connection with these land exercises the procedures of receiving such forces have been worked out.

For some years special terminal command posts have been set up under the Eastern and Western Commands for the purpose of giving help and support to the reinforcements. The May 1980 issue of the Reserve Officers Association paper carried a description by one of the reserve officers assigned to this job, Captain Jorgen Rasmussen, of the activities of the terminal command posts. His article concluded: "The command posts were not used much for many years but with the recent increased demands posed by the reinforcing of Denmark by NATO units they have been given more importance, resulting in personnel changes, additions and training for these special units and their specialists--for they are specialists!"

Eastern Command press officer, Major Kreutzfeldt, said: "To avoid having to improvise from one time to the next we have a terminal command post with a certain composition that can be used wherever these reinforcements may arrive in this country. We have found the practical necessity of having something like this set up on a permanent basis."

Ship Transports

Ship transports from England to the continent, including Denmark, have also been practiced regularly. Thus on 3 September DFDS [United Danish Steamship Company] will take part in transporting 27,000 British soldiers to maneuvers in Belgium. NATO has chartered the two big

Other freighters, "Dana Futura" and "Dana Hafnia," to take care of the armored units while the passenger ships, "Dana Anglia" and "England," will take part in transporting the 27,000 soldiers.

DPA information chief J. Nedegaard said the transport is being handled like a civilian transport under contract. "It is the biggest combined transport job we have ever had but we have tried it before. We have helped transport soldiers to Norway and Denmark and of course this will be run with military precision," J. Nedegaard said.

The philosophy behind all these reinforcement initiatives is the desire to get them in place in time. If reinforcements can arrive before war breaks out it might be averted altogether and the quickest way to do this is to fly troops in to supply areas stockpiled in advance. Bilgrav-Nielsen said that on the contrary the Radical Liberals believe this would involve Denmark at an earlier time because the owners of the supplies in the depots could claim their right to protect them long before reinforcements are called in.

If reinforcements get here in time one can measure the time it would take. But what the Danish defense debate still lacks is clear statements on how long Danish defense is supposed to hold out in a surprise situation and how big our armed forces should be to accomplish this. It is here that a new defense act runs into the reinforcement problem. Will the Danish armed forces still be expected to fight if the country is attacked?

657A

CSO: 3108

POLL SHOWS DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Aug 80 p 6

[Article by Ager Schultz, director of the Danish Gallup Institute]

[Text] Despite a debate lasting almost 10 years on the introduction of economic democracy the result does not seem to be mounting interest in such a reform--on the contrary.

Since 1972 the Gallup Institute has conducted many polls to test public reaction to the ongoing debate and the total results of these polls cannot be encouraging to advocates of economic democracy.

A poll was taken at the beginning of 1979, just after LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] sent out its brochure on OD [Economic Democracy]. This poll has now been repeated. Among a representative selection of the adult population all those aware of the issue were asked the following questions:

"In principle are you for or against economic democracy?"

The answers are shown here with a comparison of the 1979 responses.

| | Jan 79 | Jun 80 |
|------------|--------|--------|
| For | 30 % | 23 % |
| Against | 40 | 49 |
| Don't know | 30 | 28 |
| Total | 100 % | 100 % |

Interest in economic democracy has declined substantially since the winter of 1979.

Half the people (49 percent) oppose economic democracy and only a quarter (23 percent) are for it.

The differences might be explainable in terms of the view of contract negotiations expressed in the first poll. A repetition of that survey in the winter of 1980 could help here.

The next question asked was this which was asked of all those favoring economic democracy who were aware of the mutual fund:

"Would you prefer economic democracy with a mutual fund or economic democracy without a mutual fund?"

The answers were:

| | Jan 79 | Jun 80 |
|------------------------|--------|--------|
| OD with mutual fund | 29 % | 33 % |
| OD without mutual fund | 36 | 38 |
| Don't know | 35 | 29 |
| Total | 100 % | 100 % |

As we can see it is not the mutual fund that determines whether or not one is for economic democracy. Only a third (33 percent) of OD supporters favored the mutual fund, with 38 percent opposing it.

Opponents of OD were also asked about the mutual fund in the following question:

"If economic democracy is introduced without the so-called mutual fund would you then be for or against economic democracy?"

Here are the answers:

| | Jan 79 | Jun 80 |
|------------|--------|--------|
| For OD | 11 | 13 |
| Against OD | 63 | 60 |
| Don't know | 26 | 27 |
| Total | 100 % | 100 % |

If one opposes OD the mutual fund doesn't make a lot of difference and it must be said to represent a bit of a drawback for OD proponents.

All in all interest in OD seems to be limited and eroding and if we count the people who are aware of the issue and support OD with a mutual fund they add up to only between 6 and 7 percent of the population.

6578

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DEVELOPMENTS IN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY SURVIVED

HORN JOURNALTECHNIK in German May 80 pp 14-27

[Articles: "The German Aerospace Industry 1980"]

[Text] On the occasion of the ILA [International Aviation Exhibit] it is appropriate to draw a balance of the German aerospace industry. Employment has climbed to over 65,000, order books are full, the primary Tornado and Alpha Jet systems are in the profit-making production stage, the Airbus is selling well, a second Space-lab has been ordered. We really have it good! Hence only selling faces in the boardrooms? Is this reality? Some worry wrinkles are very obvious. There are serious doubts about future programs, particularly the new tactical aircraft [TKF]. Will this be, despite ministerial denials, a native development or will there be a fall-back to the 1950's and 1960's, that is, a purchase? Likewise, the merger of MBB [Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blom] with VFW [Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werke] has not yet been settled even though the need for long-term future planning makes it more urgent from day to day.

While the personnel departments are combing through the areas around their firms to a radius of 100 kilometers — MBB and Siemens buses can be seen in Garmisch before sunrise — and the professional leftists continue to sing their old song about unemployment among youth and in general, there are worries about follow-on programs. Production of the Alpha Jet will run out in 1982 for the Luftwaffe [air force] and in 1984 for the French. It is unlikely that a TKF can go into production before 1991. This gives rise to a capacity gap. The federal government has agreed to an employment level of 50,000 for the aerospace industry. To what period does this agreement apply? On the other hand, the market requires, customers require a high-rate Airbus production, require further members in the Airbus family. In Germany alone hundreds of millions must be invested to keep deliveries at a high rate. Will this not result in a capacity peak with Tornado, Alpha Jet and Airbus which will be followed by a depression

as surely as an amen in church? who in the federal government will assume responsibility for the employment guarantee? and controls the federal economics, defense or research (ministries)? will the interministerial pecking order have to be fought out again? Haven't Schnell and Apel already requested relief in this case? Those in the defense ministry could not see why they should take billions from their budget which has grown only slowly and sometimes only by optical tricks to finance a TKF development at the cost of other programs with equally high priority when civilian development and production programs such as Airbus are promoted with billions solely for economic and employment policy grounds. If each Airbus costs the state several millions in, among other things, marketing aid and the state willingly pays this, why not also funds of this type for the development of a combat aircraft? One fact should have long since become common knowledge. Without the technology thrust given the industry by the Tornado development, participation by the equipment industry in particular in Airbus would not have been possible. And if the TKF development should not be taken up, in the long run it also means getting out of the civil aviation business. The billions provided to the aerospace industry for Tornado, Alpha Jet and Airbus would have been totally uneconomical in the longterm view. They produce a payoff only when followon programs are taken up. The best example: for DM 300 million the Tornado RB 199 engine could be further developed so that it would become a good TKF engine and could also bring performance increases for the Tornado if this aircraft had to be reequipped. The superficially cheapest solution of buying an engine in the United States would have little logic in the sense of a longterm European and German structure policy, that is, would be a return to the rebuilding phase of the 1950's and 1960's.

For this reason the aerospace industry was very shocked by Apel's hard, negative words about the TKF on the occasion of his far east trip. The possible purchase of the F-18 suddenly hung like a Damocles sword over the future of the aerospace industry. What had happened once with AWACS was transferred to the TKF — did not the Federal Republic itself destroy the illusion of faith in the liberal market system when AWACS compensations were negotiated which had absolutely nothing to do with this program? The German systems firms become uneasy when they think now that an exchange of technology for forklifts, trucks and telephones could also be practiced as part of an F-18 purchase.

The fusion between MBB and VFW which has been "imminent" for two years is another question. Where is this fusion, this so highly praised new arrangement, this remedy for all ills? The "Technology Center in the North" — as VFW views itself — or "the workbench extension" — as the (still existing) competition in the south views it — is, despite the divorce from Fokker, still an independent enterprise which even enjoys increasing economic health if the 614 program loans to be repaid to the state could be forgotten. Literally every shareholder — with there being only three in VFW since the Heinkel group sold its 12 percent to the Hanseatische Industriebeteiligungen GmbH and enabled the city state to jump

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The Do-27 Do-2 Skyvort was displayed at Hannover in a maritime surveillance version with 30 beam radar. The Skyvort fuselage is being used to develop a 14- and 16-seat commuter aircraft with a new high-lift wing and retractable landing gear. It is to be named the Dk. As of April 25, 1967, seven Do-27 aircraft have been sold. On the world market the biggest competitor is de Havilland of Canada. A Skyvort with turbo-propeller engines is being equipped for the Bundeswehr (Federal armed forces). There are hopes of a major contract for 100 aircraft for the Luftwaffe and the Federal navy.

IN THE BUDGET NIGHTLY LINE JOURNAL IS WORKING ON THE FOLLOWING LINE
" (railroad structure) (air-traffic) (airline) and has also had a few others.

about a cruise missile. Dornier is proud of the ISM (International Solar Mission) in which it is not only the prime contractor in a strong consortium but also won all seven experiments. In February 1983 two probes, one by the ESA (European Space Agency) and one by NASA, are to be launched together. Other deliveries include the Spacelab life support system, the microwave sensing experiment for the first Spacelab payload and parts for the space telescope and the European earth resources satellite system.

All this gives a positive picture but shadows are still being cast by the question: what comes after Alpha Jet?

MRB

Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blom GmbH, now already (before joining VFW) the largest German aviation concern, is active in all aviation and space sectors: combat and commercial aircraft, helicopters, guided missiles and space. With an order backlog of over DM 6 billion, the 1979 turnover increased to DM 2.6 billion (1978: DM 2.12 billion) with 25,500 (1978: 22,200) employees. Military business comprises 65 percent but a tendency to decrease shows as Airbus production increases. Professor Gero Radelung informed WIRTSCHAFTSZEITUNG that "this scale is not a goal in itself for MRB but rather an indication of capability," whereas the political heads of the ministries want a large concern, the lower working levels seem to view MRB as a monopoly which "is of some concern to us."

The Aircraft Division is concentrating heavily on the development and production of Tornado but mention may also be made in the development sector of the development of technical maintenance for the F-4, ZTL/KCL (future aviation technology/aviation components and experimental program) work and also a certain degree of cooperation on the A-300. In manufacture there is, in addition to Tornado (final assembly of the German Tornado in Munich, fuselage middle section manufacture in Europe's likely most modern aircraft plant in Augsburg), maintenance of F-104G and F-4 (also requirement for the latter) and repairs for the USAF (F-4, F-15) and the US Navy air arm in the Mediterranean. In the future Tornado technical maintenance development will occupy a lesser share of development capacity so that this can be wholly concentrated on the IXV. If this development program should not materialize, the consequences for the firm (and the German aviation industry) cannot be predicted.

The Hamburg Division is making an effort to increase, with a considerable investment (about DM 500 million in the medium term), Airbus production from the present 2.5 per month (actually already components for 3) to 6 by 1984 and possibly even to 10. One important aspect: personnel increase will be limited (less than 1,000).

ST002 (D) Flight training at Manching
ST003 (D) Flight training at Manching.

MTU

In 1979 the Munich aircraft engine enterprise with 6,400 employees (up 300) increased its turnover by almost 16 percent to DM 508 million with orders received actually up 128 percent to DM 1.15 billion. The RB 199 Tornado engine, now produced at a rate of almost ten per month, makes up a significant share of all figures but there is also a good turnover in development (this includes the manufacture of development engines). Over 80 percent of the turnover comes from military contracts — in addition to the RB 199, spare parts for the Tyne, T64 and J-79, a production share in the Larzac-04 Alpha Jet engine and manufacture of the parts (40 percent) and final assembly of the Allison C20 engine for the VUH/PAH-1 [liaison and observation helicopter/antitank helicopter]. Civilian business consists largely of manufacturing shares in the General Electric CF6 engine for the Airbus, the Pratt & Whitney JT40 and the civilian version of the Tyne. The company is placing great hopes on the modern Pratt & Whitney JT100 engine in which MTU has a 13 percent development and production share. From the mid-1980's this engine could be used in the Airbus A-300 B-11 and the Boeing 757.

In the medium term the RB 199 will remain the primary production of MTU Munich. About 80 of these engines have been manufactured hitherto and the monthly rate is to be increased to 24 with MTU doing final assembly of all German Tornado engines in addition to its 40 percent production share. The company is, for understandable reasons, making efforts to offer this engine, possibly modified, for the TKF (see also the box in the TKF article).

Since December 1979 MTU and Turbomeca have been running test models of the 800kW MTM380 engine which will be used initially in the yet to be developed PAH-2 but also in future civil helicopters and — in a turbo-prop version — for general aviation aircraft. MTU is responsible for the hot gas tract of the MTM380 and Turbomeca for the axial radial compressor and controls.

VFW

When someone who was fatally ill two years ago gets better from day to day, only the heirs are sorry. Today VFW employs, together with its daughter firms Erno and Rhein-Flugzeugbau, around 12,000 workers, more than ever before. Turnover last year reached DM 1 billion. The high production rate Airbus program is not yet the main source of profits. On the contrary, the program requires considerable investment — about DM 300 million for Airbus and Tornado.

Airbus occupies 2,400 employees. Fuselage sections 13 and 14 (between the cockpit and the wing) are manufactured in Linzwarden and Lemwerder (also the service center). Final equipping of the wings is done at the Bremen plant. At Lemwerder 30 Airbus aircraft have already been modified into special versions. VFW has 35 percent and 1,600 employees involved in Tornado production. The new Transall series occupies 500 VFW workers. The expanding Special Equipment Division with 700 employees had a 1979 turnover of DM 67 million achieved through development and construction of electronic systems, measurement data capture systems, simulators, checkout systems, functional test stands, transport and hoist systems and special machines.

The company has close ties with firms in the United States. In space this includes Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas as well as the agreement between Rhein-Flugzeugbau and Vought about the Fantrainer. A memorandum of agreement with the [US] Navy about X-114 technology is still waiting for the American signature. The delay is being attributed to American budgetary difficulties but the signature is expected in the summer. The Pinguin underwater drone is being tested in the Baltic.

VFW also has a few irons in the fire in the unmanned aircraft area. One is Tucan, an experimental aircraft for target reconnaissance and army fire control and another is an antiradar drone evaluated as very promising by many experts and being jointly developed with General Dynamics.

Erno presently employs 1,100. NASA has finally issued the contract for the second Spacelab. Erno has overall responsibility including integration and tests for the second stage of Ariane launch vehicle. As a member of the MESSE consortium, Erno participates in the ECS, Marex, Telecom and TV-Sat communications satellites. Sea King helicopters are serviced in Bremen and CH-53's in Speyer.

Tornado

The Trinational Tornado Training Establishment [TTTE] is a joint training establishment for Tornado crews from the Federal Republic, Great Britain and Italy. Crews of the British national Air Defense Variant will not be sent to Cottesmore. Perhaps the best description of the TTTE is that a German pilot will be trained in a British aircraft by an Italian instructor. About 800 German soldiers and their families will be stationed there for some years. The TTTE will provide not only retraining to the new aircraft type and acquisition of weapon system skills but also formation flying, navigation flights, primarily terrain-following, extreme low level flights and tactical training. Crews at Cottesmore will gain operational experience through simulated attacks based on simulated tactical situations and return to their units as crews trained for their operational mission. In addition to the three flying squadrons designated A, B and C, there is also a standardization squadron and a fifth squadron for

theoretical flight training and flight simulation. The formation is commanded by either an RAF wing commander or a German Luftwaffe lieutenant colonel. About 150 crews per year are to be retrained at Cottesmore. The German side will require that the pilot and systems operator (combat observer) remain together in at least the training phases. Individual crews will spend four months at Cottesmore and fly about 80 hours during this time. Instruction will begin in the second half of 1980. Up to 48 Tornado aircraft will be stationed in the common aircraft pool at Cottesmore. From 1987 on this number will decrease to below 30.

In 1982 the first navy wing will convert to Tornado. The *Koerwisch* wing will follow in 1983. Because of excessive British financial demands, weapons training will be done on a national basis at the — to be renamed — Weapons School C in Jever. Jever will receive aircraft between Marine and Luftwaffe reequipment.

At present three lots with a total of 314 aircraft are in series production. The release for the fourth lot of 300 aircraft is expected this year. At present there is no delay in series production in Germany. The production rate is two aircraft per month and will be increased to the economic rate of nine by 1982. Acceleration is already underway and investments are at work. The strikes in England have resulted in a delivery delay of two months to which may be added the 1978 delay of six months. Germany has a certain advance since reserves were programmed from the beginning. The air forces or naval aviation reequipment plans will not be effected by this delay.

A trilateral decision was made that, in addition to single-source production for the first three years of the use phase, the single-source principle would be continued as regards maintenance and spare parts. Device manufacturers are thus responsible for maintenance and spare parts. Afterwards the country is free to take up maintenance and spare parts with other firms and with its own capacity (repair plants).

Avionics have changed greatly during the development period (10 years). There are practically three avionics generations installed. The flight control system is analog, there is digital hardware and the ECM components are also digital.

Alpha Jet

At Fuerstenfeldbruck Air Base on 20 March under very low cloud formations, Luftwaffe Commander Lieutenant General Friedrich Obleser was able to proudly place Alpha Jet in service with Fighter-Bomber Wing [Jabo] 49 against a background of 32 displayed aircraft. Jabo 49, which functions as a training wing, is the first to be reequipped with this flexible close-support fighter. Next will be Jabo 43, Oldenburg, and Jabo 41, Husum. In May 18 Alpha Jets will be sent to Beja, Portugal. According to the general, no Luftwaffe weapon system has ever been introduced with

such enthusiasm and energy. Squadron strength amounts to 10 aircraft. Each wing has two squadrons. There is a circulating reserve of 15 aircraft. Obleser also made the following remarks:

The weak points previously detected were, from the engineering standpoint, held within permissible limits during testing. They had no effect on troop trials or operations. There was never any risk to flight safety. The second weak point — ejection — was fixed with a separated jettison system.

As concerns weapons selection, it could be said that weapons equipment could be repeatedly changed during the life of a weapon system since weapons development normally took only five years whereas the useful life of the system was 20 to 25 years. A weapon system should thus be regarded as satisfying future requirements. Precision standoff weapons were provided for Alpha Jet. Consideration was also being given to equipping Alpha Jet with a smaller RU-X.

The criticism about the weapons inventory was justified. The weapons concept had to be discussed with NATO. The so-called "third weapons generation" of the Americans was heavily influenced by Vietnam. All these weapons required a certain operational scale. This applied also to the existing Maverick which was not suitable as is for Europe. But a version suitable for the lowest altitudes was being developed.

The danger from Soviet combat helicopters had been recognized by NATO. The problem in combatting these was one of detecting the helicopter. It was intended to equip the Antitank Helicopter 2 [PAH-2] with a longer-range weapon. The use of Alpha Jet against combat helicopters had to be investigated in practice jointly with the army. The trials were to take place this year.

According to General Obleser, the Alpha Jet had very good avionics and considerable development potential through differing programming. There were also development reserves in the capability to fly in a single- or twin-seat [configuration]. The ECM equipment was already fitted and could be removed and improved with infrared attachments.

On the subject of spare parts supply, General Obleser stated that production-standard devices normally became available only at a late date because current production had to be satisfied first. There were bottlenecks at present but they had hitherto had no effect. Difficulties could be expected when the first aircraft were sent to Baja.

As concerns a possible powerplant performance increase, consideration had to be given to what it would cost and whether it would really result in a weapon system performance increase. It was thus a financial question.

On the basis of the December 1979 price structure, the aircraft unit price was DM 13.7 million, the system price DM 20.3 million and the total program over DM 3.5 billion.

By the end of this year a total of 230 aircraft would be delivered. Testing continues, including weapons tests in Cassau. Testing of the overall system would begin in the summer. Supplemental equipment including the doppler navigation system (LITEF), the TRT-6-18 radar altimeter and the Lear Siegler LSI 6000E gyroscopic platform would be installed. Improvement possibilities included the double pylon [as] the one previously developed by ML [M.L. Aviation Company Limited] was creating headaches. For this reason Dassault had developed a tandem pylon.

In the summer the A-1 was to be reequipped. It was to be given a transonic wing. This was a test vehicle for various new technologies. In addition to the new wing, the A-1 would also receive important CFK [carbon-fiber reinforced plastic] components such as a dive brake which was already in series production, a rudder which was being flight tested and later an elevator.

Direct lateral force control was also being investigated. Split flaps on the pylons (maneuver flaps) increased the maneuver spectrum.

The flaps were already prepared. Testing was to begin in the fall with prototype 03. This was, however, a purely national program financed from ZTL and KTL [funds]. Another possible improvement was an automatic flight planning system.

A comparison between Alpha Jet and the A-10 "tank killer" was interesting. Whereas the A-10 was a pure ground support weapon, the Alpha Jet had other missions. According to Dornier studies, the maneuverability of the Alpha Jet was considerably better than that of the A-10. This applied to both the 200 and the 400 knot radius with the A-10 proving to be even worse in the latter than the F-5E and F-4.

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CSO: 3103

PEKKA VENNAMO ATTEMPTS MODERATE IMAGE AT RURAL PARTY MEET

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] Lahti (Hannu Savola) It was the usual cracks that the Finnish Rural Party (SMP) convention followed, which opened in warm Lahti on Saturday.

Once again corruption of the old parties and decay of politics were established, whereas the Rural Party was seen as the only defender and saviour of democracy.

The 21-year old party still closely remains in the Vennamos' command. The Lahti convention unanimously approved by prolonged applause the reelection of Pekka Vennamo, 35, who now begins his second year as chairman.

Speakers praised Pekka Vennamo "the best chairman in Finland" and "a strong personality." He was considered to have given the party a new image and several speakers argued the excellence and far-sightedness of the power transfer.

Tone Down

Pekka Vennamo opened the Saturday meeting with an hour-long political survey. Though the old parties did get their due, the Rural Party chairman used a clearly lower and more moderate tone than the Rural Party delegates get used to hearing during Vennamo senior's chairmanship.

According to Vennamo it is the Rural Party's duty to uphold the banner democracy and to remind the rulers that the people's will must be obeyed.

"The ruling parties and the economic direction have become estranged from people," accused the chairman. The four big parties are continuously drawing closer to each other and people cannot get their voices heard through them."

According to Vennamo change of faces has not changed the situation: "Vayrynen's ears are just as clogged as Virolainen's are, and only the wishes from the capitalist circles can cut through the armours of the Conservative Party's Suominen as it was the case with Holkeri."

Chairman Vennamo also found fault with the tax debate. According to Vennamo, talks about shifting the tax center of gravity are only intended to hide the fact that total taxation is far too heavy. He announced that the Rural Party strongly opposes value added tax increase, which would create taxes for the poor to pay.

The uniqueness and excellence of the Rural Party in comparison with the others were stressed in the speeches. Party Secretary Urpo Leppanen among others told the convention delegates that Finland without the Rural Party would no longer be a nation of free party formation.

Toni Poikolainen gets applause

Except for a small crack the choices for the party leadership were unanimous. The second loudest applause after Vennamo, however, was given to Toni Poikolainen, whose [Olympic] gold medal convention chairman Mikko Vainio told the delegates about in the course of elections.

Silja Salpakari, 60, a Tuusula farmer and trucker was elected the first deputy chairman. He is a former member of the Rural Party board of directors.

Farmer's wife Aune Rautanen, 50, of Haukiputaas will continue as the second deputy chairman, and representative Urpo Leppanen, MA, 30, as party secretary.

One convention delegate did attempt to propose organization secretary Arto Hirvonen for party secretary. He reasoned his proposal with the fact that representatives to the Diet have too much work. Leppanen could, however, be elected unanimously as Hirvonen rushed to refuse the honor.

In the political communique the Rural Party convention states that the period of democratic front has driven the nation to misery of problems. Democracy is seen to have fallen into decay and the true choices have shrunk to only one - the Rural Party.

"Serious crisis after UKK"

The most colorful speech of the day in the usual style was delivered by temporary chairman Veikko Vennamo, who spoke at the convention's evening event.

In the long speech he reviewed the Rural Party's achievements and fight against abuse. To conclude his speech he stated that the Finnish people gradually will have to face the moment of truth, "which possibly coincides with Urho Kekkonen's stepping aside according to nature's law." "We will then find ourselves in a serious social crisis," Veikko Vennamo declared.

The organizers estimate that over 1,000 Party Members have gathered to the Lahti convention. On the last convention day Sunday the meeting will adopt a number of communiques and reports.

RAILS

RAILS COUNTERVAILING SALES--The Hawk (including jet) countervailing sales with England have proceeded as anticipated and will probably be completed as scheduled. At this time over 90 percent of the countervailing sale has been completed and the rest of the goal of nearly 800 million marks will be fulfilled by the deadline next summer. The countervailing sales value now is over 71/2 billion marks. The purpose is to fulfill countervailing purchase for over 77 1/2 billion marks. The main part or two-thirds of the sales consist of metal industry items. The forest industry's portion is only around 10 percent and the Finnish work at the Valmet assembly plant covers 15 percent of the goal. The rest consists of miscellaneous, mainly electronic, items. "The purpose is to concentrate the countervailing trade mainly to high-technology metal and electronics industry production," says the secretary of the compensation working group, Pekka Rantanen of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "At the same time we are seeking to develop the established commercial relations to become permanent. It has been the principle not to accept for compensation sales any items we traditionally trade with England, such as pulp and paper." The value of the Hawk trade signed by the Finnish government in 1977 was approximately 1 billion marks and it is the largest single order made by our country. Four of the 30 planes will be built in England and the other 26 will be assembled at the Valmet plant in Kuopio. The first English made planes will be delivered in the latter part of the year and the ones being assembled domestically will be ready for flying by 1980 with the pace of one to three planes a month. [Text] [Helsinki] SWEDISHS BARNAT in Finland 2 Aug 80 p 19 UTR

DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO LAPP--The Parliamentary Defense Committee will visit the military region of northern Finland and the Lapland border areas at the beginning of August. The tour begins in Rovaniemi and ends on Thursday. The committee will visit the garrisons of Oulu, Rovaniemi and Utsjoki, the Field Artillery training camp in Rovaniemi and the border guard command in Utsjoki. During the tour the committee members will familiarize themselves with military positions, questions of northern Finland and with the conditions and equipment of troops in the area. Representative Tapio Miettinen (National Coalition) will head the tour. The Parliamentary Treasury Committee headed by Pertti Salminen (National Coalition) on Thursday ended its seven-day tour in Lapland. The committee raised the 30 to 100 million mark question of the Rovaniemi. The Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee already paid a visit

to Spain, the Agriculture and Forestry Committee to Turku and environs, the salary division of the Treasury Committee went on a two weeks trip to Africa and the traffic division to Lake-Finland. Besides the Defense Committee other visits are scheduled before the Diet assembly by the Social Affairs Committee to Kalma and northern Finland, the Education Committee to Denmark, England and France and by the Law and Economy Committee to Ostrobothnia. [Text] (Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Aug 80 p 6) 9718

LAW TREATY WITH USSR--The treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union on legal assistance and judicial protection took effect on August 8. It is confirmed by a statute released on Thursday. Among other things the agreement provides a citizen of the other country with same judicial protection as the country's own citizens in both countries' judicial courts. Both countries will also give each other legal assistance each according to her own laws. Citizens of each country are eligible for cost-free trials in the other country on the same basis as the other country's citizens are. About marriage it is ordered that the forms of the country will be followed where the marriage takes place. [Text] (Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Aug 80 p 3) 9718

CSO: 3107

CHIRAC, GAULLIST FACTOR IN 1981 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Chirac Weighs Possible Candidacy

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Jul 80 pp 1, 7

[Article by Andre Passeron: "The Presidential Election"]

[Text] The Gaullists do not feel themselves bound by majority solidarity.

Mr Chirac refrains from attacking the PS [Socialist Party].

In publishing, on Tuesday, 22 July, on the eve of the August political truce, a somewhat solemn statement (read page 7), Mr Jacques Chirac is showing his concern for making things clear, as far as he is concerned, some 9 months away from the presidential election, and for stating the principles on which his thoughts are based at this time.

The mayor of Paris states that he will only reveal his decision to be--or not to be--a candidate for the presidential election "when the time comes," that is, at the end of the year or at the beginning of 1981. He already lists, however, four principles which may lead us to believe that he is "leaning" very seriously toward a candidacy, but that he is still giving himself time for reflection and the freedom to evaluate the circumstances which will arise from now till then.

This is the first time that Mr Chirac is tackling so precisely the problem of the presidential election. This focusing is justified, not only because the electoral campaign is already--in reality--fully open, but also because of the pressures in opposite directions being exerted on the mayor of Paris.

The announcement of Mr Michel Debre's candidacy has for the past few days intensified these antagonistic tendencies. Many of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] chairman's friends were urging him to declare his candidacy without delay, in order to check the relative confusion which has taken over a part of his party's militants.

Many of Mr Debre's friends, on the other hand, think that Mr Jacques Chirac can no longer henceforth plunge into the race to the Elysee. They affirm that the mayor of Antibes is enough to personify Gaullism, and they promise the mayor of Paris greater opportunities in...1988.

The two former prime ministers had, however, agreed, during a private luncheon on 31 May last, to inform each other of their decisions and, in any case, not to declare their candidacies before September. Now, without warning Mr Chirac, Mr Michel Debre announced his candidacy as early as 30 June. Encouragement from various sources--much of it coming from opponents of the mayor of Paris--convinced him to speed up the movement to catch his party chairman unawares.

He himself affirms it was only the opinions expressed by Mr Giscard d'Estaing in his 26 June press conference, with which he was in disagreement, that decided him. Since then, besides, neither Mr Chirac nor Mr Debre has made any hurtful remark about the other, each one seemingly wanting to prepare for the future. Both prefer to use veiled allusions which can be deciphered by the initiated.

Each one is aware that the political future of the Gaullist family is at stake in this election; each one hopes to be at one and the same time the guarantor for Gaullist unity and to ensure for it by his candidacy the best possible electoral score.

If Mr Chirac insists today on saying at the same time that he is not yet a candidate, but that he remains very much present in the political battle--as if not to let us forget--it is in order to better list four principles that constitute a real preamble to his subsequent entry into the lists. Despite their restrained and even elliptic formulation, they are already sufficiently explicit.

The statement that "a Gaullist candidate should strengthen the union" on the occasion of the presidential election is an indirect and veiled reproach to Mr Debre. Whether the latter denies this or not, his candidacy has indeed been received, particularly on the part of the Giscardians, as a sign of Gaullist division.

However, no deep crack is visible as yet in the RPR ranks. The committees calling for Mr Chirac's candidacy, often set up on the initiative of party officials, are a reminder of the loyalty to the movement's chairman. And if those with Mr Chirac affirm having received encouragement from some 30 members of Parliament, they refuse to publish their names. Only Messrs Rufenacht, the Loire-Atlantique deputy, and Maurice Duval, the Paris deputy, a long-time partisan of the deputy from Reunion, deputy mayor to the mayor of the capital, have openly taken a stand.

Mr Chirac then stresses that, according to the traditional doctrine of the Fifth Republic, a candidate for the presidential election--at least in the

concept held by the representatives of the majority--could not be "a man of one party." The three presidents of the Fifth Republic always ran without seeking the nomination of their original formation. It can be expected that Mr Chirac--if he decides to run--will give up his duties as RPR chairman, entrusting them in the interim to the others presently leading the movement. During the autumn, after holding a press conference around 15 September, he could, moreover, stand somewhat aloof from the activity of his parliamentary group by devoting more time to Paris and by making several trips abroad, particularly to Brazzaville, from 3 to 6 October.

The mayor of Paris, in his third point, specifies somewhat more the political direction of his possible candidacy. Just as John the Good listened to the exhortations of his son Philip the Bold, Mr Chirac is advising himself to protect himself on the right and on the left. While challenging "the mirages of the union of the left," he avoids any direct attack on the socialists and their future candidate. During the preceding consultations--the legislative consultations in 1978 and the European ones in 1979--Mr Chirac several times appealed to the socialist electorate, and he has never denied that certain "convergences" could exist between Gaullism and socialism. The Gaullism of the left, however scabrous, scattered and divided it may be, is none the less taken into account by the RPR, which has made of Mr Charbonnel, former chairman of the Federation of Progressive Republicans, its general delegate in charge of participation, in spite of the lack of success of his efforts to federate the small groups of Gaullists of the left.

What the mayor of Paris categorically rejects is an organic collusion between communist and socialist leaders pretending to believe that this hypothesis is still achievable, but he does not dispute the rightness of certain principles of socialist doctrine, although he does not list them. Denouncing the union of the left, whose obsolete nature is now well demonstrated, Mr Chirac seems--a contrario--to give new consideration to socialism alone.

Curiously, in Mr Debre's entourage a comparable analysis is made. It is pointed out that next year--in contrast to 1974--the socialist candidate will no longer be tied by a constraining agreement to the Communist Party administrative staff and that he will, consequently, be free to modify his politics in accordance with his own convictions and his own electoral interests.

If in his inclinations, the socialist candidate takes Gaullist sensibilities more into account than did Mr Cocard d'Estaing, this can then influence the choice for the second ballot.

The Gaullists, whether it is a question of Mr Chirac or Mr Debre, now seem therefore to be taking into consideration the disappearance of the union of the left, the evolution of the PS and also the bureaucratic influence, growing for the last 5 years, which is to some extent draining the content out of liberal society.

Mr Jacques Chirac does not seem at all ready to become, in the second ballot of the presidential election, the purveyor of Giscardism, nor to fly to its rescue without taking precautions as he had done in 1974. Indeed, in challenging "pretences and double dealing," the mayor of Paris is plainly taking aim at the behavior and ulterior motives of Mr Giscard d'Estaing. The friends of the deputy from Corrèze have been denouncing, since 1976, not only the policies decided on by the chief of state and implemented by Mr Raymond Barre but also the prospects of a change in majority. According to this plan, which is sometimes attributed to him, Mr Valéry Giscard d'Estaing would be ready to accept a socialist support that would enable him to get rid of the too insubordinate Gaullists.

In adopting, as of now, a reproving attitude toward the union of the left and a critical one toward Mr Giscard d'Estaing, and in placing both on the same level, Mr Jacques Chirac allows an uncertainty to exist as to his behavior between the two presidential election ballots. The position which he seems to take today cannot in any way prejudice the voting instructions he may give to his constituents the day after the first ballot, or even allow us to foresee that he will give any advice at all. Mr Chirac wishes to keep his hands free as long as possible, but already--just like Mr Debre--he no longer considers himself bound by majority solidarity.

It is true that Mr Chirac affirms--and this is his fourth principle--that a candidate's only objective is to win. This proclamation is indeed legitimate on the part of a man who could seek votes beyond the limits of his party. He does not reproach Mr Debre, as do some of his friends, for being a candidate to "bear witness," thus once again avoiding a clash with one who was his fellow candidate in the European elections. The mayor and to disperse its electorate (as published).

Chirac Statement on Candidacy

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Jul 80 p 7

["Text" of statement published by Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac on 22 July 1980--place not specified]

[Text] The presidential election should leave no place for pretences or double dealing, affirms the former prime minister.

Here is the entire text of the statement published on Tuesday, 22 July, by Mr Jacques Chirac:

"The electoral campaign for the presidential election has indeed already been open for several months. Such a situation is bad for France: it accentuates the divisions in public opinion whose present concerns are rightly of another nature, while, at the same time, deepening the rift that is widening between the citizens and those who have the mandate to represent them.

"For my part, I do not intend to add to the confusion or to the confrontation of ambitions. That is why I have decided not to make any statement concerning the decision I will have to make before the time comes for me to speak. That time will come when the great national debate which the presidential election should lead to can begin without endangering the authority of France and the efficiency of the State.

"On the other hand, while rivalries between the parties and trends within the parties will become more intense, it is urgent to remind the French that the president when they will invest with the supreme responsibility could not claim to represent France in the name of a political group. The president is the man of the nation as a whole; his mission is to express and to serve the national interest alone.

"Such is the basis of the institutions which the Fifth Republic has given to the French Government, to free it from party influence and to deliver it from impotence.

"These principles, to which, whatever happens, I intend to remain faithful, entail for all those who use them requirements and duties which they must clearly assume.

"1. The vocation of the Gaullist movement has always been to rally the French in the service of the national interest. For that, it must first of all remain united and stand together. That is why a Gaullist candidate must strengthen the union and not incite division. It is in that spirit that, nearly 4 years ago, I founded the Rally: I will not give up this ambition.

"2. Any man supported by the force and dynamism of a great national movement, who comes forward as a candidate for the votes of the French, cannot, evidently be the man of one party, or be mixed up with any political group. He must make his decision alone, according to his judgment of the situation and according to his capacity to answer the call of the nation. To be a guarantor, tomorrow, of the destiny of France, he must be called and confirmed by the confidence of as large a majority of the French as possible, above and beyond all legitimate differences.

"3. The French people must be presented, by those who seek their votes, with a clear choice, as is required, at one and the same time, by the spirit of our institutions and by political morality. As for me, I am, in any case, determined to fight for a society of freedom and responsibility and to defend the essential independence of the nation. That is why I have always challenged the mirages of the union of the left with or without a common program.

"The presidential election should leave no place for pretences of double dealing.

"a. The man who will bear these ambitions must have winning as a clear, avowed and convincing objective, so that France may assume the rank which is worthy of it. Politics is a battle in the service of an ideal, in order that that ideal may triumph. The people in their wisdom understand it thus. Such are the principles which have inspired my action in the past and which will determine it in the future."

The mayor of Paris is more afraid of the initiatives which could be taken--particularly by members of the government--to divide the Gaullist family and to disperse its electorate.

9434

CSD: 3100

IDEOLOGICAL PRECEPTS OF DISSIDENT COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST FACTIONS

Paris PROJET in French Jul-Aug 80 pp 874-879

[Article by Hugues Portelli: "The Ideology of the 'Ideological War'"]

[Text] For 2 years a new ideological theme has been serving as a reference point for part of the political and intellectual left. In the Communist party as well as in CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Education] this discourse has found its ideological exponents in the intelligentsia from among writers and journalists such as R. Debray or A. Mattelart: it is all summed up in a word, the "ideological war."

Behind this catchword, a very pessimistic vision of the evolution of French society is omnipresent. We must briefly lay that out.

In order to understand the thinking of these ideologues, one must locate its origin: the defeat of the French left in the elections of March 1978, which followed on the heels of the failure of the Portuguese revolution and, in the Third World, of the crisis of Asian communism. For this current of opinion which had long held out hope for a socialist evolution in France, the disappointment was severe. And the reaction is all the more bitter since the left's ebbtide has been accompanied by the rise of ideologies challenging the creed on which the undertaking of the union of the left had rested: criticism of Marxism via denunciation of totalitarianism, ideology of rebellion and the rise of liberal and liberatarian currents which appeal to a proportion of the intelligentsia.

For those intellectuals with Marxist leanings, who had been in a dominant position in the intelligentsia of the 1960s thanks to the pervasiveness of Marxism (especially of the Althusser variety) and Third World myths, the response is all the more difficult to take since the new intellectual leaders of the critique of Marxism (and of the traditional left) came from their own ranks: French Maoism was to supply the "new philosophy" with a certain number of its leaders, and the best defenders of a neo-liberal group are to be found among the former members of the group with Trotskyist leanings, "Socialism and Barbarism."

The counter-attack was also to take several forms.

The first was to be the one criticizing the "intellectuals." Since the statements had originated from within the intelligentsia "on the left," the denunciation of this circle was to be a priority task. R. Debray does it brilliantly in "Le Pouvoir intellectuel en France [Intellectual Power in France]" and others take their turn in passing it on through works devoted to the "perverse effects" of means of social communication. At a lower level, that of party conflicts, this is the fuss CERES has been making since 1977 by attacking the harmfulness of the "intellectual lower-middle class."

When one reads "Intellectual Power in France," the failings which are denounced turn out to be obvious ones: the smug self-importance and Parisian style of a notable portion of the intelligentsia, the playing on faddishness and lowering of quality by using marketing techniques along with the triumph of the ephemeral and the facile, and the harmful consequences of the close ties between the media and renowned intellectuals.

Unfortunately, this savage picture and the denunciation it provides hide a portion of reality from view: those persons who nowadays declaim against this stranglehold over the media and this ideological domination hardly used to do that when they themselves benefited from it and imposed different Marxist fashions on the intelligentsia. The same person who, in "Intellectual Power in France," denounces a particular publishing house as the headquarters of the new philosophy, will not consider it beneath him to have his new tract published there. Is this the "system's" capacity for rehabilitation or just simply the limitations of a statement of condemnation which appears only when one is no longer benefiting from the advantages--ephemeral ones--of that intellectual power? By the same token, how is one to believe in a denunciation of the intellectual lower-middle class by a portion of the left at a time when this same portion of the left recruits nearly all of its activists from there?

Therefore, the weakness of the argumentation used in this attack surfaces quickly: if the arrows it shoots at the failings of Parisian intellectuals do reach their target, it is armchair ideologues, yesterday's as well as today's, who are hit.

That is why the anti-intellectual argument is used with care. There is more intensive recourse to be had in straight ideological arguments.

And going beyond the petty arguments, what do the proponents of the "ideological war" in effect reproach their opponents for? Basically for being the relay stations, the agents of adaptation in France to the dominant culture on the other side of the Atlantic. This culture, fundamentally alien to Marxism, has two defects: it is based on middle-class liberalism and its values, but above all--in appearing as a universal model--it sets France culturally in line with the United States, with the active complicity of the French upper-middle class (and its politico-ideological power, "Gaiscardism"), and the more or less passive acquiescence of a portion of the left. Thus there would

seem to exist an "American" right and left, partially opposed because of their political following, but fundamentally in agreement for accepting the political and cultural values of Anglo-Saxon liberalism. Since 1974, with the liquidation of Gaullism and the victory of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, this ideology has become genuinely "dominant."

Now then its roots are older than that. For R. Debray,¹ just as for CERES (as the original version of the "socialist program" drafted by J.P. Chevenement shows), this development began in May 1968. The "liberal-libertarian" themes of the May movement, its alienation from Marxism (beyond some language from leftist groups), its roots in the "new layers of society," are just so many "proofs," for this current of opinion, of the collusive connection between May 1968 and current ideologies. Furthermore, it is asserted, was not May 1968, in the final analysis, the cradle of Giscardism?

This is a remarkable reversal: in the 1970s, the same people who reject May 1968 invoke its spirit in order to declare the need for the union of the left (a necessary "strategic" continuation of 1968) and for self-management.

In fact, aside from the guarded judgment this represents of a phenomenon which is still quite alien to this current of opinion, this is all a matter of a very clear throwback to a certain tradition.

In effect, under the guise of a return to Marxism, the critique of 1968 ideologies and of Americanism masks, in this current of opinion, the rediscovery of pre-1940 ideologies. From this point of view, the original text of the "socialist program" is revealing: condemning the "return of the irrational" in its various forms (the return to religion, neoromanticism, and the rebirth of fascistic schools are referred to in a confused jumble), the program's author glorifies the role of "Science," and of "Reason," and makes a reference to the pre-1940 French left and to its secular ideology. For these ideologues, when you look at it up close, the real conflict is not between Marxism and Americanism, but between the currents of rationalist thought (Marxism included), which characterized the culture of the left of the Third Republic, and the "irrationalist" tendencies, on which Americanism is grafted.

Once we have made some sense out of this defensive struggle, which is reaching the scope of an "ideological war" between the two camps, the essential question is to know how to succeed in getting past it. From this standpoint, the controversy takes off from two somewhat contradictory arguments.

On the one hand, there appears the "plot" theory, dear to conservative thinking: this plot has as its goal the Americanization of France, it is being carried out by a powerful pressure group led at the top by the Trilateral Commission

1. "Modeste contribution aux ceremonies du dixieme anniversaire [Modest Contribution to the Tenth Anniversary Ceremonies]," Ed. Maspere; this is a small polemical work devoted to May 1968.

and relayed by numerous networks in which high officials and intellectuals meet up with each other (along with compulsory activity by European institutions in their turn). This thesis of the intellectual plot--which is not without echoes of the Catholic counterrevolution's attacks on Freemasonry--is coupled with that of the internal enemy: a portion of the left (Rocardism) is participating in this undertaking by serving as a vehicle for "rightist" plans and is helping to "cloud an issue which had been carefully clarified, an issue from before 1940, at a time when the Right and the Left intersected without colliding."¹ For obvious tactical reasons, for CERES and R. Debray this "American left" is limited to Rocardism, while the Communist party extends it to the entire Socialist party.

The second argument is that of the dominant ideology: Americanism and the neo-liberal culture are described as omnipresent, advancing insidiously on the whole of our cultural domain to the point of becoming completely dominant. There would therefore seem to be in France a new dominant ideology (for R. Debray, dominant in the intellectual world; for the PCF and CERES, dominant in the political class, from Rocard to Giscard d'Estaing) to combat in a good old "ideological war."

The theme of the dominant ideology presents a problem: just as the plot theme refers to the classic counterrevolutionary argument which the left has made much use of,² the denunciation of the dominant ideology leads one to inquire about what ties this current of opinion has with a Marxism which it continues to cite as its authority. To be sure, since Gramsci and then Althusser, stress had been laid on the need not to fall into economism and to reevaluate the role of political and cultural "superstructures." Along these lines, the orientation provided during the years from 1960 to 1970 emphasized the study of the state (using the approach of Nicos Poulantzas) and what Althusser called the "State ideological machinery."

This second area has been the subject of two sets of considerations. On the one hand, more or less empirical analyses devoted to schooling, mass media and even religion; on the other hand, an attempt to more precisely delimit the notion of "ideology." Now then, in this latter area, an off-shoot has gradually been developed, focused on the theme of the "dominant ideology." There simplified reading of Gramsci and Althusser, which abandons the tie that those authors establish between ideology and socio-economic structures, has ended up by defending the idea that the quality of the ideology is the fundamental determining factor.

According to this conception, ideology is the real "cement" of all social and political groupings; it gives them their cohesion and influences the other governing factors (political and economic).

1. Original text of the "socialist program."

2. Cf. P. Birnbaum, "Le peuple et les gros [The People and the Big Shots]," Grasset, 1980.

This ideology is of course the ideology of the dominant social group, the middle class. But there once again, the voluntaristic rereading of Gramsci and Althusser makes itself felt. For the proponents of the "ideological war," the "dominant" ideology constitutes a reality which is more than autonomous in its relation to the social environment.

More than autonomous first of all to the extent that these ideologues put emphasis on the people who generate ideology. True to the political and economic interests of the ruling class, this ideology receives its stamp most of all by those who elaborate it: the intellectuals. The latter become, according to this notion, the real strategists of the middle class, by virtue of their privileged position: the world economic crisis, it is stressed, will end up weakening the social and economic domination of the middle class: ideology and, along with it the intellectuals, must make up for these weaknesses and play a prominent role. Furthermore, ideology is better able to keep the working classes in line (by developing a new conformity) than are the traditional means (economic and institutional) to the extent that "popular culture," traditionally weak and broken-up, is in a state of full-blown crisis nowadays due to the effect of modernization. Finally, through the agency of the intelligentsia, the most powerful and most advanced sectors of the middle class can impose an ideology which escapes the influence of traditional or marginal sectors of the ruling class. Therefore, from every point of view, the fundamental conflicts are unfolding on ideological ground.

The strategic role of intellectuals is also due to the central function allotted to them by those ideologues: in their capacity as the intellectual leaders of the ruling class, intellectuals are not simply the ideology's "civil servants" but they entrench that class in power, they provide its policy direction, and they mould its culture and spread it throughout the body of society; on this account, their function is more important than the industrial or financial middle class, and more effective than the civil service or the army.

From the time when ideology became the principal stake for the proponents of the "ideological war," the fundamental class conflict was not located on the level of production relationships or political struggle but on that of culture. The "ideological war" is none other than class conflict between the dominant ideology and those who resist it. According to this notion, the ideologues of the "resistance" to the dominant ideology are accorded a role as the central protagonist: finding themselves up against upper-middle class intellectuals, and up against their culture, some other intellectuals rise up, standard-bearers of alternative values. This type of thinking might well recall movements such as the "Proletkult" ones of proletarian culture during the 1920s, in a Russia in which Leninism was triumphant. In fact, it is nothing of the sort: for the proponents of the "ideological war," it is not at all a matter of glorifying or unearthing a working-class or popular culture (they have nothing of the populist about them); they would much rather "defend" traditional values (basically national ones) threatened by modern-day culture which has come from the other side of the Atlantic and been transmitted by

large portion of the intelligentsia in an accommodating fashion. From this point of view, after one goes past a certain amount of Marxist-leaning verbiage, the make-up of the ideological war has nothing Marxist about it: for some (R. Debray), it is a new leading a struggle analogous to that of those persons who once condemned the "trahison des clercs [treachery of the intellectuals]" (Benda, Herl); while for the others, the essential question is to save the traditional ideology of the French left (and the three panels of its triptych: Marxism, secularism and Jacobinism) from those who would like to put another in its place: this is the meaning of the argumentation made by CERES and the Communist Party.

In both cases, the battle against those who are considered usurpers starts out by appealing to tradition and orthodoxy. From the point of this denunciation on, the overall reaction is above all and inevitably defensive: up to now, these ideologues seem to have been incapable of going beyond the level of condemnation per se in order to propose a genuinely positive alternative. Because it is a denunciation of an ideology and opponents who are omnipresent, the dominant trend is to withdraw into sectarian corners, into an intellectual ivory tower for some, into a defense of orthodoxy for the others.

The drawbacks of this kind of attitude are obvious. By withdrawing into ideological fortresses, the proponents of the "ideological war" are in fact giving up on doing battle and rallying around a genuine intellectual and political program those people who they would like to tear away from "Americanism." They are only able to gather together meager troops on the basis of their critiques: this is confirmed by the paltry success the restructuring of the center of communist intellectual activity has had, or by the decline of CERES, as well as by the incapacity of R. Debray to win over to his stands more than some embittered or nostalgic people.

Quite logically, these ideologues end up being subjected fatalistically to the ideology they denounce: certainly one might have to vigorously denounce a new dominant culture but one should not have any illusions about the immediate success of that denunciation. Convinced of the current decadence of French society (linked to the victory of Americanism), the proponents of the ideological war are waiting for this decadence to bring in its train a national upsurge: therefore the analogy is made with 1940, the comparison between the Vichy regime andiscardism, categorized as "weak Vichyism," and the appeal for "resistance" to this decadence.

By doing this, the ideologues of this intransigent and voluntarist left are leaving themselves open to complicity with certain Gaullist groups (for example in articles and works such as those of Ph. de Saint-Robert) and indeed the "new right," which agrees with them in their denunciation of Americanism and defense of a European "civilization."

This is, "objectively speaking," a coincidence, which should make them more cautious in their discourse about the relations between an "Americanist left" and "Americanist right" and to handle certain arguments more circumspectly.

Beyond the value, which is arguable and even fanciful (like that of the analogy with Vichy), of certain assertions, one has trouble seeing how this political and intellectual current could go beyond having an influence which is not negligible but is decidedly a minority one among the intelligentsia, and could really establish the "ideological war" which it desires but it proves incapable of justifying with anything that is serious.

9631

CSO: 3100

MILITARY, CIVIL AIR OPERATIONS AT TOURS AIRPORT DESCRIBED

Paris AIR ACTUALITES in French May 80 pp 37-43

[Article by Philippe Sourzac: "Fox Mike 0152 Approaching Tours"]

[Text] "Rictus Sixteen, you can take off, axis wind 15 miles -- Obstruction on manual -- At 1000 feet contact Approach on Channel 5."

"Fox Mike 0152 approaching Tours, at 1500 feet recall to Fox Echo the 1003 millibars, transponder on 'Low'."

"Right, Fox Tango Echo Bravo Charlie, in CCM Alpha and Charlie, it's a Y33... Departing from Tours at 0800 Zoulou, Raki, towards Romeo Kilo 05, level 185."

These are some radio and telephone messages sent by the Local Airport Control of Tours. Yes, some only as the air traffic means more than 70,000 movements (landings or takeoffs) in 1979 -- one movement per minute every day last January or 30 planes in flight handled simultaneously on some occasions.

The CLA (Local Airport Control) personnel do not complain, the whole fascinating part of the job being precisely to adapt oneself to the traffic with each one having one part of responsibility in the takeoff or landing of the planes under control.

The mission of a CLA is to insure within its air space the management of a certain traffic, in other words to control it. And to control means to guide, to supervise, to authorize and to inform the air traffic in count-down or in radio contact.

At Tours it is question of an important mission since Saint Symphorien Airport is open to air traffic both military and civil as well as to the international air traffic. The military engines (Y33 and Alpha Jet of the Fighter Plane School) represent 98 percent of the recorded traffic but following precise timetables, there are integrated to this traffic

civilian company plane^{*} and those of general description. And while controlling all this intense air activity the CLA directs a GCA (Ground Controlled Approach) instruction center as well that has to do with the training of young controller officers and noncommissioned officers.

Three Elements Complementing One Another

The CLA is articulated around three great divisions:

- the approach
- the lookout
- the aeronautics information bureau (BIA).

The two first divisions are closely interlinked since their missions are very much complementary.

The Approach: Located on the first floor of the tower, the approach room is plunged in semiobscurity which allows for a better reading of the radar screens. Donning their radio helmets the controllers are in constant touch with the planes coming within the zone of responsibility of the approach: always on the lookout with their eyes fixed to their "scopes" or screens, they supervise the movements, control and guide. This room is subdivided into several posts:

- a climb/takeoff post in charge of the protection and radar guidance of the planes which are climbing in altitude and of their transfer toward military or civilian control organisms responsible for following up on other phases of their flight.
- a reception post which regulates the arrival of all planes coming in or landing on the ground. It's a master controller, the head of the shift, who takes care of the identification and distribution of the planes toward the individual controllers and the track radar consoles. This is because this post demands a high qualification. Thus in the case of each plane he will take into account such priorities as the fuel level remaining in the engine or possible difficulties indicated by the pilot.
- an intermediary approach post equipped with two radar "scopes"^{**} in charge of the guidance and of the spacing of the planes. These are guided either towards the eight landing circuits if the weather conditions are favorable or towards the "GCA gate" (point of entry on the final landing radars) in case of poor weather.
- a final landing post in charge of guidance of the planes in case of unfavorable weather conditions. This post consists of three screens or "scopes" of which two are working simultaneously. The final landing con-

* To which must be added sometimes the planes forced to change course due to unfavorable meteorological conditions in the Paris region.

** Thanks to the secondary radar and to an air-to-ground code the controller can truly "individualize" the plane of which he is in charge.

troller guides the planes and gets them to come down in an axis until the very approaches to the entry phase or to the threshold of the runway. The "final approach" takes the place of the lookout when visibility and the cloud ceiling do not allow the plane to make a sight landing. -- held by a designated personnel, an assistant controller post is in charge of the updating of the schedule of air navigation movements, take-offs and arrivals.

The lookout: Located all the way at the top of the tower, it controls, monitors, and directs all the planes flying by sight in the zone of the airport.

Its geographical location allows it an overall view over the totality of the base and of the immediate air space. The work posts face the runway and are under the responsibility of a head of the lookout section. The functions are divided as follows:

- the lookout head responsible of the coordination of the movements whether they are transferred from the approach or whether they are seen directly in flight by sight.
- another lookout head responsible for the cooperation of the movements shown, both for those movements shown by the approach room and by those seen by the lookout.
- an air traffic controller which grants the authorizations for getting aligned on the runway for takeoff and regulates the traffic within the sight landing circuit when the weather conditions do not impose the use of radar assistance of the approach.
- for the movements on the ground, a "ground" controller gives the authorizations for rolling to those planes leaving their stationing area (parking) or going back there after landing. He also authorizes the vehicles' movements on the platform.
- an assistant controller, so-called of the contingent, who receives the flight plans of the flying teams and transmits them to the base operations the returning and takeoff times of the planes.

The permanent liaison between the lookout and the approach room is made by interphone. It must be very precise because the approach and the lookout transfer the control of the planes to each other. When a plane shows itself it is first taken in charge by the approach which monitors it and guides it from the very moment it enters the control zone. At a close distance to the terrain when the weather conditions are favorable.* This transfer will be done when the controllers of the lookout will have identified by sight, and well, the plane. For takeoff it is the reverse, and the control of the plane is transferred to approach when the lookout can no longer insure the control function by sight.

* The planes flying by sight in good weather conditions can be in radio contact with the lookout only. The lookout will then regulate their movements in liaison with those presented by approach.

The Platform

It is made up of a runway 2,400 meters long and 45 meters across; of a parking area for military engines belonging to the Fighter Plane School; and of a parking area for civilian planes.

Material Means

Radio-Radar Means: The aids for navigational and landing purposes consist mainly of a SRE (Surveillance Radar Equipment) approach radar, two final landing radars for precision landing and for air-to-ground communications, and one emission and reception center.

Means of Line Communication: Interphones among the controllers, telephones, recorders, telecommand readers, radiotelephone to communicate with the planes, telephone communications with associate and neighboring control centers.

Radionavigation Means: TACAN (Tactical Aid Navigation) landing signal and all-direction landing signal used for rallying purposes.

Television means permitting the diffusion:

- of orders (distribution of control tasks)
- of information concerning the terrains, the availability of their radio-radar means, and the weather conditions
- of information regarding coordination with the general air traffic, with the military operational traffic and sometimes with the essay flight traffic and with reception.

Means of Security:

- The Security - Fire Prevention and Rescue Section (SSIS, Section securite incendie sauvetage) to assist the pilots and planes in case of difficulties
- The Infirmary.*

Means of Protection: In the case of landings made by planes that are forced to change courses, the Protection Section and the Air Security Force insure the protection of these planes.

* Other units (GERMAC and GERMAS) may also help in the rescue operation on the planes.

The BIA

The Aeronautics Information Bureau (BIA) which is equally located in the tower groups together all the aeronautical information needed for the preparation of a flight or a mission: flight plans, meteorological conditions, terrain conditions, regulations, etc. It insures the utilization of the flight plans and of the messages regarding the air traffic.

Actually, all military flight must be the object of a flight plan, deposited and accepted before takeoff.

The essential elements of the flight plan are retransmitted in the form of a "flight progression band" or "strip." The controller can read therefrom the identification, the type and the equipment of the plane. On this "strip" there appear the point and time of takeoff that have been foreseen as well as the main parameters: speed, altitude, route. These "strips" which are put on adjustable settings in order to constitute a mobile representation of the projected air circulation situation are set up manually or automatically. Eventually they are summarized on two posting screens associated with the radar screens, on the controllers' consoles.

By the use of an internal television system the BIA is in charge of informing the lookout and the approach room about the weather conditions (wind speed, temperature, etc.) as well as about the projected flights. In this bureau all the pilots find a multitude of information: aeronautical maps, plans of the main terrains, etc. This bureau also includes in its organizational chart the runway office, the reception and transmission center for flight plans deposited by the flight crews.

The function of the local airport control office is therefore a double one. On the one hand it insures the security of the flights through the monitoring of the spaces between the planes (distance, altitude, time) and thus works towards the prevention of planes coming together. On the other hand it insures the fluidity of the air traffic through a judicious distribution of the aircraft, in particular on the landing, takeoff and even waiting circuits, their transfer from one trajectory to another, and their integration into the general traffic of planes landing or taking off.

Four Qualifications

Each controller, whether officer or noncommissioned officer, gradually climbs the following degrees of qualification:

- apprentice controller
- operational controller
- first controller
- master controller.

All Control Means...

To provide three services:

- to manage the traffic in all security: fluidity, security, spacing, which constitute the control service
- to give information regarding the conditions of the platforms, the weather conditions, the position of other traffic (prevention of collision), which constitute the information service
- to assist a plane found to be in danger or in difficulty (technical or otherwise), which constitutes the alert service.

A Motivated Staff

As we have seen, the controllers all have specific missions imposed by their specific responsibility posts in the control chain. Although specific also, their tasks are interdependent and a perfect coordination is the rule among the controllers.

Numbering about 30 and divided into 2 teams, the controllers are present 24 hours a day. This is because even if the traffic does not always see the exceptional rhythm of one movement per minute, the attention and availability of the personnel are still called for. The material means are important, no doubt, since they make the work easier. But the controllers remain the sole judges of an instantaneous situation as well as of a more evolutionary situation: they are precisely charged with the responsibility of controlling them.

Both teams are under the command of the CIA commander who is seconded by a deputy. At the head of each team and directing the controllers in each level of qualification, a team captain watches their progression and their professional training. He is the one introducing them to the various qualification exams.

These teams operate at the rhythm of one day of work for one day of rest. This rotation is sometimes disturbed as the controllers cannot always be available for reason of inservice training, vacations, illnesses and coursework.

The median age of the controllers? It is very young! Many are those who exercise this profession only during 10 or 15 years. This is explainable maybe by the relatively restrictive rhythm of work which is more acceptable when one is young.

Seeing them at work, one is surprised by their intense concentration and their calm in managing this aerial ballet. They show evidence of a sure-handedness and rapid judgement, of a very developed sense of synthesis, and of an almost instantaneous capacity for deciding things.*

* More than one pilot has the recollection of a calm and quiet voice of a controller who has sometimes helped to calm a situation of anxiety on board the plane.

The pilots appreciate the professionalism of the controllers. To follow a real GCA tracking, to listen to the precise dialog between the pilot and the controller, and to see the first listen to the orders of the second, is to understand better the "complicity" existing between these two specialists. And to the "thank you for the final landing instructions" of the pilot who considers himself very well led into the runway there will respond a silent smile on the part of the controller.

Yes, this unusual personnel is characterized by their team spirit and their great motivation. Each one feels himself fully committed and takes the measure of the degree of responsibility which falls on them. The controllers participate in the training of future fighter pilots through their competence and their being there. They help make ready the same qualities in the pilots, the rigorous training of the first helps condition the rigorous preparation of the latter.

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POLICY OUTLINES FOR MEZZOGIORNO, SICILIAN DEVELOPMENT

Palermo GIORNALE DI SICILIA in Italian 18 Jul 60 pp 1, 14

[Article by Regional Assembly President Michelangelo Russo: "Sicily in a State of Crisis Thinks Again of Unity; the Role of the Left in the South"]

[Text] It is very probable that the first reactions (I am obviously speaking of those of the regional government) to the recent national fiscal and monetary measures are still inadequate and that in some ways they reflect themes and trends that have been surpassed by time and events.

However, it would be a mistake to underestimate their political importance, if for no other reason than because it is a question of problems that are greatly experienced by Sicilian enterprise.

Of course from these first "sorties" it is difficult to understand what the real intentions of the national government are and what countermeasures it intends to adopt.

It would seem that the maneuver it wants to undertake on the one hand is to make credit more easily available and, on the other, to prepare for a somewhat vague employment plan.

That would already be something, but it would not be all that is possible and necessary to accomplish.

If we want to come to an understanding and if we do not want to fall into the logic of some "crisis" measure, it is necessary to start from the awareness that the Italian economic crisis, in spite of some contradictory indications, has now entered its acute, long-term stage and that the recent fiscal and monetary provisions by their very nature clearly make apparent the desire to proceed to other measures, all restrictive in nature, which risk perhaps decisively indicating the future development of the country.

A future, that is the point, that will be marked by a slackening of development itself, by an attempt to cause workers to pay for the consequences of the crisis, in addition to an increasingly marked emargination of the weakest areas.

After all, a purely crisis policy is what is being set in motion, and it does not take much to realize that this is quite different from the turning point that the South and Sicily expect.

Therefore it seems useless and misleading to want to discuss, as does the honorable Capria, whether or not the measures, considered separately, favorably affect the South.

The governmental policy lacks a coherent strategy that is capable of facing and resolving the structural problems of the Italian economy. For instance, it is significant that one is so slow to put in motion all the mechanisms (or when they are set in motion, it is done in a distorted manner) for decisive intervention that had already been prepared since 1976. I am referring to programs for industrial sectors, to the agro-alimentary plan, to the energy programs, and to the chemical plan, etc.

That is, there is no precise course with respect to developmental themes and everything is reduced to a mere deflationary maneuver.

Well, this is the situation. Without a program that deals with the basic problems of the crisis there cannot be a policy for the South. And certainly the .50 percent deducted from workers' salaries and wages will not resolve the matter.

Within this framework, as the experience of recent years has abundantly shown, the defense of the aspects of the crisis seems limitative. It is necessary to defend these "aspects," but at the same time it is necessary to launch and to pursue an investment policy capable of affecting the productive base.

The idea of a South that is supported means that it is destined to enter an irreversible crisis. In fact, if the fight against the evil of inflation should experience a massive reduction in widespread public [missing words] and demand, without significant incidences on the productive base, there would be disruptive results for the South. It is necessary to forcefully launch the idea of a productive South and Sicily. This is the same idea moreover to which, even in the difficulties of the moment, the unitary trade unions are attached. And this is important because, without the decisive contribution of workers, without their active and convinced participation, a developmental and recovery policy would have no prospects.

Within this framework—that is, schematically speaking—shape can be given to the tasks that are up to a region like ours, endowed with special autonomy and with notable financial resources, and to the tasks that, more generally, are up to the southern region.

In the meantime, a main question, a political one: In a situation of certainly deteriorated relationships, can the political and social forces find the minimum of understanding capable of again proposing with necessary vigor the models for development and for the revival of the South?

I realize that at present the problem presents several complications (miss'ng words) and of a special nature. But I wonder: Is it possible to give significant weight to the South, to give it more weight, without re-establishing a minimum of unity among the political and social forces, without re-establishing points of convergence?

In saying this I do not wish to restate more or less recent experiences (even if calm reflexion concerning them is necessary). I only wish to mention a political problem, to which it is hardly worth answering if one ignores the concreteness and specificity of the questions that face us.

I realize how the unitary policy has fallen fearfully behind in recent years. I understand that the greatest responsibility for such an arrearage falls essentially on those who during these years did not know how, and did not want, to undo the knot of anticommunist discrimination. But, in the meantime, I should like to emphasize that it is the task of the Left--and not of others--to again achieve real unity with respect to these matters and at the same time to seek necessary agreements with that christian democratic area that is most sensitive and most attentive to the need for further development of the country and for a new political framework, encouraging it thus to come out into the light of the sun, assuming tasks and responsibilities consistent with its ideal, and with its political elaboration in recent years.

If this procedure is not set in motion, it is unlikely that the battle of the South can have that political respite that the moment requires.

Because--let us say this most clearly--once more the outlines of national political plans for the South are too narrow. They are narrow, dangerous, and paralyzing: because, in the end, on the Christian Democratic side, there inevitably will be the usual demagogic sorties directed at covering up the internal contradictions of a policy and at salvaging, through local measures, a part of the supported area; the communist side might continue to make coherent proposals, but it would be difficult to advance them in the absence of a unitary display of political and social forces; some extemporaneous proposals can be expected from the socialists, but always with the preoccupation of upholding the positions of the government in which the socialists participate.

In short, without the search for an opportunity for resolute and true convergence, there is a risk that the social and political forces will come to the same end as did Renzo's capons as related by Manzoni.

It is also necessary to recognize that, even in the harshness of the present clash, there is an insistent emergence of the necessity and urgency of arriving at a political and social agreement in order to promote the advancement of the fight for the development and the redemption of the South and of Sicily. This is a battle which, if it is to be coherent, cannot be fought merely to obtain a handful of billions, but one which must be conducted, without complexity, in the direction of overturning the present economic policy trends of the government.

But this is not enough. It is necessary at the same time to bring about a profound turning point in the policy of the region.

If it is true that we find ourselves in the face of a structural crisis of great proportion, to think only of setting some stopgap measures in motion through easy credit (while still necessary) or some handfuls of billions to be distributed throughout the region in the form of public works, would be like saying that one wants to aim for a policy of mere convergence, without giving any sign of that turning point that Sicily expects through different utilization also of its resources.

In fact, it is not true that Sicily is poor in financial resources. It is true instead that their use occurs always at a slow and grinding pace and often in scattered and, let's admit it, unproductive forms.

But precisely because of this, along with the fight to change the economic policy trends of the government, there is need of a prompt and precise mobilization of our resources.

In short, it is necessary to quickly advance to that developmental plan, often the subject of long and frustrating discussions which, without claiming to resolve every problem, nevertheless makes it possible to move in the manner of a plot in which the basic threads lead to a positive influence on the productive base of the region, to improvement of the quality of life of urban areas and of internal zones, to increased employment.

I should like to say that there are proposals for such a policy. If we look at the development that the autonomist political forces have been able to accomplish in recent years, we will find suggestions that are still valid, both with respect to economic and social measures and with respect to institutional reforms.

But the important thing right now is to put all of the productive potential to use, with an eye of course to areas needing assistance, but without believing that support must be the policy of the region.

In short, it is a question of causing the South to send out not a lamentation, which at the same time is both victimizing and accessorial, but a message of capability of picking up promptly, through development, also through mobilization and utilization of available resources.

It seems to me that this framework contains all of the "ingredients" needed to arrive next fall at another conference of the southern regions that will mark a moment of common reflexion and of an indication of a different contractual relationship between the South and the State and that will constitute a positive message to the productive forces of the North. This is a message from a South that does not accept, as a whole, the policy of unspecified intervention by governmental authorities; that intends to again discuss the substance and form of extraordinary intervention; that does not resign itself to the idea of a gradual but inexorable abolition of that policy of programming that was initiated during the years of national solidarity. It is also the message of a Sicily that is capable of determining a Mediterranean role of its own, not simply because of its geographic location, but as an economic reality.

At this point, one might answer that the regional political situation, because of present governmental arrangements and the political choices that have been made, does not make it possible to set procedures of this type in motion.

This may be true and it may also be true that the presence of such a situation represents an obstacle to the initiation of those procedures that are political, that are comprehensive in plan, and strategic, and which therefore cannot be compressed into the remaining limited time of the legislative period.

But frankly it is difficult to resign oneself to the idea that it is necessary to wait for the election of the new regional assembly in order to start a discussion of this type.

Sicily and the South cannot wait.

For this very reason it is the duty of the Left to initiate this discussion and to try to find necessary agreements now, not tomorrow, so that the discussion can be carried out coherently and resolutely.

And also in the matter of wanting to examine future governmental arrangements and the fate of the present government, the best way is to discuss them during the enthusiasm of a political initiative and in relation to choices which little by little all of us—whatever our role may be—will be called on to carry out.

POLICE ADOPT NEW POLICY TO DEAL WITH SQUATTERS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 23 Aug 80 pp 12-19

[Report by Coen van Harten and Jan Heinmans: "Rush Hour in Amsterdam."]

[Text] The police had opted for a different strategy on Tuesday, but so had Amsterdam's squatters' movement. Things had gone wrong on "House-in Day" (pun on "Queen's Day"). That day the military police had to protect a cordon which had been drawn around the coronation event on the Dam [square]. That almost didn't succeed; outside of the small circle around the New Church, the MP's were being molested to a truly unheard-of degree -- by activists who did not respect anything or anyone. They were able to operate so "effectively" because they used a crowd of "sympathizers" (who, for that matter, wisely did not participate actively in the struggle themselves) as a buffer. Hence the bitter violence, hence also the low number of arrests -- since the stone-throwers were able to withdraw into the crowd. That ought to be different, it was concluded right after the 30th of April [Queen's Day].

And things were different during the evacuation of the block of luxury apartments on the Prins Hendrik Quay. The preparation was carefully thought out, the plan of battle clever, the men (all recruited from the Military Police) admirably disciplined. The manner in which the "PH [Prins Hendrik Quay] operation" was carried out was extremely efficient, even original. When the equipment (power shovels, bucket trucks and hoisting cranes) was driven in by relaxed drivers, a surprised spectator murmured: "This is the biggest military operation since May 1940; except: this time we're winning."

Another strategy: The MP's calmly walked in from various directions. Very calmly, a pincer movement was carried out around the Prins Hendrik location. Those who wanted to get away, children or adults who preferred not to get any blows, were able to leave. And thousands of them wanted to;

they set athletic records as soon as the MP came walking in (at the tempo of a funeral march).

Another strategy: only one squatter turned out to be left on the premises. And actually, he wasn't even a true one, for he had procured the status of "spokesman." Sitting in a windowill with a megaphone, he tried to start a dialogue with the police commander. Barely had the constitutional state been so visibly and audibly been present. In an official tone, the bailiff read the evacuation order and set an ultimatum. The police commander subsequently set two conditions, but wasn't too interested in discussion. "To my regret I have to inform you" Meanwhile the spokesman was posing like a dove of peace with crippled wings, waving to fans with a little bouquet. He did not want to "reduce the struggle to violence." But meanwhile, outside the PI cordon, the inner city was full of activists who ultimately had abandoned a confrontation with the strong arm of the law. And there they stood ready with stones, helmets and sticks. Although the squatters -- ironically supported by the Council of Churches -- can disassociate themselves from the latter, they do indeed furnish a striking picture of the sort of anarchism they have landed in: viewed ideologically, it is a matter of an earthy philosophy of the street, in spite of black flags and the Autonomia Operaria symbol. That is precisely an area a fighter against the housing shortage wants to get away from. But ultimately the struggle is waged on the street, on the asphalt, where the riffraff no longer has any idea of what it is all about.

And that is a violent event from which the squatters' movement cannot disassociate itself easily. Perhaps Mayor Polak is not a very decisive administrator, but the squatters' reproach that he has evoked an atmosphere of escalation is only accepted by the minds of muddleheads. And it looks as if the squatters' movement is increasingly populated by that category. Although Amsterdam politicians can be happy that the PI squatters ultimately abandoned a violent confrontation, one should nevertheless have no respect for that attitude. Civil sentences are carried out daily, without those who maintain order being stoned into the hospital. And although not a single rock may have been thrown by squatters' hands, that doesn't cleanse the hands of the anarcho-squatters syndicate.

The PI Quay seemed to be empty, but, as it is called in old-fashioned police jargon: "Things would remain restless in the inner city for a long time." And that was the result of the provocative atmosphere of escalation evoked on the Prins Hendrik Quay by the squatters. One can imagine more idyllic scenes than tanks, barking bouviers des flandres, mounted police and MP's protected by ice hockey equipment, but no sensible Amsterdammer (and there are around 700,000 of them) feels their presence as a provocation.

"Restless for a long time?" for shortly before the evacuation the squatters released a new declaration of war: "We are not criminals who make money with tough violence; we will continue to struggle wherever we can against unoccupied premises and speculation."

Amsterdam Mayor Polak did not exaggerate on Monday night when he had warned the occupiers of the PW apartments that "an impressive armed force stood ready to evacuate the premises, if necessary by force." At a press conference a few hours before the attack, Wim Polak had already made it known that that Tuesday afternoon steps would be taken. He gave the squatters a last chance to leave. A little later than planned -- some of the units from the provinces had got caught in a traffic jam -- the attack was initiated. To the extent -- anticlimax -- it could still be called an attack. On the Prins Hendrik Quay the self-controlled MP platoons encountered only a weak -- by Amsterdam standards -- shower of rocks and a few little smoke bombs wrapped up in beer cans.

The calm emanating from the troops was entirely justified. Behind the dark shields of the MP lines, the heavy equipment with which they had thoroughly practiced beforehand in the Olympic Stadium rolled in: an armored vehicle furnished with an assault ram strongly welded to the chassis (forward of the front door), about five bucket trucks with a range long enough to give the weathervane of the Nicholas Church a good cleaning. On the bucket trucks there were steel buckets with crowns; a sharpshooter with a machinegun (Heckler und Koch) and two men to man the firehose. Marine-like equipment.

The navy -- for that matter -- can never carry out a civil judgment in our constitutional state. With their actions, the squatters indeed invoke a dangerous atmosphere in which the civilian calls for military intervention. And that seems to be the heart's desire of the anarcho-squatters: hardening of social relations. He who negates the constitutional state is asking for a police state in which military force is used against civilians. The squatters must have thought (hoped?) for a moment that they had already brought about that situation: the day before the evacuation they announced that they would not succumb to force by police, but only to military force. The squatters turned out to be less heroic than would appear from those words, but it is clear from that text that these weakly developed "anarchists of action," who abandon that action when worst comes to worst, don't have the slightest idea of approximately how that criticized constitutional state works. And surely that is the least one can ask from an anarchist. The squatters pay less attention to practice than to theory. They left the realization of a free society, in which property once and for always will be known as theft, up to spontaneous violence which indeed broke out all through the city.

Two thousand police and MP troops. That had to be enough and it was, and if the PW operation had not started at such an unfortunate moment, Amsterdam perhaps would hardly have noticed it. Instead, chaos originated due to the throngs of commuters who saw their way to the Central Station blocked by a continually growing crowd. Professional rattle-rouers were able to move around comfortably within that disorder. Among those ring-leaders once again were the 10-year old masked grade schoolers (An MP member: "Of course one doesn't like to hit those") with lead pipes and other objects which can be counted as heavy arms.

The squatters, who that morning had removed their possessions -- refrigerators, semi-antique TV sets, doors, bricks and other building materials -- from the roof, sneaked out shortly before the police force showed up. And thus political Amsterdam was satisfied, with one exception: a bold, well-organized action, thus read the commentaries of the group leaders from the curious company which in Amsterdam also is called the municipal council. Sometimes it was not clear whether the discipline of the squatters or that of the police was meant. A satisfied tone also dominated the commentaries in the morning papers. The action also lent itself admirably to cheerful armchair comments. The operation even had comical aspects, was reminiscent of a medieval stronghold battle, or perhaps of the occupation and rescue of Leiden, but then with Spaniards and without Leideners.

The following is very clear: the large force in personnel and equipment has strangely enough prevented violence. The squatters, outwardly rather militant with gas masks, helmets and masks, lazily reclining on comfortable little armchairs in the roofgutter, had mutually deliberated long beforehand. They decided not to make "Evacuate the PH Quay, just forget it" their motto, but to take to their heels immediately. It seems as if this peaceful gesture is valued too highly. The attitude of the squatters hasn't changed at all. Squatters' commentary: "We are treated like criminals." Critics determined very rapidly that the government had ordered an overdose in force. Forgotten were the thefts of building materials, the hermetical welding shut of doors, the building of an untakable fortress which, in this desolate condition can be declared condemned. The terrorizing of legal inhabitants. --So who in fact is escalating here--? a dumbfounded police officer wondered.

Meanwhile those 2000 strictly disciplined policemen reacting with great self-control have had to do a dirty job which wasn't theirs. Authorities and inspectors may speak of "pride" and "failproof worked out operation," but the owner of the premises is stuck with an almost irreparable apartment building which is completely hollowed out and destroyed on the inside. The squatters announce that they will continue. The authorities have thrown new, powerful arms into the struggle. The squatters will never be able to defend themselves against those. But simultaneously it is clear that an operation like this does not lend itself to weekly execution. Just as after "House-in Day" there is a question of a hangover. The perpetrators of the rankest violence escaped arrest at that time. The varying occupants of the premises were able to behave like criminals undisturbedly for many months, but they were not imprisoned. The spokesman in the window-sill ("MP, will you listen for a moment?") no longer had any connection with the dictatorship which had been practiced for a long time within the occupied premises. He was led away in handcuffs. For he was the only person who, watched by the bailiff and millions of TV spectators, had breached the law: local disturbance of the peace. His excuse "I can't get out" no longer worked. He had maneuvered himself into that position. And thus the anarcho-squatters -- at a bargain -- still had a martyr, although a live one. The anarcho-squatters had a more dramatic type of

martyrdom in mind, but no one -- with one exception -- wanted to adopt that role. Thus it remains a question who has won the battle of the Prins Hendrik Quay. The squatters who now can coquet like doves and subsequently remove themselves from the violence on the sidelines? Or the government?

That government will now have to prove itself. Mayor Polak will have to turn to requisition if the renting of the empty apartments isn't achieved within the term set by him. In which freedom did that decision (promise) come about? No one will be content with the further course of events. Only the anarcho-squatters are happy with that dissension. For weeds grow most profusely on the dunghill of dissension.

[Editorial conclusion; in boldface]

Finally

What was to be a trial of strength between the government and the squatters simply blew over -- fortunately. That doesn't mean that the squatters of the Prins Hendrik Quay acceded to the law. They resisted a legal judgment in word and action. The barricading of illegally occupied premises with stolen building materials; the destruction caused in those premises; the continued occupation of the living space also after the legal judgment and the threatening and aggressive language coupled to it, are a form of open perpetration of violence. The squatters did not give in to justice, but only at the last moment to the tremendous superior force of the police, mobile unit and military police, in order to save their own life. Meanwhile it is a fact that they have placed themselves outside of the democratic legal order. There is no single guarantee that they will adopt a democratic standpoint from now on. To the contrary, in their propaganda it is once again the police who "provoked." And the squatters themselves now play the apostles of a "peaceful solution," simultaneously threatening with new "hard actions."

The manner in which the authorities from the capital discharged their duty continues to be a riddle. Mayor Polak's repeated adjurations to stay away from the inner city, his repeated announcing that the evacuation would take place shortly, the foolish rush hour time, precisely at the closing time of offices and businesses, gave the squatters the opportunity to turn their evacuation into a last large-scale demonstration.

The ulcer of illegal occupation of houses on the Prins Hendrik Quay is burned out. But the disease stays. That disease is the anarchism of a group in our population which in a provoking manner snap their fingers at law and justice and which, unpunished until now, as a small minority terrorizes the majority.

Democracy is not merely tolerance; it also requires vigorous protection against terror. The events of this past Tuesday show signs of hope that the Amsterdam municipal administration is also coming to that conclusion. Finally.

DUTCH WILLING TO ACCEPT LOWER INCOMES

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 23 Aug 80 pp 8-11

[Report by F.A. Hoogendijk]

[Text] Union leader Arie Groenevelt, Minister of Finance Fons van der Stee, and the CDA draft campaign platform all plead for a cut in income. Percentages from 1.5 to 2 have been mentioned. That is the reason we asked NIPO [Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion] to take a sampling of 1,165 persons to find out how far the Dutch are willing to go in any cut in their income. The poll brings out a surprising result. If it is really necessary, a majority (55 percent) are willing to give up an average of 5 percent of their income. That is a high percentage, which shows that the Dutch people understand that sacrifices are necessary to make our economy healthy again and keep employment from crumbling away still more.

It appears from the poll that the greatest willingness to sacrifice exists among the members of the CNV (National Federation of Christian Workers in the Netherlands): 38 percent are willing to give up 5 percent or more, and 16 percent even 10 percent or more.

Among the members of the FNV [Netherlands Trade Unions Federation] (Groenevelt's union) the percentages are lower. But 13 percent are still willing to retrench by 2 percent or more, 9 percent by 3 percent or more, 8.5 percent by 4 percent or more, and 17.5 percent by 5 percent or more.

Within the political parties the willingness to sacrifice is greatest in the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] and least in the PvdA [Labor Party]. But it is clear from the sampling that if the government (with arguments) manages to make it clear how the flag flies on the matter and the trade union movement will present a plan to improve employment, both the voters and the union members are willing to dig pretty deep in their pockets.

"Could you get along practically just as well with somewhat less income? With what percent less could you get along?"

| Could get along JUST AS WELL with income reduction of: | Self or breadwinner member of: | | | Voted for: | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|---------|---------|------------|------|-----|------|
| | FNV | CNV | No | CDA | PvdA | VVD | D'66 |
| | Union % | Union % | Union % | % | % | % | % |
| 10% or more | 3 | 16 | 11 | 11 | 6 | 21 | 7 |
| 5% or more | 7½ | 38 | 21 | 24 | 11 | 36 | 23 |
| 4% or more | 8½ | 39 | 24 | 25 | 15 | 36 | 28 |
| 3% or more | 9 | 44 | 27 | 30 | 17 | 37 | 34 |
| 2% or more | 13 | 51 | 35 | 40 | 25 | 48 | 37 |
| 1% or more | 20 | 64 | 42 | 49 | 36 | 54 | 45 |
| No % indicated | 28 | 5 | 17 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Could not get along | 52 | 31 | 47 | 42 | 56 | 38 | 47 |

"With what percent less could you manage to get along if it were absolutely necessary because of the economic situation?"

| If NECESSARY, if I had to, could get along with income reduction of: | Self or breadwinner member of: | | | Voted for: | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|---------|---------|------------|------|-----|------|
| | FNV | CNV | No | CDA | PvdA | VVD | D'66 |
| | Union % | Union % | Union % | % | % | % | % |
| 10% or more | 9 | 25 | 13 | 15 | 6 | 24 | 11 |
| 5% or more | 22 | 44 | 27 | 30 | 16 | 40 | 39 |
| 4% or more | 24 | 46 | 29 | 31 | 19 | 43 | 41 |
| 3% or more | 28 | 54 | 34 | 36 | 26 | 49 | 44 |
| 2% or more | 42 | 66 | 45 | 48 | 37 | 60 | 51 |
| 1% or more | 56 | 80 | 53 | 57 | 49 | 68 | 62 |
| No % indicated | 17 | 12 | 19 | 18 | 17 | 15 | 12 |
| Could not get along | 27 | 8 | 28 | 25 | 34 | 17 | 26 |

A one-percent operation would cost 42 percent no pain and would be possible for 55 percent.

A two-percent operation would cause 35 percent no distress and 45 percent could accept it if necessary.

Obviously there is more room for a step or two backward where the income is higher.

The climate for moderating income has grown considerably better lately. Year in and year out big majorities have answered in NIPO polls that they were satisfied with their income. Nevertheless, about 4 out of 10 Dutchmen can just get along, and it was found time after time that 5 percent

less income would really be too little.

About 6 out of every 10 Dutchmen have said for years that they were ready for the so-called zero line with regard to their own incomes. Now, via NIPO, we have posed the question, "Could you get along practically just as well with somewhat less income?" and 47 percent said "yes."

Thus far we have been talking about getting along almost just as well with the same wages. We asked NIPO to sharpen the statement of the question and to ask the same 1,165 Dutchmen, "With what percent less could you manage to get along if it were absolutely necessary because of the economic situation?"

Really tightening the belt, that is. A good quarter say that they cannot manage it, and 19 percent do not answer, but the remaining 55 percent of those asked indicated (if it were really necessary) retrenchment percentages of from 1 to 10 percent and higher.

The CDA platform committee wants to effect a restoration of employment by annual sacrifices from all incomes (from 0.5 to 1 percent for the minima to 3 to 3.5 percent for higher incomes). A courageous campaign platform, but one that, according to the ELSEVIER/NIPO poll, it seems possible to sell to the voters. The CDA anticipates an economic growth of 2.5 percent in the coming years. That seems to us a questionable optimism. When the PvdA mentioned a 2 percent rate of growth in its draft campaign platform, Prime Minister Van Agt said that "sprang from a dream." With regard to the CDA's 2.5 percent, the prime minister said, "It bears witness to a benevolent optimism. I have no criticism to make of the striving for economic growth. But it is a matter of whether you see the possibilities as being present. If it is possible, it is fine."

The CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] hopes with a growth of 2.5 percent to create 300,000 jobs in the next 4 years. The bizarre thing about it is that the number of unemployed still fluctuates around 200,000. Only the new job-seekers can get a place.

But Prime Minister Van Agt doubts whether the CDA's growth percentage is realistic. If, contrary to expectations, the economic growth should not take place, other measures will have to be taken in order not make the unemployment still more disastrous. Van Agt will almost surely be the CDA standard-bearer in the elections. He will thus have to sell the new platform. Even if he has his doubts about it himself. Similarly, he himself is a proponent of the construction of nuclear power plants, while the CDA campaign platform does not advocate building any more of them for the time being. We suspect that during the election campaign Mr Van Agt will put more emphasis on a continuation of the policy that has been outlined by the cabinet. The CDA party workers will not thank him for that, but very probably the voters will. Now that practically everybody is convinced that retrenchments are necessary if there is not to be a great economic disaster, the cabinet may be able in a final spurt to realize some essential part of Specifications '81 after all. When that program

was presented as the cabinet took office 3 years ago, the (political) time was not ripe for it. Now it

The switch in public opinion is also bound to be a support when the budget for next year is presented. Besides an income reduction, the spending for social services must be cut. Almost everybody seems to be gradually realizing that, too, provided it is done in a cautious and responsible way.

CDA leader Lubbers said in an interview with NRC HANDELSBLAD of 16 August that "the cabinet can now start harvesting." Usually the third year is the harvest year for the cabinet. The fourth year is then reserved for handing out presents in connection with the coming elections. During this cabinet's tenure the order has been reversed. The majority of the people are now fortunately beginning to realize that every gift from Santa Claus either is a cigar out of your own box or comes at the cost of still more unemployment.

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BENKOW MOOS PARTIES TO BUILD BOURGEOIS ELECTION FRONT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Egil Sundar]

[Text] Conservative chairman Jo Benkow will take the initiative in talks with leaders of the Christian People's Party and the Center Party to clear up misunderstandings and discuss possibilities for a joint bourgeois strategy leading up to the 1981 Storting election. In his first talk with the Conservative central committee, currently meeting at Jevnaker, the party chairman said: "A year before the Storting election the time is ripe to draw up the major lines for a bourgeois policy in the 1980's. Although the joint positions of the bourgeois parties can best be expressed in discussing the long-range program for the next parliamentary period, I place great weight on agreeing on basic lines on which the three cooperating parties can stand together even before the fall budget debate begins."

Benkow made it clear that uniting on major lines of direction would naturally not prevent the opposition parties from standing up for their own individual special interests and this would include work on the new budget. That too is an obligation and an obvious right, he said. "But we have a joint platform in the basic attitudes that unite us and are outlined in our party programs."

In his talk to the party's central committee the party chairman underlined the Conservative Party's special responsibility for staking out a course for the current decade. It should be a course that can serve as a fruitful bourgeois point of departure in discussing what should happen in the future, said Benkow and continued: "On behalf of a united party I would like to confirm that the Conservatives will work hard to implement bourgeois cooperation through a broad and credible government alternative."

"It is such an alternative bourgeois voters, with good reason, are waiting for--even demanding," said the Conservative chairman. "And

let me add this. At the moment the balance of forces among the bourgeois parties is such that there really is no bourgeois alternative that does not include the Conservative Party."

What would characterize a joint bourgeois policy? On this topic Benkow said:

"The policy we present must be realistic and it must be based on obligations and promises we know we will be able to keep. Nothing has done more to reduce the status of politics and public confidence in politicians than the policy of making too many promises which some resort to in the hope of gaining votes. We don't need politicians who always say yes, we have an equal need for politicians who are able to say no when the situation requires it. Such stands will be respected by the voters who have more common sense than many people seem to think."

The Conservative chairman pointed out that there are several good reasons why Norway should have different political leadership. If the socialist development we have now continues with unchecked force even after 1981 it could be very difficult to change course later because the very foundation for multiplicity and the dispersal of power would become too eroded. This underlines the fact that the bourgeois parties together face an historic task in next fall's election. Benkow put it like this: "The main task confronting us is to find an appropriate model of political guidance that will be the answer to the complex problems of modern society."

The Labor Party's economic policy was sharply criticized in the Conservative chairman's speech. "More and more people now realize," he said, "that the planned economy system with strict controls and centralized political decisions has gone bankrupt." Benkow was convinced that this realization extends far into the ranks of the Social Democrats even though no one has stepped forward and admitted it.

"The Labor Party's attempt to manage the economy has produced an unguided public economy beyond control," said Benkow who felt that a growing number of people are realizing that the social market economy is a better answer to the needs of the time. "We are really on the threshold of an era in which the market economy as we now know it will undergo a renaissance--a rejuvenation which professional economists stress the need for." And in his talk to the central committee Benkow gave several obvious reasons why the planned economy doesn't work in its Norwegian version either.

The Conservative chairman pointed out that the reason he spent so much time on the economy was that he realized economic resources are decisive if we are going to be able to do more for the elderly, the handicapped and the mentally and physically ill.

The economy will determine what we can put into environmental protection. It is the economy that will determine what we will be able to preserve. Today the limits are set by the economy--that is why we have to do something about it, Benkow stressed. "There is plenty of determination to reform but at present this outruns our ability to do so. That is what we have to overcome."

Benkow also went into school policy in detail, a gloomy area in the view of the party chairman. At a time when the increased pace of technological development calls for more knowledge, greater expert insight and a mounting level of education the Labor Party is proposing admission rules to universities and high schools that would undermine professional requirements. This is directly contrary to the present need for more knowledge and the stiffer competition our production and business life will encounter in the next few decades.

"The Labor Party is involving us in a system leading to an irresponsible squandering of our most valuable resource," the Conservative chairman said.

Benkow stressed that a bourgeois policy for the 1980's must aim at easing the housing shortage in this decade. "There are many vital sectors the bourgeois parties would agree deserve a high priority. Housing policy is one example," he said. "We could hardly find another area in which the Labor Party's urge to regulate and its misguided control have been more obvious or less successful."

In discussing oil policy the party chairman commented on a statement by Arve Johnsen that 1980 would be the first of 100 good years for Statoil. "Politicians must see to it," said Benkow, "that these 100 years will be good ones first and foremost for Norwegian society and for each and every one of us. But that means it is also time we got going on a debate concerning how we can best use our revenues."

Benkow said that if the Norwegian economy is to have a reasonable balance Statoil's activity must be limited. "The Conservatives cannot accept Statoil involvement in division, derivative industries, base activity and distribution. With the economic resources at Statoil's disposal in the years ahead such an expansion of activity would lead to making the rest of Norwegian business activity dependent on the decisions of Statoil. Norwegian society would not be served by such a concentration of power," said Benkow. And he added:

"To give politicians real control over oil activity in the North Sea more Norwegian firms must have a chance to work in all phases of oil. Real democratic control requires insight. It takes more than an oil industry centered around one company."

BENKOW'S INITIATIVE FOR BOURGEOIS COALITION PRAISED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Sep 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] For all those interested in seeing the bourgeois coalition efforts channeled into more constructive paths in the year remaining before the parliamentary election Conservative chairman Jo Benkow's initiative must come as a welcome contribution. The discussion we have seen in the last half year could not have been encouraging to bourgeois-minded people who felt--and still feel--that a power shift in the next election should be the mutual superordinate goal of all non-socialist parties. At times the discussion among the bourgeois parties has taken forms more suited to the divide-and-conquer mentality that is the Labor Party's most important weapon in the fight to maintain the socialist majority. Therefore it is high time that the leaders of the three biggest bourgeois parties meet to talk the situation over and make plans for the future. As Benkow, the man taking the initiative, says himself personal talks would probably be a better method than carrying on a debate in newspapers and other media with the limited opportunities provided to clear up misunderstandings that can easily arise if one has to discuss problems through an intermediary.

The chairmen of the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, Kare Kristiansen and Johan J. Jakobsen, have reacted positively to the Conservative chairman's suggestion that talks be held. As they say, such talks are nothing new. We too realize that both party leaders and others have met each other before. Even so, Benkow's initiative should be evaluated against the background of the apparently frozen situation we have been seeing for some time, a situation characterized more than anything else by a lack of communication and personal contact. Instead of getting together in private and talking openly about the problems that might make a broad bourgeois coalition government impossible an agonizing war on the basis of fixed positions has been conducted in the mass media. Surely no one would claim that

this debate has benefitted bourgeois cooperation efforts. Therefore we note with real satisfaction that the three party chairmen have now reached a point where they all recognize the need for personal discussions.

One year before the Storting election is the time to draw up the main lines for a bourgeois policy for the 1980's, Benkow said in his talk to the Conservative central committee on Saturday. Bourgeois voters, regardless of their party, would undoubtedly agree. We take it for granted that the mutual positions of the bourgeois parties will be expressed in connection with the discussion of the next long-range program, as was the case in 1977. But to give the bourgeois alternative a minimum degree of political credibility in the months ahead it is also necessary to agree on fundamental lines the Conservatives, Christian People's Party and Center Party can stand together on now, even before the budget debate this fall.

6578

CSO: 3108

KNUT AXEL SVERRE, FOREIGN MINISTRY HUMAN RIGHTS ADVISER, INTERVIEWED

Oslo NORGES SJOPART-OG HANDELSTIDENDE in Norwegian 30 May 66 p 11

[Interview with Ambassador Knut Axel Sverre by Per Bang]

[Text] Ambassador Knut Axel Scheel Sverre was born in 1927 in Strasbourg where his father was consul and later consul-general. He was educated in French schools, ended his legal training in Norway in 1952 and took the Foreign Ministry's candidate's exam in 1953. The same year he started working at the embassy in London. In between tours of duty as secretary and later department chief at home he has served in Ottawa, Helsinki, Washington, Tehran, Kabul and Islamabad--the last three as ambassador, stationed in Iran with accreditation in Afghanistan and Pakistan on the side. Starting last year he has served as the Foreign Ministry's special adviser on human rights.

He readily admits that his work resembles the labors of Sisyphus but even so he looks on the bright side. The voluntary organizations, especially Amnesty International, make a fine contribution that is very vital to the follow-up work done by the authorities. He is glad that Amnesty International received the Nobel Prize, creating greater awareness that human rights are now part of the political scene. He sees a danger in assuming a cultural arrogance based on western ways of thinking and is glad that regional human rights bodies are being set up. In this way countries close to each other culturally will be better able to evaluate conditions in the region. Such a body has been set up for the two Americas and a separate African commission is being established to work on the basis of the big UN conventions but--he hopes--with greater viability because the members are familiar with each other's procedures and ways of thinking.

Did Norway do the right thing in refusing to attend the Moscow Olympics?

"Yes and I think it was quite correct that the decision was made by the sports organizations themselves. I feel this form of reaction has true

meaning. The assault on Afghanistan was such a serious matter and the Olympic Games receive so much attention that this should have an effect on many people."

Ambassador Knut Sverre is not a man you will meet outside the embassy of a dictatorship with a demonstration poster in his clenched fist and his voice raised in songs of protest. The Foreign Ministry's special adviser on human rights expresses his moderate viewpoints in the dignified language of diplomacy. With a father who was a consul-general and a long foreign affairs career of his own from the time when he took the candidate's test at the age of 26 until today when at 53 he sits in the late Halvard Lange's little closet of an office self-control is the face he presents to the outside world, at least to an interviewer. In some situations he has to keep quiet out of politeness to bandits on the side of power--and he was not the one who used the word "bandits."

There must be times when it is hard to choke back indignation and the ambassador admitted that he feels frustrated when he receives reports of gross violations of human rights.

"Many times these things are frightful to read about, an endless tale of suffering..."

Does he sometimes want to react more spontaneously than allowed by protocol? Oh yes, he admits the fundamental justification for demonstrations, both the spontaneous variety and those that are planned and organized. At best they can push public opinion in the right direction. In response to a direct question he said he would have liked to take part in some--such as the torchlight parade for Sakharov or the Albert Schweitzer march of homage, not protest marches with their hostile slogans. But he places more emphasis on quiet work behind the desk and on international conferences. It should be added that this work would not make much progress unless the ground had been prepared by the demonstrators, among others, those with more fire in their hearts and higher levels of indignation. It is ultimately a question of temperament that determines where each individual belongs.

[Question] The position of special adviser on human rights was established last year. What does it consist of?

[Answer] The background for the position is the interest felt by the government, especially the minister of foreign affairs, in international human rights. It took a long time to prepare the big UN conventions on human rights, they were not ready until 1966 and it took another 10 years before they were ratified by enough states to put them into effect. This happened around 1976 at the same time as President Carter issued his statements. A Storting report then recommended that this kind of position be set up.

[Question] Is there anything like it in other countries?

[Answer] Not in any European country but in the United States there is a separate section in the State Department with its own undersecretary for human rights. I have colleagues in the other Scandinavian countries who are working in the same area but are connected with legal departments or political sections and do not stand free and independent as I do.

[Question] And what kind of work is involved?

[Answer] In practice it has worked out so that the special adviser coordinates what is done in the various departments in this sector, especially with regard to the United Nations and the Council of Europe. One of the biggest jobs ahead of us is to prepare Norway's position at the conference in Madrid, the one that is supposed to follow up the Helsinki conference. In addition there are several other concrete issues, relations with native populations, work on the elimination of the death penalty, the search for people who have disappeared in some countries. And we have quite concrete things such as Argentina, Ethiopia, the apartheid policy in South Africa.

[Question] Will you help to draw up the Norwegian position on concrete problems?

[Answer] The human rights factor is one of several elements in foreign policy issues along with things like economic considerations, security policy and other aspects. My job is to promote human rights viewpoints when the government draws up the entire package. It is particularly important to form a Norwegian stand on the international conferences in the more specialized UN bodies.

[Question] Does this mean that Norway will define its position more sharply to the rest of the world?

[Answer] We may hope so and we will see more consistency in the Norwegian position. In the past we could say that the position of the various departments was not coordinated satisfactorily.

[Question] Can we expect more Norwegian initiatives on the international level?

[Answer] That is quite possible. The foreign minister has said that the main concern is not to define a Norwegian view although that could be important enough in some connections. It is more important to see what is most effective and expedient--for example statements in Storting might be more appropriate than moves via diplomatic channels. We feel we have reason to believe that it is better to strengthen the

capacity of the United Nations to react than to define a Norwegian standpoint.

[Question] Is the ministry working on the basis of a list of nations that have seriously violated human rights?

[Answer] No, not really, but from working on special UN commissions we have discovered that some countries are the objects of justified criticism which at times can be made best on a confidential basis. It is debatable whether this is the most effective method but it is better for this to come up in UN bodies than to have it get locked into rigid prestige positions. Some issues we are especially concerned with are the disappearance of people in some Latin American countries and the apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa.

[Question] What can Norway do to the worst offenders?

[Answer] It is a question of the appropriateness of various reaction patterns. Unfortunately the conventions do not specify any sanctions against violators and therefore it is important to have as broad a base of public opinion pressure as possible. We can help to involve the world in these problems. And there are also more concrete possibilities. A five-man committee has been set up in Geneva which will work on violations of human rights this year. Norway can help there by providing information on concrete matters, increasing the chances that something will be accomplished.

[Question] Are there any general guidelines for Norwegian boycott actions?

[Answer] No. Boycotts are very extreme reactions that have been used only against Rhodesia on the basis of a UN resolution and now against Iran by some countries. There are no criteria in international law with regard to precisely how to react and under what conditions.

[Question] Do boycotts really work? After all Rhodesia managed under "Prime Minister" Smith.

[Answer] It is very hard to make boycotts effective but the mere fact that such an action is approved indicates a condemnation that is stronger than declaratory statements. Private boycotts of goods from a country can hardly create problems for the country against which they are directed. I view them as strong reactions that can affect public opinion and attitudes.

[Question] Are there times when ethical matters should be given more weight than economic considerations?

[Answer] One can see that the authorities find such considerations desirable but in general business interests are free to do what they want to. One tries to avoid direct injunctions but this is something that is there in the background, a recommendation to show restraint when dealing with certain countries.

[Question] Argentina, for example?

[Answer] In relations between two countries many things must be taken into consideration. Argentina is again the object of Norwegian concern and this must be assigned some importance. Therefore it is natural to show some restraint with regard to forming new trade connections.

[Question] To take another current example, should the film on the Saudi Arabian princess be shown in Norway?

[Answer] I have not seen it and what I have read and heard about it suggests that it doesn't really present a complete picture of the problem, that there were motives of sensationalism behind the production. I don't really think the desire to air the issue of the death penalty is best served by showing this film.

[Question] But when some Norwegian firms protest the showing of the film it is not for that reason but because they fear countermeasures on the part of Saudi Arabia.

[Answer] That kind of consideration should not be a deciding factor from the point of view of human rights but it could be said that some cultural forms are so far apart that one might receive an unbalanced picture from seeing this film without having any broader understanding of the problems, such as one might gain from attending a seminar presenting an objective debate on Islamic punishment forms.

[Question] A debate on cutting people's heads off in the town square?

[Answer] The problem should be brought up and we are involved in this. In the summer we will be taking part in a big conference on sentence forms in Karachi and the question of the death penalty will come up. Participation on such a level should lead to a useful exchange of views in which Norway will take an active part.

[Question] With regard to the film two viewpoints are on a collision course with each other--the obligation of the mass media to present reality and the need of certain firms to avoid irritating big customers. What are your comments on that?

[Answer] It is natural to try to present all the correct information available on conditions in countries with which we want to have closer

ties so that sweeping unpleasant facts under the rug is not the proper solution. But then there can be other factors involved for a big company or shipping firm that indicate closer ties with the country in question and that is understandable. It should be up to the individual firm to evaluate its own affairs freely--this should be up to the conscience of the individual.

[Question] How do other countries view Norway's missionary attitude toward many problems?

[Answer] I don't think this has become a burden for us but there is a certain danger of that happening. We live in an orderly society here in Norway and the opinions we have on this and that in other lands with no knowledge of their entirely different conditions can seem unproductive and inappropriate to our objectives. That is why the Foreign Ministry finds it inappropriate to keep detailing the Norwegian viewpoint at all times, preferring to strengthen the opportunities for more effective implementation of the conventions already agreed upon. It is not that long since the big UN conventions were ratified and it is only 2 years since the United Nations set up a permanent committee to oversee implementation of the conventions. Reports received there from the individual countries will provide a basis for regular examination by UN bodies. This will set off a kind of dialogue based on legal obligations and there will be a legitimate basis for getting involved with the internal affairs of other countries.

[Question] Is our attitude consistent when it comes to violations in the East and in the West?

[Answer] There is a certain amount of selectivity but the authorities try to adopt a balanced point of view. In some dramatic periods of time we may be justified in directing our attention toward certain countries more than others, but there is no general lack of consistency.

[Question] Should we include clauses on human rights in our aid to developing nations and our trade agreements?

[Answer] It is extremely difficult to include that kind of condition in an aid package to a developing nation since the intention is to assist the groups of people with the greatest need. There can be many circumstances making it difficult for the poorest nations to meet these desirable demands that they live up to the human rights conventions and we should be understanding and not make demands that cannot be met. With regard to regular trade, human rights should be the general guideline for the entire social development and it is impossible to tie this to concrete trade agreements.

[Question] Are we too timid to speak out in Norway?

[Answer] We are more apt to give our opinion too quickly on issues that are so involved that we lack an overall view of the problems. Because we have managed things very well in this country we have ideas on how other lands should do things--but we may be a little less than perfect when it comes to our own attitude toward foreign workers, for example. We must not overestimate what a small country like Norway can accomplish on an international level.



Rolf Axel Sverre

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HYSING-DAHL URGES SPEED IN PRIOR STORAGE APPROVAL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] "It is urgent that we gain approval for prior storage of heavy allied equipment in Norway. We don't have time for party tactics or delays on this issue. I will therefore regard it very seriously if Labor Party people or others try to use unclarified but purely practical and economic questions to sow doubt or create a sense of delay concerning our determination to make effective allied help possible." Defense Committee chairman Per Hysing-Dahl (Conservative) pointed this out to AFTENPOSTEN after the recent debate on the political foundation for such prior storage in Norway.

Hysing-Dahl stressed that there has not been--and shouldn't be--any disagreement on the necessity for advance storage of such equipment. "On the contrary it has been regarded as a condition for the maintenance of Norway's base policy. This appears clearly from government and Storting documents," said the Defense Committee chairman who professes not to understand prominent Labor politicians who are treating this vital matter as almost a formality--or suggest that there is no rush.

Storting representative Hysing-Dahl referred among other things to the Defense Ministry's budget request for 1980 which states: "In this area (reinforcement with NATO air and sea forces) plans have been updated and finalized in recent years. As a result of previous agreements equipment will be stored at five air fields during the fall of 1979...for the reception of American planes in an emergency situation."

A unanimous Defense Committee--half the members belong to the Labor Party--said in its budget report that a clear condition for maintaining our base policy is the creation of conditions so that Norway can get help quickly and effectively when this is regarded as necessary. And the committee mentioned that it had earlier indicated the need for advance storage of heavy allied equipment as a condition for maintaining the base policy.

It also appears clearly from the ministry's statements and evaluations on the basis of the Defense Commission's recommendation that prior storage of allied materiel is regarded as a necessity. Among other things the ministry says it will "stress accepting, protecting and supporting allied reinforcements. Plans to make allied reinforcements effective must include cooperation on the delivery of forces, the storage of equipment and coordination with Norwegian forces."

And there have been no objections to that either in the Defense Committee or during the defense debate, Hysing-Dahl emphasized.

Hysing-Dahl stated: "If we are to maintain our base policy with a great change in the balance of forces in the immediate vicinity and we continue to base our national security and defense on support from the alliance we must make such support possible. And we must bear in mind that our defense and security policy must have credibility if it is to contribute to keeping the peace and preserving our freedom of action. This credibility is necessary not just with respect to a possible enemy but also with regard to our allies and ourselves.

"It is true, as Labor Party vice chairman Gro Harlem Brundtland says, that we have not yet clarified all the technical and economic questions connected with the storage of heavy equipment for land combat forces. But if such problems are now used to sow doubt or create delays concerning our determination to make effective allied help possible, I will regard it as a very serious matter because this is urgent, especially with regard to compensating for the big change in the reinforcement situation caused by the expansion of the Warsaw Pact lands at sea and in the air."

Therefore advance storage is needed according to Hysing-Dahl, due in part to the fact that ocean transport has become extremely difficult.

The Defense Committee chairman also emphasized this: "As part of an integrated collective defense system we cannot permit ourselves to 'grade' our allies in any way. Defense cooperation is based on the entire alliance taking the overall view. Thus it is of secondary importance whether the reinforcements for Norway consist of British, Dutch or American forces at sea or in the air. We will be getting allied reinforcements, not national ones."

6578
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ERRATUM

In JPRS 72467 of 18 December 1978, No. 1341 of this series titled **CONSTITUTION OF THE SPANISH STATE, 1978**, on p 31, the last sentence of Article 112 should read:

"Confidence shall be taken as being granted when a simple majority of the deputies votes for it."

The phrase "simple majority" replaces "absolute majority" in the sentence.

CBO: 3110

LIBERAL PARTY AT CONGRESS SEEKS 'OWN PROFILE'

Congress During VAT Fight

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 18 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Axel Waldemarson]

[Text] There is no one as exultant as a happy Liberal Party member and no one as sad as a troubled one. Let us maintain a good balance in our psychological and political decisions and not vacillate between exaggerated hopes and fears.

These words were spoken by Gunnar Helen in his speech as newly elected Liberal Party leader in 1969.

Last Friday the Liberal Party congress began in Umea.

The mood is perhaps not so "exultant." The party is gathered after a defeat and the fall of its own mini-government. True, the opinion polls have stabilized but the figures are still low. Will the mood be "as sad" as a troubled Liberal can feel or will the topics that cause rejoicing and anxiety balance each other in a constructive manner?

The crisis-ridden party has made its way to Vasterbotten Province, once the stronghold of liberalism, with a very special profile, as well. Vasterbotten liberalism, made manifest in the figure of Gustaf Rosen, stood for total prohibition and nihilism in defense matters. At one time its call to arms was: Not one vote for the alcoholic Conservatives!

Strong Constituency

Even today Vasterbotten is one of the Liberal Party's strongest constituencies but with a much lower share of the electorate than previously--12.5 percent.

An indication of developments in previously typical liberal constituencies is the fact that in the catastrophic election of 1968, in Vasterbotten, Jonkoping, and Kopparberg Provinces, the Liberal Party lost 11.5, 12.4, and 10.5 percent of the electorate, respectively.

After the loss in the 1958 election, in which the general supplementary pension scheme was the major issue, the Liberal Party demonstrated a resilience few people believed it had.

Sven Weden's major defeat 10 years later was followed by more or less permanent crisis.

The change in party leadership has alleviated the crisis only temporarily. The bold, almost desperate attempt to show with the Ullsten mini-government what Liberal governmental politics are about looked promising--only to end in an election defeat.

The Liberal Party also has perhaps the most difficult to handle of all constituencies. In his studies of the 1964 and 1968 elections, Bo Sarlvik paints the following portrait of the Liberal Party voter: he "is weakest in his convictions, ... changes parties most often, ... identifies least with his party, ... is least informed on current politics, ... is least interested in the election outcome."

It follows from this that the clarity of the party's political appeal and the party leader's ability to act as a magnet for attracting votes are of particularly great significance for the Liberal Party. Part of Bertil Ohlin's greatness as a politician was his ability to keep the party together and to keep the voters in the party election after election.

A Question of Program

This time, however, the Liberal Party's crisis is more a question of programs than personalities. The antagonism is similar to that of the 1960's between the "light-blue" and the "dark-blue" in the Conservative Party of that time. The Liberal Party is divided between those who see themselves as genuine trustees of the liberal heritage and those who are accused of diluting this heritage by falling for collective solutions and social democratic temptations.

Ola Ullsten's position is in no way threatened, even though the need for new life is being expressed here and there within the party organization. However, even if Ullsten tries his best, it will be of little help if the congress fails to create unity in the fundamental questions. Programmatic clarity will make it easier to determine political positions.

What the newly awakened and obviously active liberal wing is demanding is that there be no misunderstanding concerning the deep and insurmountable ideological chasm between the Liberal Party and the Social Democrats.

Safeguarding the liberal heritage through the free market economy and seeing the enormous public sector and collective solutions as a threat to private initiative do not mean closing one's eyes to the plight of the weak in society. Rather, it is necessary to stress the liberal aspect of the liberal social message.

Nonsocialist Left

Those who dream of reviving a nonsocialist left, those who speak of the Liberal Party as a reform party and protector of the weak must not necessarily find the public sector to be problem-free.

The party should unite around solutions on this side of the ideological gap between it and social democracy. Those who believe in cooperation on the other side of that gap must be reminded of the bitterness with which Bertil Ohlin noted in his memoirs that the Social Democrats found it "necessary to paint a distorted picture of the Liberal Party, accusing it of a lack of interest in social policies, servitude to high financial interests, and unreliability in matters of neutrality."

War of Symbols

A battle of ideological labels easily becomes a war of symbols.

Just as in the divided Conservative Party, the antagonism is personified by a single individual. At that time it was Gunnar Svard and now it is Carl Tham. Child support allowance and the general supplementary pension scheme were the symbols in the Conservative Party. In the Liberal Party they are employee funds and the public sector.

Svard was sacrificed. The hope certainly exists in liberal circles that Tham will be relegated to a less prominent position. That would indicate a repudiation of the employee funds and the bulging public sector he is viewed as supporting.

A manifesto, however cogently constructed and elucidating it may be, never has the same effect as the sacrifice of a person or symbol.

It is perhaps a sign of the times that the spirit of Bertil Ohlin is hovering so conspicuously over the congress. In the initial skirmishes both the liberals and Tham have cited him as their mentor! However, Ohlin was not that ambiguous. To the very end he attacked union funds with great logic.

Internal Test

The congress is being held in the midst of the great battle over the value-added tax. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage. The gathering can count on greater publicity. There is also nothing wrong with having the spotlight directed toward the burning issues of the present. But herein lies the danger, as well: it can be all too tempting to put off the internal test that hopefully will lead to increased clarity.

Perhaps some people even find it rational to postpone clarification until the next congress, when a new party program is to be approved. However, politics is an irrational business, filled with strong feelings.

Can the congress really bear to leave Umea before the liberals have gotten the sought-after clarification?

Leadership Must Define Role

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Aug 80 p 2

(Editorial by Svante Nycander)

[Text] Yesterday, one of the representatives at the Liberal Party's congress in Umea, Olle Westberg, stated that "we must be judged by our ideology, not by that of our coalition partners." That is a very reasonable and understandable desire. The Liberal Party has other tasks, apart from providing the ruling nonsocialist block with the final necessary percent of the votes and mandates. After the independent rule by the liberals last year, the desire within the party for self-assertion is strong. It is not only a question of the current feeble demand for the party's "own profile" but also that Sweden must follow a third path, apart from that of the Conservatives and Social Democrats if the country is not to slip into a deeper and deeper political crisis.

The feeling of having a mission is strong and there is dissatisfaction with the party leadership for not succeeding in relaying this conviction outwardly. The Liberal Party was reluctant to enter the three-party government last fall but since then it has acted with self-destructive loyalty. Events have proceeded as in 1976-1978. The Liberal Party has key positions in the government but stands nonetheless in the shadow of the Center and Conservative Parties. As Ola Ullsten pointed out in his speech, the government faces "wavering confidence among the voters." The Conservative Party scores high in the opinion polls and does not seem to be affected by the government's overall drop in prestige and popularity. The center parties, especially the Liberal Party, were hit all the worse. The smallest party is receiving the greatest blame for the common failure of the three parties.

As Ullsten points out in an interview with VÄSTERBOTTENS-KURIEREN, after 1976 the non-socialist parties had the greatest voter support under the Liberal Party government. The majority that brought the first three-party government to power disappeared shortly after the election and under the present government, too, the Social Democrats and Communists have achieved a clear lead in the opinion polls. The Liberal Party's voters seem to be especially sensitive toward whom the party cooperates with. The party's own ideology seems to be of less importance in the eyes of many than its position next to the Conservatives.

Given the present composition of parliament, policies must be based on the three non-socialist parties. There are issues that in themselves could be better solved through settlements with the left but policies must form a coherent whole and be shaped for the long term. Necessary cutbacks and tax increases during the coming years cannot be accomplished by following the polls and the shifting majorities. For this reason, we must be thankful that we--unlike, for example, Denmark--have a functioning, stable majority in Parliament.

Both within and outside the Liberal Party a certain tolerant understanding is needed toward the sensitive situation in which the party and its leadership find themselves. Conservative newspapers, and sometimes some liberal ones, are on a constant vigil, lest the Liberal Party undertake something unsuitable from the three-party point of view and pounce on any statement that indicates sympathy toward the left. It is maintained that the party gives the impression of not really being reliable. Its commitment to the free market economy is said to be wavering.

It would be dangerous for the Liberal Party to give in to such pressure from the right. Every step in that direction would be seen as a confirmation that the criticism was well-founded and would trigger new demands to adapt to the Conservatives' brand of liberalism. This type of pressure could make it impossible to carry out three-party cooperation. The Liberal Party must chart its own course. Policies must emerge in a natural manner from the party's own internal debate.

The self-examination within the party after the election has dealt mostly with secondary matters. Among other things, members have taken offense at the domination of Stockholmers in the party leadership. Some have spoken of an "aristocratic intelligentsia" surrounding Ullsten. Carl Tham, who has been especially singled out, is reported in an article in VÄCKANS AFFÄRER to be "in a kind of quarantine" and is expected to leave active politics. Thus, after Peter Ahlmark and Ingemar Mundebo, one of the party's few political talents seem to be on the way out. Carl Tham is one of the people the Liberal Party can least afford to do without if it is to provide real content to the declarations of the congress concerning an independent liberal line.

Congress Speakers Voice Discontent

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Aug 80 p 6

[Article by Ake Ekdahl]

[Text] It has been a long time since anyone heard the Liberals rejoicing. We have problems and should admit our mistakes. This was stated by Liberal Party leader Ola Ullsten when he opened the party's extra national congress in Umea last Friday. He soon had his request granted when speaker after speaker aired his discontent and concern over the Liberal Party's crisis.

However, no miracle cures were revealed by the party leadership. Ullsten recommended Bertil Ohlin's example of drawing sharp boundaries to the right and left in politics. A specifically liberal free market economy is needed when free enterprise is threatened by both the Social Democrats and by business itself, he said.

The dissatisfaction has long been fermenting at the party sections throughout the country, against the party leadership in particular. The party chairman himself, however, has a strong position and received frequent and long applause during the meeting.

"The Liberal Party has lost its profile as the environmentalist party," Charlotte Branting of the women's alliance said.

Part of the Blandness

"The Liberal Party is part of the blandness that characterizes the politics of today. The Liberal Party must again dare to fight at the barricades. If the party cannot defend the Swedish aid program in the government then Ullsten and the other Liberal cabinet members should leave the government," Peter Orn of the Liberal Youth Association said.

"Our conviction must be noticed. We must express ourselves more clearly. We must not be judged according to the coalition partners we have," Olle Wastberg said.

"We are afraid that the Liberal Party's profile problem will mean a return to a harsher free market economy," Gote Pettersson of Norrbotten said.

"We should not waste time on matters of form and titles. We have lost the confidence of industry. The fund question is a misfortune for the party," Lars Norrstrom, party chairman in Gothenburg, said.

Women Better

"Ola! The women in the party are not so bad that they cannot do a better job than the men who have the power in the party today. If you open the door to equality we will have a better Liberal Party," Bonnie Bernstrom said.

"Listen more to the people in the party," Ingvar Pering told the party leadership.

The lamentation continued in this manner for most of the day from the 60 or so speakers.

The new party secretary Lars Leijonborg, one of the youngest officers in the party, directed his criticism outwardly. He said that confidence in Olf Palme as an international politician had received a serious setback because of his assessment of the Iranian crisis. And if Rohman can call himself liberal, then Khomeyni can be called a democrat, he said.

Stubbornly Ignoring

Entrepreneurs are one group the Liberal Party wants to win back.

"There is nothing wrong with being an entrepreneur." This was one of Ullsten's statements that drew applause. "But the Social Democrats threaten to kill free enterprise with their planning and industry is another threat with its blind faith in large quantities," Ullsten said. He called for better competition legislation so that the government could examine the sale of businesses. He also wanted to initiate a prohibition against price cartels.

Money to industry can be released through "some form of national funds," Ullsten said, again rejecting the union-owned funds proposed by the Social Democrats.

"It is unfortunate that so many leading businessmen simply close their eyes stubbornly to the funds instead of participating in the debate. We must seek broad solutions to the questions of how we can best create competitive, functioning, and profitable businesses, in which the employees have influence and the growth is shared by the broad masses."

"Those who seek such solutions are friends of the free market economy. Those who just say no are undermining the economic system they think they are defending," Ullsten said.

The digs at the Social Democrats and Conservatives came in rapid succession. The Center Party was mentioned only once by the chairman of the meeting Karl Erik Eriksson, whose task it was to introduce the guest of honor from the Center Party at the meeting, Borje Hornlund, but the representative from the Center was not present.

Tham Supported by Ullsten

The controversial former energy minister Carl Tham will remain in the party leadership and the party board. Party leader Ola Ullsten intervened personally in the nominating procedure before the election of the new party board last Thursday.

Just before the congress in Umea the criticism against Tham increased from various groups within the party. Party members who dislike the Stockholm dominated leadership or who are against nuclear power and others who are unusually strongly against Social Democrats have had the common goal of replacing Tham in the party leadership, where he is one of two representatives of the parliamentary group. But there he is inaccessible to the attacks of the delegates to the congress.

Those who are dissatisfied can, however, demonstrate their disapproval of Tham by voting him out as alternate member of the party board.

Tham was already in trouble at the last congress and he received such an unexpectedly low number of votes that he became only the seventh alternate. However, his critics have not been able to nominate a common rival candidate and the whole campaign has bogged down at the congress.

Instead, party chairman Ola Ullsten, together with among others former social minister Gabriel Romanus and chairman of the parliamentary group Bjorn Molin, started a campaign to save Tham. Tham is needed on the party board, they say, and indications are that this will also be the opinion of the congress during the election of Saturday.

The criticism against Tham is based, among other things, on his role during the debate over nuclear power and in the Liberal Party's policy on employee funds.

Ullsten expressed his irritation over the campaign against Tham at a press conference Friday in conjunction with the congress. "Much nonsense has been said in the post-election debate," he said. "People have argued here over which seat I should sit in and which colleagues I should have, instead of discussing questions of substance."

Ullsten sees the persistent but toothless criticism against the party leadership during the congress as constructive. It was not the storm of doomsday predictions that was heard before the meeting, he said. Ullsten stated it was currently a time of prosperity for the prophets of doom and this was especially affecting the Liberal Party.

He also said that he had renewed his contacts with Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin to achieve a joint solution for the Center and Liberal Parties to the question of employee funds but where this will lead remains unclear. The will exists in the political center to solve the problem, he said.

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